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2Abstract
This work discusses Sir John Reeves EHerman’s career and shows how he translated 
inherent skiUs which were apparent at an early age into financial acumen. This resulted in 
his becoming not only a major shipowner, but a powerful figure in pubfishing, breweries 
and property. The genesis of EHerman lies in his apprenticeship as an accountant, and a 
legacy from his maternal grandfather, which gave him ready resources. This led swiftly to a 
period during which he was budding up business as an accountant, an auditor and a 
company promoter. Over the next three or four years EHerman made useful acquaintances 
in finance, breweries, commerce and industry; which developed into a network of 
coUeagues and which formed the foundation of later successes in his eclectic spheres of 
operation.
In 1891 EHerman participated in the incorporation of the shipping company 
Frederick Leyland (1891) Ltd. Within a year he was chairman of the company, and took it 
from strength to strength whfie acquiring two other shipping lines. In 1901 EHerman sold 
aU his ordinary shares - with which went control of Leyland Line - to J.P. Morgan and his 
embryo International Merchant Marine. Part of the agreement of sale was that EHerman 
would not take any interest in the Atlantic trade for fourteen years; if he wished to continue 
in shipping he had to find other areas of opportunity.
EHerman bought back the Leyland Mediterranean steamers from IMM complete 
with managements, crews and trades. He then, in rapid succession, acquired two short-sea 
and two deep-sea companies - aU with their own ancHlary services. EHerman formed 
EHerman Lines Limited, which totaUy owned aU the shipping subsidiaries. The majority of 
ordinary shares in the new company were owned by EHerman and his immediate 
coUeagues, with the result that three directors and one secretary effectively ran the whole 
group.
Over the next decade, EHerman buHt up and modernised his fleets. In 1913 he 
acquired BucknaU Lines as a whoUy owned subsiduary and increased the nominal capital of 
EHerman Lines Ltd to £3.500,000. His last purchase, of Wilson Line of HuU in 1916 
brought total ownership of some 200 ships.
EUeman died in 1933, leaving almost £40,000,000 and a memory which lasted 
among seafarers untH the 1970s. It is beHeved that this work has contributed to the spread 
of knowledge by explaining those areas of his life hitherto considered as being most 
obscure.
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9Preface.
The raison d'etre for a sixty-seven year-old retired chief engineer from the Merchant Navy 
finding himself carrying out research in the University of Glasgow is directly attributable to 
a conversation with Professor Anthony Slaven, then Dean of Faculty, and Professor 
Michael M. Moss, then Archivist of the University, at a meeting of the Scottish Records 
Association. Believing that my salt-encrusted background might cast a blast of fresh air 
through the academic world by the banks of the Kelvin, it was suggested that I look at the 
records in the University Archives, and possibly carry out research into the career and 
works of Sir John Reeves Ellerman, Bart, eponymous founder of Ellerman Lines in all its 
different guises.
It became evident that there was very little that had been written about Ellerman in 
the form of definitive biography, and once the covers of the shipping company minute 
books were breached, a completely different story emerged from the anecdotes, lists of 
ships and rumours of dealings in breweries and collieries which comprised existing 
literature. Much of the discoveries of the years of obscurity were made among the Scottish 
Brewing Archives, including a prospectus that in the contents of one page confirmed 
Ellerman as a company promoter, as an auditor, and working with Panmure Gordon. This 
unlocked further doors and produced the chapter called ‘City Gent’.
Ill-health precluded my extending my research furth of Glasgow or Edinburgh, but 
the facilities and willing help given to me wherever (and whenever) I appeared asking 
questions, demanding help with reaching books from shelves and the patience shown to my 
problems with Information Technology went far beyond any reasonable expectations. The 
first term - in the winter- was the most uncomfortable until Dr Mike French took pity on 
me and arranged for me to share a room in 4 University Gardens where I could leave 
clothes and books and use a computer.
Professor J. Forbes Munro was my principal supervisor, and was unable to conceal 
his disquiet about having a post-graduate student who was not an academic. However, it 
was his suggestion to produce the Ellerman Chronology and the Smith genealogy, and 
within the limits of his knowledge and experience he tried to turn me into a quasi-economic 
social historian, rather than attempting to see that my only justification for research into 
Ellerman was a nautical background. To me Ellerman, the sea, ships and shipyards were 
part of my life, and I was - still am - unable to be sufficiently objective about it.
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The most important single source which provided clues to my further pattern of 
comprehensive research was the University Archives, both in Thurso Street and Dunbarton 
Road. It is not possible to name any particular person - everyone went out of their way to 
help me from lending pencil-sharpeners to photo-copying pages from publications such as 
Burdett’s Official Intelligence or Lloyd’s Register o f Shipping. As it is, I only scratched 
the surface. To complete the research into Ellerman, let alone George Smith and Sons, 
would take another twenty years in the archives alone. The University of Glasgow Library, 
apart from the text books used, also provided various snippets of information which 
rounded off other pieces of research. In addition there were all the reference works and 
volumes of journals and periodicals covering the period.
Next came the Mitchell Library - invaluable not just for the shipping sections but 
also for business with a frill set of the Directory o f Directors starting in 1886. The 
Registers o f Ships fleshed out details of the original City Line Fleet, including vessels 
owned by the Debenture Trustees. Volumes of Fairplay provided details of public 
shipping companies and copies of annual balance sheets. One departure from Glasgow was 
to the Royal Bank of Scotland Archives in Edinburgh, and the assistance given me to 
determine conclusively the reason for the incorporation of City Line Limited in 1891.
Due to problems with my health, it was simpler for me to stay in university 
accommodation during the Easter and Summer vacations rather than travel during term 
time. In this I was helped by those working in the accommodation itself and in the main 
office where everything was organised. Lastly, but far from least, were the patient and long 
suffering inhabitants of the computer centre, who recognised my appearance as a disaster 
ranging from losing my password to printing out hundreds of pages from a reference book 
because I had pressed the wrong button.
A (fifth) heart attack in 1999 halted my studies, but thanks to encouragement from 
Professor Moss and Dr Mike French, I was able to start working again in April o f2002, 
after a successful cataract operation which restored full sight to one eye. In conclusion I 
must mention Dr Duncan Ross who has taken over from Dr Mike French and has 
encouraged me to continue and submit the completed work before the end of the academic 
year.
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CHAPTER ONE - BACKGROUND 
Introduction
John Reeves Ellerman, who overnight became the owner of a large British merchant fleet, 
was the son of a grain merchant in Hull. Newspaper commentaries, biographies and 
obituaries ensure that his name is associated with shipping and also with being the richest 
man in England. Yet, despite his wealth and his seemingly effortless success in running 
profitable enterprises, there has been little attempt to research his career and relate it to 
business history by examining his tactics, strategy and possible motivation. My interest in 
Ellerman began in 1972, when I was working for a Swedish company in direct competition 
with Ellerman Lines. Those were the days when British shipping began the steady slide to 
near-oblivion which has left a merchant fleet, in 1999, of not more than 300 ocean-going 
vessels. The phrase that ‘Ellermans is symptomatic of British shipping’ was coined in 
conjunction with my Swedish colleagues, and the question raised was whether John Reeves 
Ellerman would have stopped the rot. The objective of this thesis is, therefore, to examine 
the life and career of Sir John Reeves Ellerman so as to evaluate his business leadership. 
The emphasis is on his shipowning activities, since his name is best remembered as a 
shipowner although that was not necessarily the most profitable sector of his interests. As 
chairman or director he sat on the boards of many companies, including breweries and 
financial trusts, but it is as the eponymous founder of Ellerman Lines that he is chiefly 
remembered. Despite his large holdings in brewery companies, he is never described as a 
brewer. With majority share-holdings in The Financial Times, The Times and significant 
holdings in other publishing interests, he is never considered a newspaper proprietor. His 
dealings in collieries and property were almost un-noticed (Daily Chronicle, May 1917) l. 
Shipping is highly visible, because it comprises a large number of individual units - the 
ships. Breweries and collieries usually remain more in the background so far as public 
interest is concerned. With ships, each one is immediately identifiable, and regular reports 
of movements and cargoes were to be found in the popular press as well as the specialized
i In 1917 an article appeared in the Daily Chronicle drawing attention to his various holdings and 
suggesting that, unlike other shipowners, he escaped public opprobrium because of his publishing 
interests and influence with newspaper proprietors.
McCleave, P. R ., 2003, chapter 1
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journals. Although the focus is on shipping, comparisons may be made with Ellerman’s 
other interests such as publishing and property.
A general pattern is sought from existing literature on shipping to determine 
questions and arguments relevant to Ellerman’s significance as a shipowner, and his role as 
the controller of a major British liner fleet. One question is whether his existing 
entrepreneurial ability simply transferred to shipping, or whether the industry had different 
requirements which depended upon original ideas and methods. Another is whether the 
companies he acquired would have expanded at the same rate had the original managers 
employed by Ellerman worked under any other owner. In other words, did Ellerman have 
a particular expertise in shipping which made the apparent success of his company an 
individual attainment, or was it simply the possession of particular management or 
entrepreneurial skills which were also displayed in his other areas of interest?
The hypothesis to be tested is:
Sir John Reeves Ellerman’s success as a shipowner was due to specific 
entrepreneurial qualities which he transferred to shipping and distinguished him 
from his contemporaries.
Rubinstein, (1984, p.68-69) describes Ellerman as having found shipping ‘on the same 
entrepreneurial slope as breweries’, without explaining his understanding of the phrase. 
Gourvish and Wilson (1997, p.214-216) refer to ‘[Ellerman] and others coming into the 
brewing industry and displaying equal entrepreneurial skills to the existing owners’. 
Certainly Ellerman displayed many of the characteristics attributed to the present-day 
entrepreneur, but others in shipping also possessed these qualities. Apart from amassing 
the largest fortune in the United Kingdom (The Times, Obituary, 18th July, 1933), how did 
Ellerman differ from other shipowners of his day, and was he indeed superior in his 
operation and management of shipping companies to, for example, James Mackay, initially 
Holt or Runciman, Owen Philipps or Christopher Furness? These are questions to be 
addressed in this thesis, and if it appears there was no magical ingredient to Ellerman’s 
success, it should be possible to identify specific characteristics and qualities which 
distinguished his work from that of his contemporaries.
Literature on shipping falls into distinct categories. There are ‘popular’ 
publications which deal primarily with ships and their characteristics, with anecdotal 
extracts of specific voyages, companies or characters. These usually deal with one
McCleave, P. R ., 2003, chapter 1
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company, and may include a potted history of growth or decline, and biographies of 
prominent individuals such as chairmen. Useful in general terms, they usually pay 
meticulous attention to the details of ships, and the visible differences between parts of a 
company’s fleets. There are seldom references given, and the source is generally Lloyd’s 
Register or fleet lists; their value lies as a medium for confirming numbers and tonnages of 
ships against other sources. More specific and of some historical value are company 
histories. These are usually produced to celebrate an anniversary and are often ‘in-house’ 
publications. The periods covered may vary between fifty to one hundred years, and there 
is usually a biography of the founder and sometimes of his successors. Some financial 
detail is provided, particularly where take-overs have been involved, and sometimes 
personal correspondence on shipping matters is included. Again, there are seldom 
references to other works, although there may be useful tables of ships and their operating 
costs, or freight rates for certain trades.
Semi-academic works are usually well-researched and deal with some event or 
personality engaging the attention of the public at large. In the case of shipping, these are 
usually disasters, either financial or human, or a combination of both. Then there are 
academic works concerning themselves with shipping in a wider sense of trends and 
behaviourial patterns of shipowners and their companies. They may include details of 
networks and particular characteristics of individual owners but by the very range of the 
subject matter there is little room for detailed examination of all owners and all 
management patterns. There is, however, sufficient of a consensus among most authors to 
define certain general characteristics in shipping operations, technical changes, and access 
to finance.
In the early part of the nineteenth century British shipping and British seafarers 
generally had a poor reputation. There were some good shipowners, such as the Smiths of 
Glasgow2 and the Holts of Liverpool, but generally marine casualties were high, and the 
indiscipline and incompetence of seamen the subject of Parliamentary inquiry. From 1834 
onwards, regulation was gradually introduced into the shipping industry, with the Board of 
Trade being made responsible for the monitoring of merchant ships and their crews. 
Examinations and Certificates of Competency were introduced in 1864, records of service 
introduced for all sea-farers, and rules for the safe construction, loading and operation of
Also known as City Line, they carried British crews until 1896, when they made substantial 
savings by changing to lascars, even when offset by accommodation alteration costs.
McCleave, P. R ., 2003, chapter 1
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all British ships introduced with the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894. This introduced the 
Load Line (Plimsoll Line) and other statutory safety regulations for all United Kingdom 
registered shipping. As it was introduced unilaterally, other flags were not affected, which 
was considered by most British shipowners to impose an additional burden on an already 
hard-pressed industry (Hyde and Harris, 1956). This, at least, was the shipowners’ story. 
At the same time, technological advances increased the size of ships and engines, with 
consequent increases in speeds and fuel consumptions. There was added competition from 
‘non-traditional’ maritime countries which subsidised their fleets on uneconomic routes; 
while increased capital requirements led some existing companies to either insolvency or 
incorporation and amalgamation. Reading the arguments of some shipowners in 
publications such as Fairplay makes one wonder why any of them continued.
There is no disagreement among historians about these changes; but there is 
disagreement about the effects they had on the shipping industry, its financing and 
management. It is undeniable that there was a movement away from small family firms into 
large groups controlled by one individual or a small board of directors, who may or may 
not have held a majority financial interest in the undertaking (Boyce, 1995). It may be 
argued that the reasons underlying these changes were those which brought about similar 
phenomena in other industries such as brewing, steel-making or shipbuilding. It may be 
suggested that the old shipowner was being replaced by the entrepreneur, not necessarily 
knowledgeable about, or trained in, shipping, but possessed of inherent transferable skills in 
negotiation and management. Traditionally, 64thers had represented the investors in ships, 
which had a managing owner who may have been either an individual or a partnership 
drawn from the existing 64th owners. Management fees and commissions were charged, 
and deducted from profits before paying dividends. No accounts were published, and 
depreciation was fixed by the managers - a common figure being 5 per cent per annum of 
the initial cost of the vessel - which was the maximum allowed in tax relief. Greater capital 
requirements for steamships meant that family networks were insufficient to fund 
expansion, and greater use had to be made of intermediaries and negotiators such as 
brokers, bankers and accountants. This enabled corporate sources such as investment 
trusts to be drawn in as investors. Frequently the family management firm remained a 
private partnership or company after incorporation and the introduction of public 
shareholdings. The share structure of the newly incorporated company was designed to
McCleave, P. R ., 2003, chapter 1
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leave control in the hands of a minority, usually ordinary shareholders, while the bulk of the 
capital was provided by preference shareholders whose dividends were guaranteed but 
fixed, and whose shares had diminished voting rights (Boyce, 1995), or by the issue of 
debentures. Like other industries, shipping was passing into the hands of professional 
managers, although most of these managers were still, at the end of the nineteenth century, 
shipowners themselves and part of the original owning family.
As competition between lines increased in the nineteenth century, shipowners in the 
United Kingdom introduced and developed the Conference system (Rochdale, (1970, 
p. 116-136) where particular trades were shared among shipowners, with minimum freight 
rates and sometimes a ‘loyalty’ rebate to regular shippers. This had the effect of restricting 
entry to those trades, requiring a newcomer to reduce rates below those of the Conference 
lines, or negotiate entry on Conference terms. Incomers also had the problem of acquiring 
tonnage, either by buying second-hand vessels, which may not have been suitable for the 
intended trade, or building new ships. Both these methods were capital intensive, and did 
not address the further problems of fleet management and building up a network of 
agencies. In addition, low prices for ships usually coincided with slumps in the freight 
market. An experienced owner could out-guess the market, and buy when prices were low 
in the expectation of an upturn of the cycle before too extended a period of low freights. A 
new entrant, however, was faced with an indeterminate period of certain expenditure and 
questionable returns. Not surprisingly some existing companies were unable to weather 
depressions, and so were ripe for takeover by larger undertakings. The simplest means of 
both entry and expansion came from the opportunity to buy out existing companies, 
complete with their managements and agency networks. By the end of the nineteenth 
century there was an acceleration in this process, which led to the disappearance of many 
family companies, and a growth in size of those companies which were bent on expansion 
and formed groups under one overall management and financial control.
Comparison with Contemporaries
With this study of Ellerman, the time-frame chosen is between 1886 and 1933, and the 
contemporaries with whom he will be compared are Lord Inchcape (1852-1932) and Lord 
Kylsant (1863-1937). Both these men controlled large shipping groups and operated liners 
on similar trades to Ellerman. Both can be seen as ‘Twentieth Century’ rather than
McCleave, P. R ., 2003, chapter 1
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‘Victorian’ shipowners, as their activities mostly took place after the technical and 
regulatory changes of the nineteenth century which altered the whole culture of British 
shipping.
The choice of Inchcape, of the Peninsular and Orient Steam Navigation Co. (P&O) 
Group, and Kylsant, of the Royal Mail Group, is based on two factors: first, they are near­
contemporaries of Ellerman in age and careers in shipping. Secondly, both, like Ellerman, 
expanded fleets by accumulation; that is, acquisition of existing companies complete with 
management and agency networks. However, unlike Ellerman, Inchcape and Kylsant were 
public men, involved in government committees and politics. Kylsant, as Owen Philipps, 
was first elected an MP in 1906. Inchcape, as James Mackay, was appointed to the 
Viceroy’s Legislative Council in 1891, coming into shipping late in his career (Jones, 1989, 
p.50-53.)3, although involved with the British India Steam Navigation Co (BISN) from 
1876 through MacKinnon MacKenzie (Jones, 1989, p.50-53).
James Mackay, Lord Inchcape
Coming from a family with a shipping and shipbuilding background, James Mackay was left 
an orphan at the age of seven years. Thanks to family connections and a legacy from his 
father, Mackay entered a lawyers office in Arbroath after leaving Elgin Academy. In 1874, 
after two years as a trainee shipping clerk with Gellatly, Hankey, Sewell and Company in 
London, he joined Mackinnon Mackenzie in Calcutta. In 1898 a deed of co-partnery 
officially recognised Mackay as second only to the senior partner, Duncan Mackinnon. 
Mackay demonstrated his effectiveness in shipping by personally settling a dispute with 
British India Steam Navigation Company’s masters and officers in February 1898, which, 
although costing the company about £4,000 in lost revenues, resulted in a return to work 
on the original terms of the officers involved. Returning to London, in 1901 he was sent to 
China by the government to take charge of negotiations for a commercial treaty, following 
the resolution of the Boxer troubles. The mission was successful, and Inchcape returned to 
London to become involved in more government committees, including one which was 
examining the question of insurance for British shipping in war-time.
His career as a publicly recognised shipowner began in 1911 when he succeeded 
Duncan MacKinnon as head of BISN. Then, for the first time, he was actively involved in
Inchcape was 59 years old when he became a shipowner; Kylsant was 26 and Ellerman 29 when 
they acquired their first ships.
McCleave, P. R ., 2003, chapter 1
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ordering new vessels and agreeing contracts with shipbuilders (Jones, 1989, p.62-66).
Once established as chairman and manager of BISN, Inchcape started on a programme of 
expansion, with a reverse take-over of P&O in 1914 that gave him control of a combined 
fleet of 180 ships totalling 1,400,000 grt. Although he claimed to delegate responsibility to 
his juniors, in fact Inchcape remained as managing director of the shipping companies until 
his death. During the First World War, the P&O group lost many ships both to 
government service and from enemy action. With high costs of replacement some 
companies decided to dispose of their assets - the ships - while prices were high. So began 
a series of take-overs by P&O which continued until 1920, when the oldest steamship 
company in the world, the General Steam Navigation Company, was acquired for £1.9mn 
(Jones, 1989, p. 132).
The financial management of the group was entirely in the hands of Mackay 
(Inchcape) to the extent that the true accounts of P&O were only disclosed after his death 
in 1932. Then a full examination of the books was made by Deloitte, Plender and Griffiths, 
CAs, which revealed large deficiencies amounting to over £9mn between 1922 and 1931 
(Jones, 1989, p. 121-125). Yet during this period preference dividends of 5 per cent were 
consistently paid, while deferred dividends never paid less than 10 per cent until 1931, 
when they fell to 6 per cent (Jones, 1989, p.202). The whole group was desperately 
illiquid although this true state of affairs had been concealed by Inchcape’s refusal to reveal 
any figures other than ‘net results’ to the shareholders. The public perception of his ability 
as a successful shipowner was at odds with the reality of the accountants’ report.
Inchcape was also the senior partner of Mackinnon, Mackenzie and Co, through 
which firm he had entered BISN in 1909. This relationship enabled funds to be re-directed 
from the Mackinnon/Inchcape group to P&O, with the primary objective of boosting both 
public confidence and the share price. Inchcape died on 23rd May 1932, but news of his 
death was withheld until after the Stock Market had closed in London. This was a wise 
precaution, as the following day P&O £1 deferred stock sank to eleven shillings, and the 
whole market weakened significantly (Jones, 1989, p. 186).
Inchcape was chairman of an organisation which owned ships rather than being a 
shipowner in the traditional sense of the word. The companies he controlled were 
dependent for their funding upon the willingness of the general public to deal in their 
shares, expecting the payment of satisfactory dividends. These dividends were maintained
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by not depreciating the fleet and using acquisitions or revaluing assets to create a notional 
surplus rather than admit the absence of profits. Although Inchcape’s public probity was 
never in question - he had disposed of prize ships and standard ships at little cost to the 
government - his business ethics were those derived from his background as a Scottish 
merchant adventurer. The relationship between Mackinnon Mackenzie and BISN 
concealed tax evasion on a large scale (Jones 1989, p.25-28), and Inchcape’s manipulation 
of the scheme for compensation for vessels lost in enemy action showed imagination while 
assuring generous terms for the owners (Jones, 1989, p.l 10) 4.
The vast range of other informally associated companies meant that Inchcape, and 
his companies, were well placed to gain intelligence and also to resource various avenues of 
funding. In addition to his political career in the House of Lords, he sat on numerous 
committees, not all concerned with shipping.
Owen Philipps, Lord Kylsant.
Owen Philipps was one of six sons and five daughters of the indigent Reverend Sir James 
Erasmus Philipps, vicar of Warminster. He served an apprenticeship as a shipmanager and 
broker, and on completion in 1886, joined Allen C. Gow and Co in Glasgow. After two 
years, Philipps started his own company, buying his first ship in 1889. In July 1889 the 
King Alfred Steamship Co was registered with a capital of £12,500, divided into fifty 
shares of £250 each which were taken up by family and friends. Concurrently his brother, 
John Philipps, was making a name in investment trusts, which were to provide a source of 
funding for expansion of the shipping interests. By November 1893 the company name 
was changed to King Line, with a nominal capital of £50,000 of which £20,430 was paid 
up and to which two of John Philipps’s investment trusts subscribed. Over the next ten 
years the interests of the Philipps brothers widened, among them Philipps Philipps and Co, 
a ship management company (Green and Moss, 1989, p. 12-15) and the London Maritime 
Investment Co.
The shipping interests had been strengthened by the formation of the Scottish 
Steamship Co Ltd as a wholly owned subsidiary in 1896 and Northern Transport Ltd in 
1901, in which year an attempt was made to acquire the Tyne Steam Shipping Co. This 
was given up to allow Christopher Furness to form the Tyne-Tees Steamship Company,
4 The Ballarat, lost in 1917 had cost £175,000 in 1912, and was written down to £15,000.
Inchcape refused £395,000 in compensation and was eventually awarded £420,000.
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from Tyne-Tees Shipping, Tees Union Shipping Co and Free Trade Wharf Co. Furness 
had been negotiating for the Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. (RMSPC) but, having acquired 
Tyne Steam Shipping at the expense of the Philipps brothers, now allowed them to make an 
offer for RMSPC. In 1903 Owen Philipps was appointed chairman of that company. This 
takeover of one of Britain’s leading liner companies by a relatively insignificant tramp 
shipowner (Green and Moss, 1989, p. 19) must be seen against the background of the 
perceived threat to the British Mercantile Marine offered by J. Pierpoint Morgan and his 
creation the International Mercantile Marine (IMM). RMSPC, incorporated by Royal 
Charter in 1837, needed to modernise and expand. In 1906 the issued capital was £1.5mn, 
and ordinary shareholders, which included the Philipps family investment trusts, had their 
voting rights strengthened. The RMSPC fleet comprised 32 ships aggregating 92,000 grt 
when Owen Philipps became chairman; four years later it had increased to 42 ships totalling 
165,000 grt.
A series of acquisitions and new-buildings then ensued, with an increasing demand 
for capital which by 1908 amounted to £2.5mn of which £lmn was in debentures, while 
Royal Mail was now fourth in the first league of British shipping companies (Green and 
Moss, 1989, p.25). A partnership with Lord Pirrie, of Harland and Wolff, led to the 
acquisition of the entire shipping and commercial interests of the late Sir Alfred Jones 
which was concentrated around West Africa. This gave the partners control of Elder 
Dempster and Co, three other shipping companies and a host of subsidiaries and other 
assets in West Africa, with a combined fleet of 109 ships totalling 300,000 grt. Then in 
June 1910 the Royal Mail acquired the Pacific Steam Navigation Co with 37 steamers. 
Further acquisitions over the next few years included Glen Line and Lamport and Holt. In 
all, new issues of debentures totalling £3.25mn were raised to meet these liabilities, which 
now included new-buildings. With the purchase of Union Castle in 1912 and another 44 
ships of 320,000 grt, the total tonnage of the group was now over 1.3mn grt, with a capital 
valuation of £6.9mn for Royal Mail plus £4.3mn for Elder Dempster (Green and Moss, 
1982, p.30-32). This round of acquisitions ended with the purchase of Nelson Line and its 
17 modem ships of 113,389 grt, bringing the total tonnage above 1.6mn grt, and the fleet 
and steamship company shares’ account to £8.92mn (Green and Moss, 1982, p.33).
From this time onwards, the seeds of the eventual collapse of the group had been 
planted, and high gearing became a necessity, not an option. By the end of 1922 the
McCleave, P. R ., 2003, chapter 1
20
Group had £18mn in debenture or preference stock, demanding annual interest payments in 
excess of £lmn. Sir Owen Philipps, MP, was credited with the expansion of the group, and 
his operation, with frequent references to transfers to reserves, was seen as an example of 
conservative management. In fact, as these reserves were not supported by cash or liquid 
assets, they were, for practical purposes, non-existent (Green and Moss, 1982, p.37-38).
As the controller of 1.5mn grt of shipping, with a paid-up capital and loans of £28 mn, he 
basked in the soubriquet of ‘Colossus of the seas’, confident in the ability of his 
professional managers to operate the ships while he looked after the finances, acting as his 
own guarantor (Green and Moss, 1982, p.40). One expedient was the incestuous purchase 
of shares among the constituent companies, which, in the days before consolidated 
accounts, had the dual advantages of not requiring cash payments either for the shares or 
the dividends, an entry in the accounts being sufficient (Green and Moss, 1982, p.51-53). 
As early as 1914 doubts had been raised about the financial integrity of the Royal Mail 
companies, these were based on the fact that mixing fleet values and shares in subsidiaries 
made it difficult to interpret trading results (Green and Moss, 1982; Fairplay, May 1914).
The full story of the Royal Mail Group, with details of all the financial transactions 
concerned with both the near-collapse and eventual long-drawn out rescue of most of the 
shipping interests is told in A Business o f National Importance (1982) by Green and Moss. 
In 1931 Lord Kylsant was charged with publishing false statements of the Royal Mail’s 
accounts in 1926 and 1927, and with making false claims in a prospectus issued in 1928. 
Cleared on the first charges, Kylsant was found guilty of the last, and sentenced to 
imprisonment for one year. The opinion of the City and the Establishment was that the 
one-time Owen Philipps had been unlucky, and no social sanctions were imposed on him. 
His obituaries glossed over the unpalatable facts that he had nearly wreaked havoc to the 
British shipping industry, and that un-secured creditors and shareholders lost £50 mn 
(Green and Moss, 1982, p.202), while banks and brokers profited from the sorry saga with 
its continuing fees, commissions and interest charges. His shipping empire disintegrated. 
Kylsant presided over a house of cards that eventually collapsed when the pressure of an 
international depression was placed on it. Inchcape created and led a group that, despite its 
growth in size, was continually haemorrhaging its internal resources and was kept afloat 
only by dubious accounting practices. John Reeves Ellerman’s methods were diametrically 
opposed to these - he believed in cash, not paper. High yield coupons could be dangerous
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unless guaranteed funds were available; Ellerman’s debentures were instruments designed 
to provide maximum security and earn interest.
The Ellerman Historiography
These questions - about the knowledge and skills that Ellerman brought to the shipping 
industry, and about how his reputation as a shipowner/manager should stand alongside 
those who controlled shipping groups of comparable size and complexity - are not 
addressed by the only recent scholarly assessment of his career. In a study published in the 
Dictionary o f Business Biography, Rubinstein (1984, p.257) combines what is known of 
Ellerman’s biography with an account of the development of his business interests over the 
years. This describes rather than explains Ellerman’s success as a shipping entrepreneur. 
Rubinstein’s purpose, given his prevailing interest in men of wealth and property, would 
appear to provide an explanation of how Ellerman became ‘the richest man in Britain’ and 
how he disposed of that wealth. He is at times compelled to admit that he does not have a 
good grasp of the inner workings of Ellerman’s enterprise network; referring, for example, 
to the period from 1886 to 1900 as ‘perhaps the most obscure phase of Ellerman’s career’ 
(Rubinstein, 1984, p.258). He remarks that ‘the known facts of Ellerman’s career and his 
approach to business entrepreneurship are probably insufficient to explain his extraordinary 
and singular success’ and he offers tantalizingly few insights into why it was that Ellerman 
was apparently more efficient and skillful than the likes of Kylsant and Inchcape 
(Rubinstein, 1984, p.68-69).
Other than Rubinstein’s predilection for analysing business wealth rather than 
business capabilities, the main reasons for such deficiencies in his account of John Reeves 
Ellerman are that he has been obliged to rely on secondary sources. In preparing his essay, 
Rubinstein undertook no primary archival research and for his understanding of the 
organisation of Ellerman’s shipping firms, he was forced to rely on a single work - James 
Taylor’s Ellerman’s A Wealth o f Shipping (1976). (Rubinstein is not the only author to 
rely on Taylor’s account. Duncan Haws’s Merchant Fleets 16 - Ellerman Lines (1989) is 
essentially a precis of Taylor’s book - potted history but with a comprehensive and 
illustrated list of ships in all the companies except Ellerman-Wilson Line). It transpires, 
therefore, that all we know of Ellerman as a shipwner and manager rests on the essentially
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amateur efforts of a retired manager, who made selective rather than comprehensive use of 
source material.
Taylor’s work is not a history in the sense of giving much in the way of references 
and sources. He joined Hall Line as a junior in 1927, eventually becoming managing 
director. He than moved to London when Ellerman City Liners was formed, becoming 
deputy chairman and retiring due to ill-health in 1974. Part Two of the book is devoted to 
potted histories of the constituent companies and lists of ships dating from the formation of 
the original companies. This leaves only one-third of the book concerned with the first Sir 
John Reeves Ellerman. Taylor would undoubtedly have access to the Hall Line share 
register, voyage returns and the Hall Line directors’ minute book, but there is no 
information on, for example, the financing of new-buildings. It would also appear that 
Taylor had no access or acquaintance with such sources as the Ellerman Lines Ltd 
directors’ minute book, or of the special role played by City Line and its general manager 
W. S. Workman. At first sight there would also appear to be a number of glaring factual 
inaccuracies in Taylor’s account. Much of Taylor’s work may be based on oral 
transmission of personal and business information among office staff which was never 
recorded and must be considered anecdotal. The purpose of this thesis is therefore to 
attempt to go beyond Taylor’s essentially narrative-descriptive account of the shipping 
group that became known as Ellerman’s City Lines, and to explore fully the motivations, 
methods and achievements of Ellerman as a shipowner. To this end it employs a range of 
archival and printed sources which were not exploited by Rubinstein (1984) or Taylor 
(1976).
Methods and Sources
When dealing with a period before the age of electronic records, whether oral or visual, 
sources are limited to written evidence. Although the telephone and typewriter, 
photography and recordings developed during Ellerman’s lifetime, inevitably most of the 
available records are confined to documentary sources. As Ellerman died in 1933, at the 
age of seventy-one, there are no contemporaries alive with whom to conduct interviews. 
There is, therefore, a lack of corroborative evidence about his business behaviour and the 
personality of the man himself. This means that, while his deeds may be recorded, his 
ideas, motives and relationships must be the subject of conjecture. It will therefore be
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necessary to identify certain common elements in his undertakings and evaluate them in the 
light of modem business history. Knowledge of the early years of his life until 1880 has 
been accepted without further investigation as there is sufficient consensus among his 
biographers about his date of birth, parentage, early education and professional training to 
justify its veracity. During his lifetime there were suggestions that Ellerman was of Jewish 
origin. However, according to the autobiography of his daughter, Winifred Bryher5 she 
traced relatives in Germany who, over several generations, were identified as Lutheran in 
faith and minor officials by occupation (Bryher, 1973).
There is, however, a question about his accountancy background, as there were no 
Chartered Accountants in England until after 1880 (Hewitt, 1966, p.21-23). It is from 
1886 that little hard evidence has been produced to help explain his genesis as a company 
promoter, financier, and shipowner by 1901. To fill this gap, a general view of his career 
has been formed from the existing biographies, which noted his involvement with Henry 
Osborne O’Hagan and company promotion, while Brewery directories and histories of 
brewing have been used to establish a chronological background for some of his activities 
from 1886-1901. Relying solely on archival sources, it has been possible not only to show 
his development as an independent accountant, but also to make an estimate of his income 
during this period. So far as the years 1892-1901 are concerned, there is no primary 
evidence concerning his shareholding in Leyland Line as all records were destroyed during 
the Liverpool blitz. However, enough material has been derived from other sources, such 
as stock exchange directories, newspapers and financial journals to provide an account of 
financial operations during Ellerman’s tenure as chairman. Similarly, the changes made in 
the Leyland fleet during this period, attributed to Ellerman, have been traced by entries in 
Lloyd’s Register which show modernisations and new-buildings. These sources have 
proved sufficient to shed some light on what Rubinstein (1984, p.68-69) called ‘the years 
of obscurity’ in Ellerman’s career. So far as his associates are concerned, all, apart from 
O’Hagan, seem to have hidden their talents from public scrutiny (O’Hagan, 1929).
However, studies by Hanna (1976) and Cottrell (1980) have provided useful 
information. With one exception, all these are secondary sources and it is only with the 
founding of Ellerman Lines Ltd in 1902 that primary source material begins to be available.
Winifred Ellerman was illegitimate and adopted the nom de plume Bryher for her literary 
works and other activities. She has a page of biography in The Enclopaedia Brittanica while her 
father is not mentioned.
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There are two differing views on Ellerman’s founding of London, Liverpool and 
Ocean Steam Ship Co Ltd (LLOSS), with the subsequent acquisition of five shipping 
companies within a few months. One view is that of the press and existing biographers, the 
other is that shown by the entries in the Directors’ Minute Book of LLOSS. In January 
1902 the company name was changed to Ellerman Lines Ltd, but the Minute Book was 
retained with the original title - a minor economy. With access restricted to the few 
directors and the company secretary, it shows how Ellerman linked his activities and 
developed his strategies for a world-wide shipping organisation. Unfortunately the entries 
end in 1919, when the book was full, and the subsequent volume has not been available. 
However, the years between 1902 and 1919 covered the bulk of the shipping acquisitions 
and the First World War. Subsequently the world descended into a major recession, and 
Ellerman’s fortunes must be followed in the published accounts of Ellerman Lines Limited 
(ELL) and the minute books of individual companies.
Initially the intention was to focus attention on Ellerman’s relationship with City 
Line Ltd, as that appeared to be the major component of the group. It gradually emerged 
that, although important, there were factors in the composition of the other companies just 
as significant. A comparison was made of the original companies and their profitability, 
and details from the individual minute books and from the Ellerman Lines Ltd directors’ 
minute book (UGD131/2/1/1) were correlated. This gave a good indication of the way in 
which financial control was exercised, and the limits of responsibility of the original 
managers. Similarly with the agencies and other companies with which Ellerman was 
connected, this document reveals the degree of control personally exerted by Ellerman.
Accounts were published for the public companies only, which meant that little or 
no financial information about the subsidiary companies ever appeared in the public 
domain. However, City Line has been chosen as a case study because it appeared to have a 
special relationship with Ellerman. Gradually, over many years, more and more ships in the 
group were re-named with the City prefix6. Not only is there more data available on City 
Line and the family firm of George Smith and Sons which preceded it, the subject also 
provides a good example of the changes which took place in the social and economic 
environment of shipping both during the years when Ellerman was developing and when he 
was established.
6 In 1971 the shipping side of the Ellerman operation was split off and became known as Ellerman
City Liners.
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Material from the account books of George Smith and Sons shows how a family 
firm worked. Private family letters tell how the network of Lowland Scots exploited their 
religious and political privileges in Northern Ireland to build dynasties of shipowners, 
shipbuilders, textile manufacturers and merchants. The move over the generations towards 
gentility is documented by the changes in occupation, from weaver to country gentleman. 
The influence of religion and politics is evident from the participation in politics which led, 
in some cases, to knighthoods and even baronetcies. One matter which has exercised the 
attention of biographers has been the incorporation of George Smith and Sons as City Line 
Ltd in 1892. Between the account books, bank correspondence and Registers of Ships, a 
true picture is drawn of the reasons and the effects of incorporation. The method of take­
over by Ellerman can be traced, as can the means by which the purchase was funded. Here 
both the City Line Share Register and the Ellerman Lines Share Register provided valuable 
information. After the take-over, there was an exchange of correspondence between 
William Service Workman, an ex-director of City Line Ltd who became General Manager 
of City Line Ltd, and John Reeves Ellerman which lasted from 1912 until Ellerman’s death 
in 1933. Although Ellerman kept in daily touch with his other companies, there does not 
appear to have been a similar personal correspondence with an equivalent individual in 
these firms. With all this material it is possible to form a clear idea of how City Line was 
assimilated into the Ellerman Group, although there is a gap in information about the 
activities of ex-principals in City Line between 1902 and 1912. Of equal interest and 
importance is the function of City Line as part of a network which Ellerman added to his 
existing sources of information and patronage. This network extended from Glasgow to 
Belfast, Liverpool and London through family members, by blood or marriage, who were 
involved in various branches of shipping. Although Ellerman bought into other networks 
with his various acquisitions, this was probably the most important since he was readily 
accepted by Workmans, Allans and Clarks who doubtless saw mutual benefits arising from 
their association with him.
The re-organisation of the fleets and the process by which orders were placed and 
funded is shown in the ELL Minute Book. A data-base was built up including all ships 
from 1902-1933, in the companies of Ellerman Lines Limited. From this, it has been 
possible to classify the ships and determine how Ellerman introduced a degree of 
interchangeabilty so employing the most effective ships in any trade as required. It was
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also possible to determine when Ellerman took an interest in companies he later purchased 
outright. During the First World War, reports of vessels lost by enemy action were not 
recorded in the Ellerman Lines Limited Directors’ Minute Book (ELLDMB), so other 
sources were used.
The frequent references to the Ellerman Lines Directors’ Minute Book underline 
the importance of this source as a key to other documents and a guide to Ellerman’s 
operations. It has provided a focal point against which other information was tested and 
accepted or rejected. The biggest problem has been to identify the personal contribution of 
Ellerman to the operation of the ships. He left existing managers in place, and frequently 
consulted with them - but whether or not these consultations affected his decisions is 
difficult to determine. The real question is to identify the particular skills he brought into 
shipping, and whether these were adapted to meet the specific requirements of his own 
companies. By comparison with two other shipowners, particularly in the fields of 
management and finance, it may be possible to determine what makes a successful 
enterprise. In terms of numbers, Ellerman had a fleet which could not compare with either 
the P&O Group or the Royal Mail Group. On the other hand, both groups chosen for 
comparison were technically insolvent for much of the period. The question may also be 
asked whether Inchcape and Kylsant were successful entrepreneurs or whether Ellerman 
alone can claim that distinction.
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CHAPTER 2 CITY GENT 
City Gent
Ellerman began his career as a newly qualified accountant with two years experience in 
Quilter Ball, leading accountants in the City of London. William Quilter was a significant 
figure in the establishment of a national body for accountants, and supported moves to 
impose greater regulation on limited companies. However, in 1877 he resigned from the 
Institute of Accountants in England as he disagreed with some of its new rules, and so 
never became a Chartered Accountant7 (Hewitt, 1965, p.48-49; Cottrell, (1980), Pp. 41- 
2.). The new conditions under which chartered accountants were to operate prohibited 
advertising, sharing commissions and acting as brokers, agents or company promoters.
In 1886, therefore, William Quilter started a new career as a broker, under the name 
Quilter Balfour and Co, while the accountancy practice continued as Weldon and Bond 
(Hewitt, 1965, p.248-249). It is likely that Ellerman followed his principal’s example - 
certainly, he never became a Chartered Accountant but moved into auditing and company 
promotion. Accountants were among those pressing for legislation to make the 
employment of external auditors a statutory requirement for all public limited companies. 
These were companies which offered shares to the general public, with liability limited to 
the value of their shareholding, whether or not fully paid up. From 1886 the practice was 
followed voluntarily by most companies, and from 1887 the names of auditors appear 
among the details of companies published in Burdetts Official Intelligence. Although 
several Bills aimed at revising the Companies’ Act of 1862 were introduced over the next 
decade, those not defeated in the Commons ended on the floor of the Lords, so that no 
new legislation was brought in until the 1900 Companies' Act (Cottrell, 1980, p.41-42).
Ellerman's progress can be traced, first as an auditor to companies being 
incorporated, and then as a financier, by references in directories and company 
prospectuses. The bulk of his activities were in brewing. His entry into shipping may be
In Scotland the style of CA was used from 1854, when the Society of Accountants in Edinburgh 
was granted a Royal Charter. Scots CAs could practise in England, but English CAs required to 
pass an examination in Scots Law before being able to practise in Scotland.
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seen as a further deployment of his accountancy and financial skills rather than an ‘outsider’ 
straying into unfamiliar territory. This predicated an ability which maximised employment 
of any resources available, whatever their nature. Examination of his activities, and the 
rewards they brought, may show a natural exploitation of the opportunities offered by the 
shipping industry (Boyce, 1995, p.76-77; p.86-87). Ellerman was able not only to display 
financial acumen but also an undoubted ability to judge character and inspire confidence in 
those who worked with him.
The Companies Act of 1862 was passed the year Ellerman was bom; and made 
limited liability a right and not a privilege. There were fewer safeguards for 
shareholders than those intended in the 1856 Act and more opportunities for disreputable 
promoters. Between 1862 and 1864 limited liability companies with total capitals 
averaging £120m a year were floated, but this gradually decreased to £28.8m in 1867 
(Cottrell, 1980, p.57-59). The decline followed the Overend and Gurney failure of 1866, 
directly related to over-optimistic and over-extension of new issues. Despite this, 
incorporation of private firms into companies continued, usually with the primary intention 
of limiting shareholders' liability to the nominal value of their investment. However, by the 
1880s only 5-10 per cent of larger businesses which might have benefited from outside 
investment had adopted limited liability status (Hanna, 1976, p.20). There was no question 
that limited liability was necessary - the collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank (in effect an 
extended partnership) in 1878 showed that directors had not only mis-applied £8mn of 
depositors’ funds, which was repaid, but left shareholders with unlimited liability to the 
extent of 27 times the value of their shareholdings (Kynaston, 1994, p.333). It had never 
been intended in 1862 that the 1856 Companies' Act should be so emasculated that 
England would have the most permissive company legislation in Europe (Cottrell, 1980, 
p.54). This meant that contemporary legislation on limited liability was increasingly seen 
by the public as a means of diverting capital raised from shareholders into the pockets of 
company promoters and unscrupulous vendors of businesses. Despite this dis-incentive, 
the last decade of the nineteenth century brought with it the metamorphosis of ever more 
family firms into larger, frequently public, organisations. There was no legal distinction 
between public and private limited liability companies until 1906, but companies which did 
not solicit the public for investment, and restricted the issue of shares to individuals, with 
transfer of shares subject to the approval of the directors, did not have to submit copies of
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the accounts to outsiders. Brewing and shipping were similar in that domestic competition 
increased even as markets grew and the demand for capital accelerated.
As fiscal pressures intensified, the separation of ownership from management was 
inevitable and a wider and individually smaller share ownership developed, with directors 
becoming less representative of the majority of shareholders. The advantages of the early 
Acts included reducing the risk to private investors, and offering an opportunity to 
accumulate the increasing capital required for ever-rising costs of technological change: 
bigger ships, more sophisticated industrial machinery, better distribution systems. The use 
made of this opportunity depended on the fiscal climate of the time, and the pressures of 
competition. For most of the Victorian era, the British economy was in a state of 
equilibrium, with wealth creation in the form of rising wages keeping pace with population 
growth (Fischer, 1996 p. 157-177). The individual not only earned more, but kept most of 
his income, whether an employer or employee. Income tax was levied on incomes over 
£300, and varied between 2d/£ to 8d/£ between 1860 and 1895, when it started to increase 
to meet growing government expenditure. In 1897 Death Duties were introduced, which 
prevented the whole of an estate’s assets not subject to a previous disposition passing to 
the heritors. Since many family firms had no assets other than their business stock, whether 
factories or ships, this could mean either selling up or incorporation, thereby raising enough 
to pay off Death Duties at the expense of bringing in outside investors. Relief from Death 
Duties could be granted by transferring shares to relatives at least one year before death, 
which was a risk usually acceptable only to a testator who was in extremis and unlikely to 
require much of a future income. The combination of Income Tax, Death Duties and, from 
1907, sur-tax on incomes over £5,000, inhibited the retention of personal wealth which 
would remain available for re-investment, and meant that minimising tax payments was as 
important as maximising margins.
One view was that limited liability made a profound breach with tradition by 
'legalising irresponsible wealth’ (Ensor, 1992, p.l 12). An opposite view is that the 
methods of those such as J.R. Ellerman may be seen as exemplifying one of the possible 
benefits of the Companies Act of 1862: ‘an antidote to the evil of nepotism, where wealth 
descended to heirs in [a] form... they were personally unfitted to run’ (Ensor, 1992, p.l 12). 
Both views were correct to a certain extent, and a combination of legislation and 
experience eventually brought some form of balance. Neither could completely eradicate
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Original in colour
greed and fraud, but by releasing capital in the hands o f individuals for investment, an 
entrepreneurial system developed. This recognised the potential for wealth creation by 
enabling industry and commerce to expand - the fructification of wealth (Bryher, (1973).
Until 1900 the Companies' Acts precluded firms from raising capital by issuing 
shares at a discount or by paying commissions to those willing to take them up. This gave 
rise to the company promoter, who positively encouraged family firms to raise capital from 
the public while reducing their own risks of under-subscription. Acting as a de facto  
issuing house, the promoter secured underwriting o f the share issue by farming it out on a 
commission basis. The vendor, therefore, would not lose if there was a poor response to 
the offer, now underwritten by the issuing house (Kynaston and Dynes, 1984, p.480-481). 
Some companies, however, preferred to use their own professional advisers such as 
solicitors, accountants and brokers (Armstrong, 1990, p.6) for this purpose. Merchant 
banks such as Barings and Rothschild were also involved, but were not interested in small 
amounts - the flotation o f Guinness was an example of merchant bank involvement 
(Kynaston, 1994, p.404)8.
BEER CONSUM PTION & REAL W AGES
REAL WAGES 1895 = 100 BEER CONS MN GALS
YEAR
Figure 1. Beer consumption and real wages. (Compiled from Mitchell and Deane, 1962).
Brewing was a capital-hungry industry with a wide consumer base that was 
generally expanding as real wages increased (figure 1). Ellerman and other professionals 
were invited into the brewing industry to raise money for such companies. In that context
8 Barings made £lm n from the Guinness flotation by ‘stagging’ the issue.
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it is not surprising that ‘they achieved similar entrepreneurial goals as established brewery 
families’ (Gourvish and Wilson, 1994, p.224-225). After all, they were not engaged in the 
business of brewing, but in providing capital to do so.
From 1886 breweries wanted more licensed premises, obtained either by building 
new premises, amalgamating or buying out existing companies. Competition in the 
acquisition of'tied' houses increased from 1869 when local magistrates, reluctant to 
increase the number of licensed premises (Cottrell, 1980, p. 168), resumed their authority to 
grant licences. In addition, to increase productivity meant modernising plant and the 
capitalisation of wealth locked up in small businesses by incorporating family firms into 
limited companies. The demand for capital by brewery companies increased and by 1890 
there was a separate Stock Exchange brewery list. By 1900 over 200 breweries had 
quoted assets of over £185mn (Mathias, 1969, p.385).
The family firms raising money on the Stock Exchange retained effective control of 
the company through ordinary shares, sometimes augmented by ordinary shares with 
special voting rights. Preference shares had priority over ordinary shares for dividends, but 
frequently had limited or no voting rights unless dividends were passed (Cottrell, 1980, 
p.164-167; UGD131/2/1/1, p.192). Debentures, which had to be redeemed at a fixed date 
and had high coupon rates, had a prior lien on tangible assets (in other words, they ranked 
before other creditors) and gave a guarantee of security that was an added incentive to 
invest in enterprises with growing production and increasing market potential (Cottrell, 
1980, p.68-69). The consumer base meant that breweries generally yielded a higher rate of 
return than most other businesses and, for individual investors, compared favourably with 
consols and railways. Investment trusts and insurance companies were often allowed only 
to invest in guaranteed debt, debentures rather than shares.
These sums represented borrowable monies, that is, funds available to support 
investment. The United Kingdom was rich, and led the world in commerce. If 1870 
marked the beginning in the loss of markets in manufactures to countries like the United 
States, Germany and France, the City of London remained the major supplier of investment 
capital for another fifty years. The new breed of accountants and brokers found rich 
pickings not only in Britain but also in the Dominions, the U.S.A. and Latin America both 
for private finance and for government loans.
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There was certainly enough capital in London to meet the demands of the United 
Kingdom and less advanced countries. In 1873, Walter Bagehot, in Lombard Street, 
calculated the known deposits in banks as shown (table 1):
Country Date of computation Amount available.
London (December 31st 1872) £120,000,000
Paris (February 27th, 1873) £13,000,000
New York (February 1873) £40,000,000
German Empire (January 31st, 1873) £8,000,000
Table 1. International capital.
Ellerman must have been aware of the possibilities in his chosen occupation, and so 
struck out on his own at the age of twenty-four years. When he left Quilter Ball in 1886 to 
start J.R. Ellerman & Company at 10 Moorgate Street, it is likely that he took with him the 
foundation of a network developed while working for his employers. One of his early 
contacts was an independent company promoter called Henry O'Hagan, of the City of 
London Contract Corporation. O’Hagan, in his book Leaves From My Life (1929), 
described a developing network of stockbrokers, solicitors, and accounting firms 
participating jointly in company flotations (O’Hagan, 1929). He is known to have been 
close to the stockbroker Harry Panmure Gordon who provided O’Hagan with business 
links and ‘a greatly increased underwriting connection’ (Kynaston, 1994, p.404; Cottrell, 
1980, p. 184-186; Armstrong, 1990, p. 123). This lends some support to O’Hagan’s claims 
to have introduced underwriting into the City of London. Ellerman opened a branch office 
in Birmingham in 1889, and O’Hagan claims that they were partners in controlling four 
trust companies by 1891 - although there is no corroborative evidence for this assertion. 
He also claimed to have assisted Ellerman's incorporations of breweries. Although there 
appears to be no direct link, Ellerman was associated in at least one flotation with the 
brokers Panmure Gordon Hill and Company of London. O’Hagan was possibly an essential 
early link and there is enough co-relation between O'Hagan's lists of breweries, Ellerman’s 
auditing, and a connection with at least one broker to identity him as part of the Ellerman 
network. Before entering shipping, therefore, John Reeves Ellerman had already 
established communication and information links with solicitors, brokers, banks and other
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accountants. This was expanded to embrace political and commercial links, through his 
investment companies which drew upon a wide range of talent from commerce and finance. 
Financiers, brokers and MP’s were, wittingly or unwittingly, included in a burgeoning 
intelligence network.
From 1886 this pattern of collecting colleagues through his original accountancy 
practice and establishing his own network becomes clear. Two of these early colleagues 
were to outlast Ellerman in the service of Ellerman Lines Limited. Frederick George Burt 
joined him, as an employee, in the first days at Moorgate Street and was to serve as 
Secretary or Director in many companies until his death in 1941. Miles W. Mattinson 
(1854 -1944) was a barrister and an MP - a useful extension to Ellerman's network. Like 
Ellerman, he had distinguished himself early in his career and was ‘[a] major figure in the 
investment trust world’ (Van Helton and Cassis (eds) 1990, p. 151-152). In 1884 he was a 
director of the Mercantile Debenture and Agency Corporation, and with T.W. Bischoff 
formed the Law Debenture Corporation in 1889. Mattinson was a founding director with 
Ellerman, in 1889, of London General Investment Trust and United Discount & Securities 
Co Ltd (Burdett's Official Intelligence 1890, volume IX). Edward Cordrey and Charles 
Eves joined Ellerman's network in 1886. Cordrey was a director of Johnson, Cole, Brier 
and Cordrey, manufacturers, one of the first companies Ellerman audited, and was a 
director of the two financial companies Ellerman formed in 1889. Charles Eves was 
company secretary of Johnson, Cole, Brier and Cordrey Ltd; as a Chartered Accountant he 
subsequently took over much of Ellerman's audit work. Eves sat on the boards of a 
number of breweries, sometimes as chairman. Cordrey was also a joint shareholder with 
Ellerman at the floating of London, Liverpool and Overseas Steamship Co Ltd 
(UGD131/2/2/1, folio 125). Mattinson and Burt became Ellerman's closest colleagues, 
sitting on the boards of many companies in which Ellerman had a large interest but where 
he did not choose to be visible. Mattinson was to be a director of Leyland Line and share 
in the birth of Ellerman Lines Ltd.
Between 1886 and 1890 records show Ellerman as auditor to seventeen breweries 
with a total capital of over £3mn. Arranging for incorporation at a modest fee of 2.5 per 
cent - a reasonable commission (Cottrell, 1980, p. 184-7)9, he would have made some 
£70,000 in three years. Audit fees averaged between seventy-five and one hundred guineas
‘Issuing’ commissions ranged between 2.5% and 12.5% for O'Hagan's company. Merchant 
banks charged between 1% - 5%, depending on the size of the issue).
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per annum providing an annual income of about £1,500. Having formed two financial 
firms in 1889, The Brewery and Commercial Investment Trust was set up in 1890
(Breweries Manual, Vol I, UB1, p .302)10 and Ellerman’s name no longer appears as an 
auditor in any of the company details published in Burdett’s Official Intelligence or The 
Stock Exchange Official Intelligence which succeeded it in 1899 (table 2).
COMPANY CAPITAL DIRECTORS
Hull United Brewery £185,000 B.H. van Tromp
Hull Brewery Co Ltd £300,000 H.C. Gleadon, Gordon-Rebon
Bent’s Brewery Co Ltd £250,000 Walter Glynn
Baltimore Brewery Co Ltd £140,000 (USA)
Dandicolle and Gaudin Ltd £160,000 B. H. van Tromp
Emerald & Phoenix Brewing Co 
Ltd
£200,000 H. Massey; J. Gordon-Rebon
Photographic Co Ltd £100,000 T. G. H. Glynn; Sir Oswald Brierly
Table 2 Audits by JRE 1886 - 91.
On the other hand, his financial trusts appear more frequently as Trustees for Debenture 
Holders, while Charles Eves is now shown as an auditor in his own name.
Although most of Ellerman’s work was with brewery companies, he was also 
involved with some industrial undertakings from which he drew wider contacts. The 
Debenture Securities Investment Trust was registered 21st March 1896, so adding another 
tool to his financial armoury which now comprised four Ellerman-controlled investment 
trusts. Having dropped the accountancy side of his business around 1890 to concentrate 
on financial enterprises and investments, his rise in financial circles was rapid and most of 
the companies he incorporated between 1886 and 1890 stayed in business. This was in 
contrast to the many companies floated by promoters whose object was to make profits 
from the promotions and not from the operation of the companies (Hanna, 1976, p.21). 
Over 30 per cent of firms formed between 1856 and 1883 ended in insolvency, many in the 
first five years of their existence. Ellerman did not believe in ‘un-called capital’. Shares 
might be paid for in instalments but the time allowed was never more than twelve months,
‘the object being to provide a medium for the Investment Capital in Brewery Debenture, 
preference and ordinary Shares’.
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and no dividends were paid to that shareholder until full payment had been made (Hanna, 
1976, p.21-22)n . He also increased protection for the Debenture Holders, who already 
had a prior lien on assets, by creating a Sinking Fund or Guarantee Trust, which required 
regular instalments to build up capital in order to retire the dated debentures at maturity. 
These monies took priority over the payment of preference dividends which ranked before 
ordinary dividends which in turn depended on any remaining profits.
A Sample Brewery
Edinburgh United Breweries was incorporated from the amalgamation of four brewery 
partnerships in Edinburgh and Leith. A copy of the original prospectus (EUB 2/1/1) shows 
clearly the circles in which Ellerman was now moving12. His office in London was the 
temporary address for the flotation, and associated with Ellerman as auditors was the 
Edinburgh acountancy firm of MoncreifF & Horsbrugh, while the Brokers included 
Panmure Gordon, Hill & Co of London. James Panmure Gordon was a close friend and 
associate of O'Hagan and provided him with links to underwriters. The Mortgage Trustee 
was the Commercial Union Brewery Investment Corporation Limited, one of the financial 
institutions which had developed to service the increased demand for capital by brewery 
companies.
These institutions were in fact investment trusts, and took up debentures as an 
investment for their own clients. Possibly the realisation of the potential of such 
institutions spurred Ellerman on to the formation of the Brewery and Commercial 
Investment Trust the following year. Independent auditors were not required until the 
1900 Companies’ Act but increasingly incorporations used them to add credibility to the 
flotations. In the case of Edinburgh United Breweries (Cottrell, 1980, p.41-42) the 
Auditors provided a report on the financial composition of the participating companies, and 
also included a forecast of dividends from the new ordinary shares. Unfortunately for the 
shareholders, this erred on the side of optimism in that the dividends were slower to arrive 
than had been expected.
Some of the newly-formed limited companies made extravagent forecasts of 
profits which never materialised before the company went bankrupt. There was a rather 
jaundiced view taken of those companies with illustrious boards of directors, a Member of
Unexpected calls on part-paid shares eroded the limitation of liability. 
See Appendix 1, p. 154.
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Parliament to add the palm of probity, and little called-up capital. Publications such as 
Fairplay, the shipping magazine, like Gilbert and Sullivan, (Gilbert, 1893)13 also had no 
qualms in expressing their opinions about some new companies and their directors. One 
MP who appeared on the boards of several companies at this time was Theodore Fry, who 
in due course became Sir Theodore Fry, Bart. He was a director of Frederick Leyland and 
Co Ltd. and later a subscriber to the allotment issue of LLOS shares in 1901. Fry had 
some usefulness as an MP and may have been included in Ellerman’s network. He also 
particapated on the incorporation of at least two companies with very little paid up capital. 
Owen Philipps, a shipowning contemporary of Ellerman, founded King Line Ltd. Compare 
the difference in both nominal capitals and percentages paid up in these three companies 
with the two floated by Ellerman (table 3). The percentage of called up capital does not 
exceed, in the best case, 40 per cent while the worst is just 16 per cent. If the company 
failed, the liquidator would still need to call up the unpaid capital from shareholders. 
Usually, dependent on their own investment, the only beneficiaries from such undertakings 
were the directors and promoters.
Name of Company Nominal
Capital
Paid-up
Capital
Percentage
paid-up
Sadler & Co Ltd (1883) £300,000 £50,000 16% (Fry)
National Liberal Land Club Ltd (1885) £200,000 £49,317 24% (Fry)
King Line Ltd (Owen Philipps) (1893) £ 50,000 £20,430 40% (OP)
Edinburgh United Breweries Ltd 
(1889)
£250,000 £250,000 100% (JRE)
Brewery and Commercial Investment. 
Trust Ltd (1890)
£300,000 £300,000 100% (JRE)
Table 3. Comparison of nominal capital and paid up shares.
Compiled from Burdett’s Official Intelligence, 1889-92. 
Key: OP = Owen Philipps; JRE = John Reeves Ellerman,
Unfortunately bad company promoters persisted despite legislation and the 
warnings of financial commentators. One result was that financiers and companies with 
good reputations could rely on support from those investors seeking long term benefits.
Utopia Unlimited, (1893) by Gilbert & Sullivan: 
Some seven men form an Association 
( if  possible all Peers and Baronets)
They start off with a public declaration 
To what extent they mean to pay their debts 
That's called their Capital...
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Ellerman, O’Hagan (Kynaston, 1994, p.403-405) and other advisers like them had an 
interest in the long term prospects o f a company, either to support their professional 
practices, or to provide continuing income and future growth, which appears to have been 
Ellerman’s underlying motive in his business transactions.
Not Rags to Riches
Joining Quilter-Ball began a period o f professional interaction with colleagues and 
acquaintances in Ellerman's career which culminated in 1886 when he started his own 
business as an accountant. Ellerman had been born into a comfortable professional family, 
and after leaving Grammar School at sixteen was articled to an accountant. It is likely that 
Ellerman became aware o f the possible uses o f capital when he lent money to his principal 
and exacted certain un-Victorian conditions o f employment from him (Rubinstein, 1984, 
p.250). The time spent as an articled apprentice included experience with company 
promotion in addition to auditing, accountancy and bankruptcies. His two years with 
William Quilter probably included company flotations and broking.
RETURN FROM INVESTMENT
BREWERIES
SHIPPING
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Figure 2. Return from investment. Sources: Burnett’s Official Intelligence; Fairplay; 
Mitchell and Deane (1962).
During the period shown (figure 2), John Reeves Ellerman was chairman o f both 
Leyland and Brewery and Commercial. The breweries dividends shown are for Brewery 
and Commercial deferred ordinary shares, which in eight out o f ten years triggered the 
bonus for Founders’ shares. The shipping dividends shown are for Leyland ordinary
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shares, the preference shares bearing cumulative interest at 5 per cent. Consols 
(government securities) returned a more modest income but were considered ‘safe’. 
Brewery shares returned more than consols but shipping could be even more lucrative.
Ellerman was very much a man of ideas and of action, so it is easy to understand 
why he started his own firm, and never became a chartered accountant. The latter would 
have circumscribed the environment required to develop his wide-ranging talents and 
exploit some of the contacts he had already built up.
Ellerman’s first recorded incorporation was Johnson, Cole, Brier and Cordrey, 
Manufacturers, in 1886. It is probably around this time that Ellerman met Mattinson, as in 
1889 the first two financial trusts were formed, United Discount and Securities Ltd 
(£360,000) and London General Investment Trust (£210,000). Financial companies and 
investment trust were associated with Ellerman’s early business ventures (see table 4).
Name of Company Issued Capital
London General Investment Trust Ltd (1889) £210,000
United Discount and Securities Corporation Ltd (1889) £360,000
Brewery and Commercial Investment Trust Ltd (1890) £350,000
Total Capital £920,000
Table 4. Companies with JRE as chairman. Sources: Burdett’s Intelligence; Breweries 
Manual Vol I; Directory o f Directors Volumes 1886-1891.
In the same year, T. W. Bischoff and Mattinson formed the Law Debenture 
Corporation, with a capital of £2,250,000. Ellerman incorporated nine breweries and 
Dandicolle and Gaudin, Exporters, of which B.H. van Tromp was chairman, with a total 
capitalisation of £1.6mn.In 1891 Ellerman floated Newcastle Chemical Works Co Ltd for 
the Allhusens, who were to become another integral part of the Ellerman network. W. A 
Allhusen was to become a director of Debenture Securities Investment Trust (£500,000) 
when it was formed in 189614.
From 1895 Brewery and Commercial appears among the list of directors of 
various companies with which Ellerman seemed to have no public connection. Companies
14 See Appendix 3 p. 156.
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with shareholdings in other companies could be directors and appoint a nominee to attend 
board meetings and exercise the same rights as any non-corporate director.
Ellerman, at the age of twenty-eight, had found his place in a remunerative 
occupation and was already well known in financial circles. Through Bent's Brewery Co 
Ltd15 he had some connection with Walter Glynn, a Liverpool shipping agent and small 
scale shipowner, and possibly this link with Glynn gave rise to stories that he had an 
interest in shipping before joining Leyland (Morgan, 1942, p.256)16. O'Hagan mentions 
several breweries with which Ellerman's connection is confirmed either as an auditor or 
through Brewery and Commercial Investment Trust as Debenture Trustees.
Directorships indicate his influence, and his first three directorships were in 
financial trusts. In 1892 Ellerman added directorships in two more financial firms - 
Mercantile and Debenture Agency Co Ltd and G.H. Hammond and Co Ltd while the 
following year he added his first shipping and brewery directorships, making seven 
companies in all). From his paper holdings, he was certainly a millionaire and probably 
actually worth some £2,000,000.
COMPANY DIRECTORS DEBENTURE TRUSTEES
Nixey, Coleclough & 
Baxter Ltd
Baxter; E. Nixey; J. 
Coleclough
Brewery and Commercial 
Investment Trust
Cameron (J. W.) & Co 
Ltd
JRE Brewery and Commercial 
Investment Trust.
Springfield Breweries J. Jones; A.J. Ker. Indian & General Investment 
Trust
Lion Brewery Co Ltd JRE; M. Mattinson JRE
Table 5. JRE and interests as debenture trustees 1890-1901.
It is from 1890 that Ellerman, and his companies, became involved as Trustees of 
Debenture Trusts (table 5). Trustees usually held possession of the collateral of the 
company, and had the power to realise the assets if debenture interest payments were not
One of the companies incorporated by Ellerman as an accountant and auditor in 1889.
‘It was a great moment for Ellerman when he joined the board of the Leyland Line in 1892. He 
had been dealing with shipping in a quiet way...'
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met. It was not necessary for any of the Trustees to hold debentures, although in some 
cases Debenture Trustees were also directors of the company (UGD313/1/2/1)17.
The source of Ellerman’s wealth has always been a matter of speculation, with 
suggestions by some biographers and obituary writers that he was already a millionaire by 
1892. Finance and brewing were early sources of his wealth but without examining the 
various share registers it is not possible to know exactly how much he owned.
One method of wealth accumulation Ellerman used was the re-investment of 
dividends in the company, either by buying shares from other shareholders, or increasing 
the nominal capital and taking up the additional shares. He also invested in other 
companies and reliable sources for this lie in the public records of his directorships.
How much money he made is of minor significance compared with his considerable 
success as an auditor and company promoter against the competition of so many other and 
well established firms including Price Waterhouse, his ex-employers (now Quilter and 
Weldon), and the great Harwood Banner of Liverpool (Fairplay December 1892)18. In 
less than ten years from being an employee, Ellerman was employing established firms to 
carry out audits on his own companies. Investing in shipping through Leyland Line was 
another opportunity for a competent manager and good cost accountant. One industry 
was no different from any other in the disciplines required for profitability and 
rationalisation of operations. After all, the companies he had audited and incorporated for 
paying clients included both industrial and commercial firms. Ellerman had the rare and 
valuable faculty of being able to determine what was worth his time and money, and what 
was not. When, therefore, he was invited to participate in the Leyland flotation, he was 
already in possession of enough capital to buy the whole company if necessary. With a 
purchase price openly disclosed as £770,000 and a proposed capital issue of £800,000 - 
less than the companies he already controlled - Ellerman had access to sources of finance 
sufficient to buy it for himself. This, in effect, is what he did, although not immediately.
Entering into shipping - or even becoming a shipowner - did not mean relinquishing 
his other activities. When he became chairman of Leyland Line in 1893, he was already a 
director of six other companies. When he formed his own fleet in 1901, and for the first 
time described himself as shipowner, he was a director of ten companies in five of which
City Line Debenture Deed shows that two of the three trustees were directors of City Line 
Limited and also partners in George Smith and Sons, managers of City Line Ltd.
Harwood Banner and Co were ‘at the top of their profession’ as auditors to many reputable 
shipping companies; they also participated in the incorporation of Leyland Line.
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he was chairman (figure 3). For a short period in 1901 Ellerman controlled not only the 
fleets he had purchased, but was still Chairman o f Leylands, giving a total o f almost 
500,000 grt under his control19.
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Figure 3. JRE directorships 1899-1901. Compiled from Directory o f  Directors, 1887- 
1902.
This period is the most crucial of Ellerman’s career, as it set the pattern for his 
business behaviour in the following years. Some o f those he met during the first years of 
company flotation joined the boards o f his companies, and later supported his flotation of 
Ellerman Lines Ltd. It is significant that he concentrated first on the financial sector, and 
quickly gained confidence in operating what was, in essence, a fund management and 
venture capital business. Here Mattinson must have encouraged him and guided him to 
influential personalities in the financial world and the City of London. In the 1880s 
Mattinson gained a reputation among a small well-informed circle as the doyen of 
investment trusts, and Cottrell ( 1994) refers to his having been director o f thirteen 
investment trusts in 1933.
Ellerman and Mattinson were joint holders o f many Ellerman company shares, in 
addition to their personal holdings. Their relationship probably lasted for forty-five years, 
ending only at Ellerman’s death in 1933. Ellerman also extended his investments in the
JRE’s fleet now seventh in UK. While chairman o f Leyland controls more tonnage than any other 
British company. Fairplay, 3 1 st October 1901.
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United States and it is possible that, through his American interests, such as the Peabody 
Trust, he came into contact with the Morgans during these years, building up a relationship 
before the sale of Leyland.
Ships and Shares.
In 1891, news of the projected flotation of the shipping firm Frederick Leyland & Co Ltd, 
produced scathing comment about the business credentials and ethics of Christopher 
Furness, Walter Glynn and O’Hagan, who were to be the first directors. O’Hagan was 
described as the nominal promoter acting for an un-named financier. The unscrupulous 
company promoter was never far from Fairplay’s thoughts and its correspondent 
suggested that underwriting costs would be 15 per cent - which would go straight into the 
pockets of the promoters. With a nominal capital of £800,000, underwriting costs could be 
half as much as the ships were worth. The Lookout Man20 was not constrained by 
thoughts of libel action. In the event his misgivings were unfounded - even although it was 
a company whose ships were described, in Fairplay, (9th December 1891) as ‘a lot of old 
crocks’ not worth £250,000. The capital of £800,000, in units of £10, would consist of 
£200,000 ordinary shares, £250,000 in 7 per cent cumulative preference shares, and 5 per 
cent debentures for £350,000 secured by registered mortgages on the ships. The price paid 
to the owners, effectively the estate of the late Frederick Leyland, was £770,000. Walter 
Glynn, described by Fairplay (9th December 1891) as ‘not worth £6,000 a year’, stayed as 
managing director for the whole of Ellerman's tenure.
By 1893 O'Hagan had gone and the new board included Theodore Fry, MP, and 
J.R.Ellerman. Val Prinsep, Royal Academician, and F.E.Speed, sons-in-law of Frederick 
Leyland, also joined the board and their chief recommendation would seem to be that their 
wives had inherited the Leyland legacies. By 1894 Ellerman was chairman, with Glynn, 
sole survivor of the original trio, still Managing Director (Taylor, 1976, pl2)21. M. W. 
Mattinson, who was already established as a close colleague of Ellerman also became a 
director and this newly-formed board, three of whose members were to be Ellerman’s close 
colleagues, remained unchanged until the sale to J.P. Morgan.
The regular columnist in Fairplay who retailed rumours and facts o f topical events.
Taylor refers to Ellerman as 'Chairman and Managing Director'. Other sources (including 
Fairplay, Burdett’s Official Intelligence and the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence) show that 
W. Glynn was Managing Director of Leyland Line from 1892-1904.
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In the following years the critics were confounded as Frederick Leyland and Co Ltd 
consistently paid ordinary dividends averaging 10 per cent. Under Ellerman, the fleet was 
modernised and a number of new ships were commissioned for the North Atlantic trade. In 
a joint venture with two other shipowners the Wilson-Fumess-Leyland Line (WFL) was 
registered, in November 1896, with a capital of £350,000. The purpose was to run a 
passenger-cargo service between London and New York. The Directors were all 
shipowners: C.H.Wilson, MP, J.R.Ellerman, Sir C. Furness and A. Wilson, with ships being 
supplied from their existing fleets. Ellerman’s newly formed Debenture Investment 
Securities Trust were Trustees for £200,000 of 4.5 per cent Debenture Stock. This board 
that Ellerman shared with the Wilsons was the beginning of a professional relationship 
which developed over the next two decades.
There had been speculation for some time, strengthened by a circular to Leyland 
shareholders, about the creation by Leyland (or Ellerman) of a shipping group valued at 
over £4,000.000 {Fairplay, 1st March 1900; 26th April, 1900). Atlantic Transport Co and 
even City Line of Glasgow were mentioned as possible targets for the new concern 
{Fairplay, 7th June 1900)22. These speculations were followed by rumours about a 
projected purchase of West India & Pacific Steam Ship Co Ltd (WIPS) which was 
eventually confirmed by Ellerman in a circular to shareholders on 30th May 1900. Other 
companies trading in the South Atlantic, including Harrison's of Liverpool, were concerned 
about the loss of a congenial competitor (WIPS) to a rival of unknown intentions (Hyde, 
1967, p.31.). However, there was hardly time to determine the Leyland strategy as, in the 
event, it was J.P. Morgan who put together the International Mercantile Marine (IMM), a 
multi-million dollar shipping group, and Ellerman who sold him the re-incorporated 
Leyland (Frederick) & Co (1900) Ltd. This now included the former WIPS and a majority 
shareholding in Wilson and Fumess-Leyland Line (WFL).
The values of the three companies before the merger (£1,853,500) may be 
compared with the prices paid at the merger (£3,501,500). Leyland Line original £200,000 
ordinary shares remained unchanged, but the original £250,000 7 per cent preference 
shares were augmented by £200,000 5 per cent cumulative preference shares, and the 
debenture issue was increased from £350,000 to £500,000. This new issue of shares made 
the new nominal capital of the company £1,229,500, so the sale price shows 177 per cent
22 Frederick Leyland & Co Circular to shareholders, 30th May 1900.
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capital gain. West India and Pacific Steamships did even better, with a capital gain of 315 
per cent.
One question frequently asked is how Ellerman - or Leyland - could have afforded 
these purchases of West India and Pacific SS Co Ltd and Wilson and Leyland-Fumess in 
1900. It has been suggested that buying WIPS over-extended Ellerman, and was a reason 
for the sale to IMM (Green and Moss, 1982, p.79). The purchase money for Leyland was 
£2,179,000 and for WIPS. £1,008,000, while WFL. was sold for only £10,000 above the 
capital value (see table 6).
Value of cash, shares and debentures of vendors Purchasers’
Company Cash Shares Debenture Total Sums paid
Ordinary Preference
WIPS n/a £320,000 n/a n/a £320,000 £1,008,000
Leyland £79,500 £200,000 £450,000 £500,000 £1,229,500 £2,179,500
W &F-L n/a £150,000 £150,000 £4,000 £304,000 £314,000
TOTAL £1,853,500 £3,501,500
Table 6. Frederick Leyland and Co. Ltd mergers 1900.
Key: WIPS = West India and Pacific Shipping;
WFL = Wilson and Fumess-Leyland.
The nominal capital of the new company, Frederick Leyland (1900) Ltd, was 
£2,800,000 of which £1,500,000 was issued in cumulative 5 per cent preference shares 
and £1,300,000 in ordinary shares, of £10 each. The only cash came from the sale of 
preference shares to the public, the rest of the ‘added value’ was obtained by bonus issues 
of shares to those remaining with the new Leyland Line and who had an option for shares 
and/or cash. 15,032 of the preference shares were reserved for exchange with preference 
shares of Wilsons-Fumess-Leyland Line whose shareholders had no options but to swap 
the preference shares, and sell the ordinary shares to Frederick Leyland (1900) Ltd. Since 
the directors held most of the shares, this did not affect the public.
The holders of Leyland 4.5 per cent cumulative preference shares were offered one 
new 5 per cent cumulative preference share plus 11 s 3d in cash, or £10.1 Is 3d in cash.
For other Leyland shareholders the most attractive part of the deal was the offer of seven 
new 5 per cent preference shares and 17s 6d in cash, or £14 a share in cash, for five of the 
old 7 per cent cumulative preference shares, while six new ordinary shares would be 
exchanged for one old ordinary share, which was effectively a 600 per cent bonus in 
addition to the continued high dividends paid by Leyland since Ellerman became chairman.
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There were £85,000 unissued preference shares, and the majority of Leyland 
shareholders exchanged their existing shares for the new issue at the appropriate rate. The 
majority of WIPS shareholders took £893,320 between them in cash, with only £114,680 
converting to new shares. Comparing the capital of £300,000 with the price of £1,150,000, 
this is not surprising. Ellerman and the other directors of Frederick Leyland (1900) owned 
most of the ordinary shares between them, and none was offered to the public. The Public 
subscription (restricted to preference shares) of £750,000 covered more than two-thirds of 
the cash price called for by existing share-holders - most from West India and Pacific SS.
Co Ltd (table 7). Little cash passed from Ellerman in the transaction and it is hardly 
surprising that IMM later lost out in the Leyland deal.
Cash transactions Exchanges for shares
Shareholders Paid out. For Preference Preference Ordinary
Leyland £79,000 £450,320 £1,150,000
WIPS £893,320 £64,680 £50,000
WFL £150,000
Public £750,000
Totals £972,320 £750,000 £665,000 £1,200,000
Total paid up shares. £1,415.000 £1,200,000
Balances -£222,320 Unissued shares £85,000 Nil
Table 7. Frederick Leyland and Co. Ltd cash and shares 1900. Key:
WIPS = West India and Pacific Shipping;
WFL = Wilson and Fumess-Leyland.
After eight years of consistently good dividends, Ellerman had turned one company 
(Frederick Leyland & Co Ltd) with an ageing fleet and a capital of £800,000 - including 
debentures - into another company (Frederick Leyland (1900) Co Ltd), with a capital of 
£2,800,000 and a reasonably modem fleet of 70 ships. Whence came the added value? 
Some came from WIPS which appears to have been grossly undervalued at the time of 
aquisition, while Ellerman’s additional capital for the original Leyland was in the form of 
an extra £200,000 preference shares, and £150,000 extra debentures which increased the 
gearing to something like 4:1 (ratio of preference and debentures to ordinary shares), 
although this was counterbalanced by an increase in fleet values. Ellerman had transformed
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the inherited fleet by a combination of retro-fitting some with modem engines and boilers, 
building new tonnage, and getting rid of the ‘incorrigibles’ to produce a book value for 
Leyland of £1,800,000. The net assets of the new company, including steamers building, 
now amounted to £3,000,000. Preference shares and debentures totalled £1,915,000 and 
ordinary shares £1,200,000, so the gearing was now only 1.6:1 compared with 4:1 for the 
old Frederick Leyland and Co Ltd.
The timing of the expansion is interesting, as it coincided with a growing demand, 
in the United States, to restore its own merchant fleet to what it had been in the days of 
sail. Rumours of a large combine had been rife for some time, and Ellerman had been cast 
in the role of predator. Certainly, the concern he had created from the original Leyland 
Line was now a major force on the Atlantic, in addition to having an established presence in 
the Mediterranean.
Shares
Original
shareholders:
Ordinary 5% Cumulative 
Preference
Un-called
Preference
4% Debenture
WIPS £50,000 £64,600 n/a
Leyland £1,150,000 £343,680 n/a
WFL n/a £150,320 n/a
Public n/a £750,000 n/a
Total £1,200,000 £1,415,000 £85,000 £500,000
Table 8. Frederick Leyland and Co. Ltd share distribution 1900.
Notes: 1. The majority (95.8 per cent) of the ordinary shares went to existing Leyland
ordinary share-holders - effectively JRE and fellow directors or descendants of 
Frederick Leyland.
2. The uncalled preference shares were acquired by Ellerman at the time of the 
sale to IMM.
3. In order to vary the Articles of Association, Ellerman obtained a private Act 
of Parliament.
Source for tables 6, 7, 8 and associated text: Stock Exchange Official Intelligence, Volume 
XIX, 1901, p. 1782.
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Incorporation o f the new company enabled Ellerman to restrict the ordinary shares 
to existing ordinary shareholders and offer the public 5 per cent Cumulative Preference 
shares. The distribution o f shares in Frederick Leyland (1900) Co Ltd and the structure of 
the new company illustrates Ellerman’s ability to retain both control o f a company and the 
confidence o f shareholders by stressing the guarantees provided for preference and 
debenture holders compared with the ordinary shares {Fairplay, May 10th 1901)23 which 
were more o f a speculation.
TRAMPSHIP FREIGHT INDEX 1881 = 100
□  FREIGHT
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Figure 4. Tramp freight index 1873-1933 (1881=100). Compiled from Mitchell 
and Dean, (1962), p.224-226.
To a certain extent luck was on Ellerman's side. The Spanish-American war o f 1898 and 
the South African War o f 1899-1902 led to an increased demand for transports and stores 
ships. The tramp rates reflect the absence o f liners from their established trades with a 
consequent demand for tramp tonnage(figure 4). Ellerman built up Leyland Line in a 
period o f rising freights, disposed o f it to Morgan when rates were beginning to slide, and 
acquired his new companies at a time o f falling rates. A good judge of the market.
Sale of The Century.
On the 29 April 1901 two circulars were sent to shareholders in Frederick Leyland (1900) 
and Co Ltd. - one from the chairman, John Reeves Ellerman, the other from the company 
secretary, George Goldsworthy. Both contained the same information - the proposed sale 
of Leyland to J.P. Morgan, as part o f the International Mercantile Marine Corporation he
Report of Ellerm an’s speech to shareholders at Extra-ordinary General Meeting of Frederick 
Leyland (1900) Co Ltd.
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was forming, and the proposed sale to Ellerman of the firm’s Mediterranean and Antwerp 
ships with agencies and management, all subject to approval by the shareholders.
The first annual general meeting of the new company on 3rd May 1900 heard the 
chairman announce that the half-year to December 31 st 1900 had been one of great 
prosperity, particularly from government work associated with the Boer War24. Dividends 
of 5 per cent would be paid on the preference shares, while the ordinary shareholders 
would receive 6 per cent - the maximum allowed until a Reserve Fund of £750,000 had 
been accumulated. £370,000 was transferred to the Reserve Fund, and £454 17s 5d carried 
forward to the next year. The balance sheet (Fairplay) shows that there were no liquid 
assets except £6,217 cash in hand. Dividends as shown in the profit and loss account 
include current dividends payable in addition to dividends accrued.
The next business was to discuss and approve the sale of shares to J. P. Morgan, 
and to approve the sale of the Mediterranean and Antwerp ships from Frederick Leyland 
(1900) and Co Ltd to J. R. Ellerman as an individual. Ellerman briefly explained that his 
sale of shares to Morgan was contingent on his agreement to stay out of the Atlantic trades 
for fourteen years.
Subject to this agreement Ellerman undertook not to participate in the North 
Atlantic trade for 14 years; would resign as chairman of Leyland on 31st December 
1901 and would cease all reference to Leyland in his shipping business within one 
year of purchasing the Mediterranean steamers.
{Fairplay. 10th May 1901)
As this would be a restriction on JRE’s use of capital should he remain in shipping, the sale 
was made dependent upon the transfer of the ships and trades described above. The price 
agreed was £320,000 to be paid direct to Leyland, not Morgan or IMM. Reasons given by 
Ellerman for the sale of Frederick Leyland (1900) & Co Ltd were: the future of the North 
Atlantic trade, which was almost entirely in an East-bound direction; the proposed 
introduction by the United States of subsidies to American shipping lines25 and ‘the 
influence of Messrs Morgan to [sic] the great railway systems of the United States’ 
{Fairplay Vol 36, May 9th 1901, p.734)26.
The South African War meant an increased demand for tonnage - particularly as troop- and horse- 
transports.
These subsidies were never introduced and IMM suffered for having made a false 
assumption.
Report of JRE’s speech to at the Leyland EGM.
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The Mediterranean ships, on the other hand, did not fit with the other IMM 
acquisitions, current or proposed, and so offered Ellerman an opportunity to develop his 
own markets in trading from the UK with an existing network of agents and shippers {Stock 
Exchange Official Intelligence 1902, Volume XIX, p. 1765).
John Reeves Ellerman announced {Journal o f Commerce 1st May 1901) that he 
had sold the whole of his 71,000 ordinary shares in Leyland to J.P. Morgan for cash, and 
had arranged similar terms for all other ordinary shareholders if they so wished. Since the 
price of the offer was some £14.5 for each £10 share in Leyland (1900), and at the 1900 re­
incorporation original shareholders of the 1892 company had received six new ordinary 
shares for each old share, this provided a capital gain of some 600 per cent. New 
shareholders showed a profit of 45 per cent on each £10 share bought in 1900. All 
accepted the offer, and IMM had added another British company to its portfolio. Ellerman 
then announced that he was retaining his £180,000 of preference shares in Leyland Lines 
(not affected by the Morgan offer) and his co-directors would retain their £120,000. He 
therefore offered to buy up all the remaining Preference shares {Stock Exchange 
Intelligence 1902 p. 1765) at par plus accrued interest, payment to be made before 27th 
July 1902, on one month's notice by the purchaser. Ellerman, together with Mattinson and 
Speed, eventually owned most of the 141,500 Preference shares issued. Ellerman then 
announced a commission of 2shillings/share on the IMM deal, to be paid by the 
purchasers, which he would match with an equivalent sum. The total (£24,000) to be 
disbursed [by Ellerman] at his discretion for various purposes connected with the 
arrangement with Morgan (Rubinstein, 1984, p.250). At the incorporation of Frederick 
Leyland and Company (1900) Limited, Ellerman had structured the shareholding in such a 
way that the votes of ordinary shares, of which he held the major proportion, were worth 
five times as much for each share as the votes of preference shares). Ellerman pointed out 
to the other shareholders that he had enough personal votes to carry the motion for sale to 
Morgan (Fairplay, 9th May 1901)27.
With 34 per cent of the issued capital, Ellerman retained over 50 per cent of the 
voting power in his own hands. If the other directors’ shares are added to his, the control 
of voting power was even greater. Not only did Ellerman hold a significant number of 
preference shares, he could rely on the holdings of Mattinson which would have been used 
to support his plans, if necessary.
27 Report of chairman’s address to Leyland Line shareholders.
McCleave, P.R., 2003, chapter 2
50
Approval of the sale was a foregone conclusion and the genesis of the Ellerman 
Lines Limited was assured (see table 9).
Shareholder Class of Share Voting rights
Ordinary Preference Ordinarv 1 for 1 Preference 1 for 5
Ellerman 71,000 18,000 71,000 3,600
Directors 17,668 12,000 17,668 2,400
Others 31,332 115,000 31,320 22,300
Totals 120,000 141,500 120,000 28,300
Ellerman’s percentage of votes 59.16 per cent 12.7 per cent
Table 9. Frederick Leyland and Co. Ltd shares and votes 1901.
It is time now to look at Ellerman’s financial situation to see if he had become a 
multi-millionaire by 1901. Starting with the re-incorporated Frederick Leyland (1900)
Ltd, his ordinary shares were worth £710,00 at par, while his preference shares were 
probably worth about £180,000. The sale to Morgan of Ellerman’s ordinary shares 
produced £1,029,500 in cash, which plus his preference shares amounted to almost £1.25 
million pounds. To this must be added probably another million from his financial trusts, 
and another £1,000,000 from his brewery interests. This is based on records in the public 
domain, so does not include any colliery interests he may have acquired, or investments in 
other companies of which he was not a director. By 1901 Ellerman’s investment trusts 
were acting for 25 companies with £3,000,000 total capital. His colleague Mattinson, with 
the Law Debenture Corporation, was also prominent in investment trusts, and was acting 
for seven companies with a total capital issue of £900,000. In addition, Ellerman, 
Mattinson and Eves held directorships in six UK and six US breweries between them, while 
Brewery and Commercial Investment Trust was director of another four. Ellerman’s direct 
involvement amounted to a total capital of £3,000,000, of which he probably owned at 
least a third, giving a conservative estimate of £1,000,000. In 1901, before leaving Leyland 
Line, he was probably worth some £4,000,000 in cash and paper from ten companies.
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E Tenebris
It would stretch credulity to regard Ellerman's sale of Leyland to Morgan and subsequent 
rapid acquisition of five fleets as spur of the moment decisions. The new company was 
incorporated in September, 1900, and the sale to Morgan completed in April 1901. Legally 
the shareholders had to approve, but as Ellerman pointed out, he held the majority of shares 
anyway. As the negotiations included the acquisition of the Mediterranean traders, it is 
likely that he had been considering other purchases for some months. In May 1901, the 
month in which the sale to Morgan was announced, he bought Papayanni Line's eight ships 
with their trades on his own account for £136,350 including goodwill. He intended to 
operate them with the ex-Leyland vessels, now known as Ellerman Line, from Liverpool. 
Being barred from entering the North Atlantic, his eyes turned East, and City Line was an 
obvious candidate for takeover. Death of the the major shareholder and chairman, George 
Smith, had left most of the capital of the company with two sons, one of whom had no 
interest in shipping. In addition, City Line had been mentioned, a year earlier, as a possible 
target for the £4 million group being considered by Ellerman. Hall Line was also known to 
be in financial difficulties, and to have no obvious management successor from the major 
shareholders and original founders, the Alexander family. Ellerman incorporated London, 
Liverpool and Ocean Steamships in June, and in August added City Line of Glasgow to his 
personal fleet. Hall Line of Liverpool was next, and Wescott and Lawrence followed, 
completing the first wave of fleet-building .
The speed of acquisition was commented on by the shipping press:
Vessels bought by John Reeves Ellerman in the last six months amount to 207,767 
grt, making this the seventh largest fleet in the United Kingdom. At this time Mr 
Ellerman is still Chairman of Leyland Line with 227,409 grt, so that he controls 
altogether 480,000 grt, more than any other company or firm in the United 
Kingdom. The ships are to be incorporated into London Liverpool and Ocean SS 
Ltd, later to be changed to Ellerman Lines Ltd (Fairplay, Vol. 31, 31st October 
1901).
The agreement with IMM called for Ellerman’s resignation as Chairman of Leyland 
on 31st December 1901, that board now included William Pirrie, of Harland and Wolff, 
(who had been advising IMM) while M.W. Mattinson and F.E. Speed were elected to 
represent the Preference shareholders (Stock Exchange Intelligence 1902, p. 1765).
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Ellerman’s progress within the business world can be traced by the changing 
descriptions of his rank or occupation in the Directory o f Directors from 1888 onwards.
He appears as JR. Ellerman and Company, Accountants until 1890, after which the entry 
is simply JR. Ellerman and Company. From 1892, however, we see J.R. Ellerman, 
gentleman, and from 1902 as J.R. Ellerman, Shipowner. From 1905 he is Sir John 
Ellerman, Bart, but clearly still regarded shipowning as his primary interest. No account is 
taken of the Debenture Trusts where one or other of his financial undertakings acted as 
Trustees, nor of the interests in publishing and mining which he is reputed to have built up 
over the years between 1890 and 1913. The companies’ issued capital is used as the 
criterion for comparison, and it is reasonable to assume that, as chairman, he had a 
controlling interest in those companies. He also retained a majority of preference shares in 
Leyland Line with two nominees appointed as directors to safeguard his interests28. Even 
so, were he to have owned only thirty per cent of the shares in the companies represented 
in this chapter it was still a sizeable fortune.
At his death in 1933 (the trough of the depression) his estate was valued at almost 
£40 million - so his public investments represented slightly more than 25 per cent of his 
total wealth. There was growth of his financial, brewing and shipping interests from 1888- 
1914. This chapter shows the extent of his shipping interests, and, with the exception of 
SSA, only those companies of which he was publicly recognised as a director. Bucknalls is 
omitted, since he was not a director and between 1906 and 1913 he controlled the 
company as Manager, with his nominees as directors. Ellerman resigned from the board of 
Wilson Furness Leyland Line, in accordance with his agreement with J.P. Morgan, and 
Mattinson replaced him.
After the formation of Ellerman Lines Ltd there is much more detail about the 
scope and breadth of Ellerman’s activities. As the minute book of London, Liverpool and 
Ocean Steamship Co Ltd shows, he effectively exercised his investment and underwriting 
skills for the mutual benefit of the Company, its shareholders and himself. His shipping 
companies benefited from the strict control over assets shown in his commercial 
undertakings and also from his access to capital.
It was not expressed so blatantly - M. W. Mattinson and F.C. Speed were fellow directors of 
Ellerman Lines Ltd and were appointed to the board of Leyland Line ‘representing the 
shareholders of preference shares’. Stock Exchange Intelligence 1902, p. 1705.
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In all the shipping companies Ellerman acquired, the inherited debenture debt was 
reduced and eventually retired. Not surprisingly he preferred to receive interest rather than 
pay it and so no debentures were issued by Ellerman Lines Ltd. Even before LLOS was 
incorporated, Ellerman had lost no time in arranging banking facilities for discounting bills 
and providing overdrafts for the new company. He also embarked on an investment 
programme, buying UK and foreign quoted shares and Government bonds. There was 
underwriting of new issues, and loans made to various companies, the latter well secured 
by deposited shares or legally binding guarantees from a third party. There is little mention 
of shipping apart from the trading in Leyland Line Preference shares, which Ellerman was 
buying from the original shareholders and selling on to the Company.
All the ex-Leyland ships were registered in his name (Lloyd’s Registers, 1902 and 
1903). and continued to wear Leyland colours. Under the agreement with Morgan, 
Ellerman had to discontinue any reference to the Leyland Line after one year, and soon 
operated the ships under the name of Ellerman Line. In his speech to the Leyland 
shareholders Ellerman had stressed that the North Atlantic embargo referred to him 
personally, and anyone else from the Leyland company was free to trade on his own behalf 
in the North Atlantic. On the 5th June, 1901, Ellerman formed the LLOS with a nominal 
capital of £1,400,000; he was chairman, Mattinson, and Prinsep joined him as directors, 
and F.G. Burt became secretary. By the time the company changed its name to Ellerman 
Lines Ltd, in January 1902, Ellerman had created a powerful shipping group and was 
rapidly being recognised as an important figure in shipping.
With his wide personal circle of informants among political, financial, commercial 
and industrial circles his fellow directors would supplement his intelligence with their own 
contributions. He was also as much at home on the Continent of Europe, France in 
particular, as in Britain. Unlike many of his fellow ship-owners, Ellerman evinced no overt 
interest in politics, but maintained contacts with MPs through his directorships. Certainly, 
he made no secret of his opposition to regulation of any sort, and probably supported the 
Parliamentary Shipping Group, a lobby of MPs and shipowners. His view of current affairs 
and future movements in trade and business drew on wider sources than his peers.
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Ellerman's continuing involvement with Leyland Line and IMM shows how 
commercial advantage may be blended with network expansion. Having decided that the 
North Atlantic was not the market of the future, he nevertheless remained the major 
Leyland preference shareholder. He had his own nominees on the board of the company 
and in 1909 Debenture Securities and Investment Trust became the Trustees for the 
debenture holders.
At the reorganisation of Leyland Line in 1908, when large sums were written off, 
the security of the debenture and preference shareholders was strengthened by floating 
charges in their favour. He also had some connection with IMM and its subsiduaries 
through his Shaw Savill and Albion holdings - SSA had four ships of its own, and thirteen 
owned jointly with Oceanic Steam Navigation Company (Green and Moss, 1982, p.79; 
p. 134; p. 144). Ellerman's continuing involvement with Leyland Line and International 
Mercantile Marine formed part of his overall strategy for maintaining relationships with 
peripheral adjuncts to his networks. Because of the financial constraints he could exercise 
as an outsider, he was assured of co-operation from the insiders.
As detailed above, it is difficult to believe that all this just happened, despite what 
contemporary journalists may have said. There was a smoothness about the whole 
operation which suggests a great deal of homework to select companies which would meld 
into one unit - which is what Ellerman succeeded in doing. Earlier in this chapter reference 
was made to Ellerman’s ability to select and keep loyal and competent employees. Most of 
those joining him from the various companies taken over stayed with him until death or 
retirement, with very few exceptions. His other interests were not ignored, and although 
they were not brought into Ellerman Lines Ltd, there was a mutual self-interest which 
proved useful. In 1901, therefore, Ellerman had directorships in companies worth, in 
aggregate, over £6mn, (this excludes other interests such as collieries which are not 
publicly recorded). The next decade was to prove the most active of his career, and his 
fiftieth anniversary saw the culmination of his genesis as a shipowner - after that milestone 
of maturity he was faced with unforeseen problems engendered first by war, and then by 
peace.
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CHAPTER 3 - FINANCES AND FLEETS 
Strategy and Tactics
The directors' minute book of London, Liverpool and Ocean Steamships, gives a clear 
indication o f the direction of the new company from its early days, and shows how 
Ellerman successfully combined his private interests with those o f the shareholders for 
mutual benefit. The first meetings were taken up with the statutory procedures inherent in 
the formation of a company, but at the fourth meeting, on 4th July 1901, after share 
allocations had been agreed, the chairman announced various financial transactions on 
behalf o f the company. Bank accounts were to be opened with the Bank o f Liverpool, Ltd, 
London City and Midland Bank Ltd and Lloyd’s Bank Ltd (UGD131/2/1/1 p.3). The 
board resolved to borrow from Lloyd’s Bank and London City and Midland Bank ‘sums 
not exceeding £25,000 each, temporarily’ (UGD131/2/1/1 p.6). Ellerman also announced 
arrangements for an overdraft up to £80,000 with the North and South Wales Bank Ltd 
(UGD131/2/1/1 p.25).
ELLERMAN BANK ACCOUNTS 1902-13
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-40000
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Figure 5. Ellerman bank accounts 1902-13.
Key: NSW = North and South Wales Bank; LMCLV = London Midland and 
Counties Bank (Liverpool); LCM = London City and Midland Bank.
Compiled from UGD131/2/1/1.
Notes. The London City and Midland Bank and the North and South Wales Bank
provided funds for shipowners, with rates varying according to the reputation o f the
company (Boyce, 1995, p.240-241; 328-329). In 1908 the Banks merged but Ellerman
retained separate accounts with the new branches and maintained his overdraft with the
London Midland and Counties Bank (Liverpool) successor to the North and South Wales
Bank (Pressnell and Orbell, 1985, p.81).
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These financial transactions included underwriting new issues o f shares and 
debentures: £30,000 with the United Discount and Security Company29 and £20,000 to 
City o f London Contract Corporation and the London and Chicago Contract Corporation 
The loan was secured by Debenture stock o f the Associated Portland Cement 
Manufacturers (1900) Ltd (UGD131/2/11, p.5-6)30. On 15th July 1901 the securities 
purchased by the Company totalled £80,800. In addition to Consols and foreign railway 
stock, they included shares in Debenture Securities Investment Trust, New Investment 
Company Ltd, and breweries in which Ellerman had an interest. On 21st September 1901 
another tranche o f investments brought the total to £468,477.
ELLERMAN INVESTMENTS 1901
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Figure 6. ELL investments 1901.
The next meeting, on 8th July 1901 (UGD131/2/1/1 p.8), dealt briefly with the 
proposed agreement between Ellerman and the Company, confirming:
1. Ellerman's position as chairman and remuneration.
2. Guarantee o f Preference shares’ dividends by J.R. Ellerman.
3. Business o f the Company ‘to be conducted so as not to create a breach of
John Reeves Ellerman's Agreement with Messrs Morgan’31.
This was a vehicle o f Earl St Davids, a brother of Owen Phillipps (Lord Kylsant).
.O’Hagen was a director of both companies to which loans were being made, and also involved in 
an attempt to amalgamate firms in the cement industry.
Ellerman undertook not to participate in the North Atlantic trades for fourteen years; would resign 
as chairman of Leyland Lines (1900) Ltd on 31st December 1901, and would cease all reference to 
Leyland in his shipping business within one year of purchasing the Mediterranean steamers.
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Three directors and one secretary controlled this company. Frequently only two 
directors were present, and on occasions when two were absent the Company secretary,
F. G. Burt32 was appointed temporary director so that he and the remaining director could 
comprise a quorum and take decisions on Company business.
The ex-Leyland ships and the Papayanni business were bought before the ink was dry 
on the agreement with Morgan, and the cost was minimal. Together, in cash for Papayanni 
and International Mercantile Marine shares for the other, Ellerman paid £300,000 for 28 
ships with associated agencies and managers. City Line of Glasgow is reputed to have cost 
£1,000,000, and included Ship Managers George Smith and Sons, Glasgow, and the 
associated firm of Montgomerie and Workman, Agents and Brokers, London. The price of 
Hall Line was the redemption of debentures and about £400,000 for shares which included 
Robert Alexander’s management business.
All these deals were made by Ellerman on his own account before London, Liverpool 
and Ocean Steamships was incorporated on 28th June 1901 (UGD131/2/1/1, p.2). The 
Minute Book shows how these companies were passed on to the new Company, and how 
Ellerman minimised cash payments. Ellerman Line (ex-Leyland ships) and Papayanni were 
not limited companies, had no boards of directors and were simply shipowning and 
management firms. All City Line shares were transferred to Ellerman in August 1901; with 
the exception of the nominee directors, the only shareholders were Ellerman, Mattinson 
and Ellerman Lines Ltd(UGD131/1/3/4). Hall Line was a limited company and the 
majority of shares belonged to Ellerman until August 1902 when they were transferred to 
Ellerman Lines Ltd (UGD131/6/1/2)33.
The first mention of shipping in the directors’ minute book (UGD131/2/1/1) was on 
3rd September 1901, when a ‘proposal for purchase from Mr John Reeves Ellerman of the 
Mediterranean steamers and business34, Papayanni steamers and business, and his interest 
in City Line was fully discussed’(UGD131/2/l/l p. 12). The Chairman disclosed that he 
had purchased the second-hand steamers Maplemore and Pinemore for £71,000 each.
Both ships had been delivered and £72,000 paid on account, with his personal bills on 
behalf of the company for the balance. The Chairman pointed out that, as he had entered 
into the contract before incorporation of the Company, it could be rejected. The proposal,
F.G.Burt had joined Ellerman when he opened his own company in 1886..
Nominee directors held qualifying shares. Solicitors Hill Norton also held some shares. 
Later Ellerman Line - not to be confused with Ellerman Lines Limited, the parent company.
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however, was approved , and ‘it was agreed to indemnify Mr Ellerman in respect of the 
said bUls’ (UGD131/2/1/1 p.12-13).
The Chairman next reported that he had made an agreement with Messrs F. Leyland 
and Co Ltd to run Maplemore and Pinemore in Leyland Line; Maplemore was currently on 
charter to HMG with horses for the South African campaign. He then added that he had 
bought aU the shares in City Line Ltd together with the ships and the business of George 
Smith and Sons. This purchase was:
originally made entirely on his own account but in the course of the negotiations he 
arranged with Mr Mattinson who was the only director of the Company available that 
as to one half of the shares in the City Line the purchase should be on behalf of this 
Company on the terms set out in an agreement signed by Mr Ellerman'. After 
consideration (Mr Ellerman not voting as being an interested party and possibly 
receiving a profit) the proposal was agreed.
The new City Line directors were Messrs Mattinson, Prinsep, Mollet and Burt 
(UGD131/1/1/2 10th August 190)35. In connection with the purchase of City Line 
Ellerman had ordered a new steamer for which certain securities of his own and the 
Company had been deposited with an unnamed Bank. Three foolscap pages in the 
Directors' Minute Book and Ellerman had disposed of City Line, bought and chartered out 
two other ships, and had proposed that all his shipping interests be taken over by the 
Company. On the sixth September 1901 further investments totalling £468,477 were 
announced, with a report on underwriting business and loans to various companies, 
including £40,000 to the brewers J.H. Cameron and Co Ltd.
The companies acquired were based on the West coast - Glasgow and Liverpool. In 
order to extend his operations to the other side of the United Kingdom Ellerman purchased 
the nine steamers of Westcott and Laurence. These cost £67,000 and the agency of 
Westcott and Flint (Antwerp) was added for a further £17,000. The insurance risk of these 
steamers would be borne by Ellerman. who would run them as single ship limited 
companies, each with a capital of £2,000 in £1 shares. He then proposed that a new 
company called Westcott and Lawrence Limited be formed to acquire the businesses of 
Westcott and Lawrence and Westcott and Flint (Antwerp). The capital would be £10,000 
in £1 shares and completion date was arranged for the 22nd January 1902.
Meeting held at 10, Moorgate Street, London.
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After the excitement of acquisition, financial reporting drifted into a pattern of bank 
statements, dividends and investments. Unfortunately final figures only are given, and the 
minute books of City Line and Hall Line give very little detail. In August 1902 Ellerman 
offered to the Company ‘such sums as may be required not exceeding £250,000 at any one 
time at 5 per cent interest for two years from this date’. Also, £259,000 was to be 
transferred from the Ellerman Lines Ltd’s Purchase Account to the debit of City Line in 
respect of the half share of the Line included in the sale to Mr Ellerman. It appears that the 
purchase price for City Line would be paid from the earnings of the shipping company. In 
the City Line Balance Sheet for 1908 an entry shows ‘interest of £789:18s:4d paid on Sir 
John Ellerman's Loan’. W.S.Workman refers to repayments made to Ellerman, and the 
amount outstanding (UGD131/1/13/3; 15 May 1915) 36.
There were also advances to Ellerman for purchase of Leyland Line preference shares 
of 5,460 from Mrs Speed and 6,796 from Mrs Prinsep. All shares were to be held in 
Ellerman's name in trust. Ellerman had also sold to the Company 3,000 Leyland preference 
shares with accrued interest for £30,235, and £70,000 had been deposited with him at bank 
rate in connection with the sale of City Line. Finally, details of a loan arranged with the 
London City and Midland Bank of £90,000 at Bank Rate + 0.25 per cent on six months 
notice, and then the proposed agreement for taking over Ellerman's shipping interests was 
considered. The chairman did not vote, as he was an interested party, and the draft was 
sent to the Company's solicitors for preparation of the formal agreement.
On 19th September 1901, after a report on transactions in securities, the Chairman 
announced that he had bought Hall Line and its management business Robert Alexander. 
Five days later London, Liverpool and Ocean Steamships shares were transferred to the 
Workmans37 and William Service Workman was appointed General Manager of City Line 
Ltd. In addition to shares for W.S. Workman and his wife, shares were also transferred to 
Robert and George Smith, Montgomerie and Workman, and Workman Clark - all ex­
shareholders in City Line - so the London Liverpool and Ocean Steamship shares may be
Letter dated 15th May 1913 from W.S. Workman, Manager of City Line, to Sir John Ellerman: 
‘ ... £15,500 redeemed 1st May 1913. £62,000 outstanding to be paid off by May 1916’.
The Workman family were among the original shareholders in City Line Ltd.
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Original in colour
seen as a ‘share swap’ which is an example of Ellerman’s reluctance to use cash when 
paying for anything. (UGD131/2/1/1 p.21).
E L L E R M A N  S H A R E S  FOR CI TY  LI NE
□  W O R K M A N S  ■  S M IT H S  D E X - C I T Y  D W . C .  LT D
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Figure 7. Ellerman Lines Lid shares for City Line shareholders.
Key: Workmans = W.S. Workman, R.A.Workman and E. Montgomerie;
Smiths = George Smith IV, Robert Smith;
W.C.Ltd = Workman Clark and Co. Ltd.
Ellerman purchased Hall Line himself, and committed the Company to a half-share, 
with the proviso that ‘should the agreement for the Company to take over all his shipping 
interests go through, they would include Hall Line’. He then detailed arrangements made 
with the North and South Wales Bank for a bill o f £100,000 and an overdraft o f £80,000. 
As security for the bill and the overdraft, 10,000 preference and 9,000 ordinary Hall Line 
shares o f £10 in the joint names o f Dickson and Hill, solicitors, were to be deposited with 
the Bank, one-half o f the shares to be transferred back to the Company on payment of the 
bill. Ellerman had also given personal guarantees for £125,000 advanced from Lloyds 
Bank on security o f the Bevan Mortgage o f £20,000 on Messrs Bevans’ cement works at 
Northfleet (UGD131/2/1/1/1 p. 20).
The purchase o f Ellerman’s shipping interests was then agreed. The point was raised 
that the Chairman would make a profit from these sales; after consultation ‘certain of the 
largest shareholders’ (excluding Ellerman) agreed to the profit on the grounds that the deal 
was beneficial to the Company. In December 1901 Ellerman’s offer to the Company o f the 
steamer Assiout, a recent personal purchase, was accepted. Ellerman then detailed the
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state of payments for City Line: another £50,000 paid and £78,000 to be paid on 13th 
December 1901.
On 22nd December 1901 and 8th January 1902, two Extra-ordinary General 
Meetings were held which marked the end of the first stage in Ellerman's progress towards 
becoming one of the largest shipowners in Britain, and ‘the wealthiest man in England’. At 
the December meeting the issued capital of the Company was raised to the nominal 
£1,470,000 by the creation of 16,990 ordinary shares of £10 each and 100 management 
shares of £1 each. No special voting rights were attached to the management shares 
(UGD131/2/1/1, p.34), but they conferred:
the right to Ten per cent of the net profits of the Company in any and every year in
which a dividend of not less than She per cent per annum is paid on the Ordinary
Shares of the Company.
All the additional ordinary shares were taken up by Ellerman; the management shares 
were alloted by the directors to Ellerman in accordance with an agreement on 4th October 
1901 and the Articles of Association of the Company were altered (UGD131/2/1/1 p.33- 
34):
(a) to prohibit the transfer of any management shares except with the consent of 
the Company or the directors;
(b) to appoint a Deputy-Chairman at £300 per annum.;
(c) to substitute for Article 93 a new Article ensuring that John Reeves Ellerman 
would be paid all office rent, salaries, wages and other expenses concerned 
with the business of the Company so long as he acted as Chairman of Directors 
of the Company, to be re-named Ellerman Lines Ltd 31 December 1901.
Mattinson was appointed Deputy Chairman and the Company was re-named 
Ellerman Lines Limited on 31st December 190138. On the 16th January 1902 the 
resolutions of the Extra-ordinary General Meetings of 23rd December 1901 and 8th 
January 1902 were confirmed; the resulting structure was to remain unchanged until 1913. 
Ellerman also gave a personal guarantee for payment of the preference share dividend 
(UGD 131/2/1/l). Simple ordinary shares had no guaranteed return but had full voting 
rights. Ellerman's management shares had no extra voting rights; apart from their
Due to the lethargy of the bureaucratic system, the actual date was 26th January 1902.
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Original in colour
incentive-based dividend, they were treated as ordinary shares. Ellerman had created 
founder’s shares in the Brewery and Commercial Investment Trust, and now introduced 
manager’s shares into Ellerman Lines Ltd. The next major change took place in 1913, 
when the share capital was increased to £3,500,000 to accommodate the acquisition of 
Bucknall Line Ltd. In the intervening years, City Line and Hall Line had become private 
limited companies, and Ellerman had expanded his shipping interests with a directorship in 
Shaw Savill and Albion (SSA); the first purchase o f SSA shares had been made in 1902.
At the first annual general meeting o f the Ellerman Lines Lines Ltd on 30 June 1902, 
Ellerman announced a dividend o f 4.5 per cent, derived mainly from investments. He also 
made the following statement:
At the time o f forming the Company there was no intention to invest the bulk of the 
capital in shipping. As there was no outlet in shipping seen by the Board the greater 
part of the capital was invested in more or less permanent Stock Exchange stocks and 
shares. Now the Ellerman Lines control seventy-five vessels with a gross tonnage of 
240,000 and is the seventh largest fleet in the United Kingdom.
The meeting agreed to all his shipping interests being acquired as from 1 st January 1902
ELLERMAN ACQUISITIONS 1901
□  ex-LEYLAND ■  PAPAYANNI □  JRE PERSONAL
□  CITY LINE ■  HALL LINE □  WESTCOTT & LAW.
20
Ligure 8. J.R.E.'s acquisitions 1901.
Ellerman’s strategy appeared to be for developing areas where there was potential 
growth; his tactics included buying into conferences through established shipping lines and 
maintaining existing structures o f management and agencies which minimised disruption 
caused by a change o f ownership. Now he owned five fleets comprising different shapes
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and sizes of ship, and a collection of trades being conducted almost everywhere except the 
North Atlantic.
His options were to leave the companies alone, under their existing managements, 
and treat them as investments; or operate them as one fleet, under a new shipping company. 
Ellerman Lines Ltd was formed as a shipping company which neither owned nor operated 
ships, yet effectively controlled all the shares in five shipping companies and their 
management subsidiaries. Ellerman himself managed the ships and drew every penny in 
commission or fees which could be derived from management in its widest possible sense. 
This personal involvement manifested itself in all areas of operations and was the factor 
which differentiated Ellerman Lines Ltd from other companies. All the ships he owned 
were liners, on regular schedules to specific ports, and while the active participation of the 
owner was common among tramp companies, it was less so with liners.
Several companies, including non-shipping interests, were now associated with the 
name ‘Ellerman’ which led to its recognition as a major English ‘combination’ {The 
Economic Journal VolXII, June 1902, p.159)39.
The only common connection with his other interests was his name on the board of 
directors and his capital investment. This recognition showed how influential Ellerman had 
become only fourteen years after starting his own firm. Among the investments made 
through Ellerman Lines Ltd were shares and debentures in the Royal Mail Steam Packet 
Company - the latter associated with Owen Philipps - later Lord Kylsant Owen Philipps 
and his brothers were, like Ellerman, financiers first. In response to the challenge to British 
shipping by J.P. Morgan and the International Mercantile Marine, Philipps projected 
himself as the saviour of the British maritime heritage, and acquired a miscellaneous group 
of companies. Due to the cross-fimding between them, there was no financial stability 
when debts eventually had to be paid with cash, and the whole edifice collapsed (Green and 
Moss, 1982). If comparison is made between Ellerman and Philipps the most striking 
difference must be that Ellerman was not a speculator and believed that the bulwark of 
solvency is low gearing and a firm base of liquidity.
An agreement was made to sell back five ships to Frederick Leyland & Co (1900) 
Ltd, plus two new ships under construction - ordered for Ellerman’s personal interest. 
Dividends of 4.5 per cent for preference shares, and a dividend and bonus of 10 per cent
In June 1902 an article under the heading “American ‘Trusts’ and English ‘Combinations’" shows 
Ellerman among the ten largest ‘Combinations’ in the United Kingdom.
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on the ordinary shares calculated to 31st January 1902 (Fairplay July 24th, 1902)40 were 
announced. Because Ellerman’s management shares were ordinary shares, dividends of six 
per cent or more triggered his bonus of ten per cent of the net profits. In a widening of 
interests the Engine Works (sic) belonging to the former West India and Pacific SS Co had 
been bought for £2,100 so providing maintenance facilities in Liverpool.
Hall Line declared a dividend on ordinary shares of 6 per cent for eight months 
ending 31st December 1901, and 20.5 per cent for the whole year. Half the amount had 
been credited to Ellerman's account, and he was charged interest at 5 per cent on one-half 
the purchase money41 to 31st December 1901. This dividend derived from the immediate 
transfer, by Ellerman, of the depreciation fimds to the profit and loss account, and then 
distributing the profits as dividend (UGD131/6/1/1 Hall Line DMB)42. Ellerman was the 
only shareholder, and so the only beneficiary. Ellerman’s practice of dispensing with 
depreciation fimds was continued with all the subsidiary shipping companies, and 
depreciation was allowed for in a single entry shared with ‘steamers, shares and businesses 
etc’ in the Ellerman Lines balance sheets43.
Ellerman had already paid to the Company £30,000 in respect of City Line profits to 
31st December 1901. There are frequent references to payments for dividends ‘before tax’ 
in an attempt to leave the tax burden with the Company. This was behind his decision that 
the Company should take over the accounts of the Papayanni and Ellerman Line businesses 
from the date he had acquired them. Ellerman would pay an annual fee of £50 for this, and 
the Company would deal with the income tax officials. Ellerman reported that a sum of 
£50,000 had been included in the Ellerman Lines Limited accounts as the estimated profit 
with which he had been credited, less tax, and debited with £28,000 which he had received 
on account from the respective businesses. Although all his transactions are recorded, the 
cavalier manner in which he indiscriminately used fimds from his own account and the 
Company's account is not easy to follow. The proposed sale to F. Leyland and Co (1900) 
of the Antwerp trade, including five steamers plus new-buildings 353 and 354 at Harland
40 The five months profits to 31 st December 1901 provided the six months dividend to 31 st January 
1902 as the most convenient date for applying to the Stock Exchange for a quotation - which had 
been granted.
41 Hall Line was 'purchased' by Ellerman on the strength of loans and in the knowledge that the 
Company would buy once the formalities of proposal and acceptance had been concluded’. He 
made a profit from each transaction, so the interest paid on the loan for his half-share was doubtless 
balanced in his favour by the profit.
42 See Appendix 11, p. 177 for details.
43 See Appendix 10, p. 171 for copies of Ellerman Lines Ltd balance sheets for 1901, 1905, 1913, 
1914, 1915 and 1916.
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and Wolff would be concluded after 25th July 1902 and Ellerman Lines Limited paid John 
Reeves Ellerman £4,500 for his personal interest in the new buildings.
Whatever the intention on incorporation, Ellerman Lines Ltd was effectively a 
holding company with shipping subsidiaries. Ellerman, as chairman, established a command 
centre where he settled in as Master44 of all he surveyed. Supporting him were three tried 
and trusted colleagues: Mattinson, the doyen of investment trusts; Val Prinsep, and 
Frederick George Burt. These three men were to work with John Reeves Ellerman until 
death parted them; the strength of his original organisation such that the machine kept 
running even after the last of the original quartet died in 194845.
The Directors' Minute Book of Ellerman Lines Ltd may be compared with a 
Captain’s Night Order Book in that the decisions that were taken were actually operational 
instructions or logistic summaries, so that all members of the team knew exactly what had 
been done and what was to be done. Why and how Ellerman reached his decisions is not 
recorded, but at each meeting he presented a report on the Company’s systems and 
progress. The inclusion of systems was an innovation at that time, and while there may 
have been discussions among the directors no details are given. Many items were dealt 
with personally by Ellerman - the sale and purchase of ships; approval of new-buildings; 
Conference agreements; agency and bunkering arrangements. These were all areas in 
which commissions and rebates were common, and when added together formed a 
significant percentage of total costs. Ex-Leyland shareholders had been given the option of 
taking up shares in London, Liverpool and Ocean Steamships, and the majority did so at 
allotment.
The names in the share register (UGD 131/2/2/1) show the extent of the network 
Ellerman had built up since 1886. From his company promotions and auditing came such 
families as the Allhusens, Bischoffs, and Schwanns, Stockbrokers. From his involvement 
with Leyland came Pirrie and Wolff of shipbuilders Harland and Wolff. Absent from the 
register were Christopher Furness and Henry O'Hagan, although O'Hagan still had 
connections with Ellerman through loans and underwriting. In addition to these outside 
investors, many of the new employees from the original companies also bought shares at 
allotment in 1901 ranging in worth from £400 to £3000. There was also an influx of 
investment from the network of families associated with City Line.
44 Master in this context draws an analogy with the Captain of a merchant ship.
45 Sir John Reeves Ellerman died in 1933; Sir Miles W.Mattinson, MP, KC, died in 1943 and
Frederick G. Burt in 1948.
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Unsurprisingly, in view of the consistently high dividends paid by Leyland Line, and 
the capital gains from its sale to Morgan, those who followed Ellerman to the new 
company did not object to his management shares. An added attraction to the cautious 
investor was Ellerman’s personal guarantee of preference dividends. Even at the Extra­
ordinary General Meeting in October 1913 announcing recapitalisation of the Company, 
when ordinary shares as such metamorphosed into preferred and deferred ordinary shares 
with special voting rights, there were only five dissenting voices (UGD131/2/1/1 p.198). In 
addition to a popular mandate, Ellerman also controlled most of the shares, so his decisions 
were practically unassailable. There was a direct link between the board of directors and 
the general managers of each subsiduary. Moorgate Street contained no Head Office 
departments dealing with an equivalent department in the individual companies. 
Communication was immediate as there were no layers of intermediate management to 
delay or distort information from the operators of the ships. When Ellerman was abroad, 
the company secretary F.G.Burt dealt direct with the general managers of City Line, Hall 
Line and the Mediterranean steamers. Considering the size and complexity of the initial 
undertaking - assorted companies, agents, ships, the structure developed proved efficient 
and economic. The secret lay in the control exercised by the command team and their 
knowledge of the overall situation of the Company, augmented by individual and personal 
access to information in areas not confined to shipping. This was relevant in the light of 
social changes taking place in widely separated parts of the world from the Far East to the 
Americas.
Ellerman and his management team of Mattinson and Burt had backgrounds in 
finance dating back almost twenty years. Val Prinsep, a son-in-law of the late Frederick 
Leyland, owed his connection with shipping to his marriage and subsequent service as a 
director of Leyland Line. F.E. Speed was married to another daughter of Frederick 
Leyland and became a director of Ellerman Lines Ltd on the death of Val Prinsep in 1908. 
This family link was maintained when Thoby Prinsep, Speed’s nephew, replaced Speed as a 
director. Ellerman Lines Ltd was a holding company only so far as the shipping companies 
were concerned. The Financial companies of which Ellerman was Chairman were self­
standing and invested in the shipping companies as part of their normal business, drawing 
dividends as shareholders. In addition, the nominee shareholders, including Ellerman 
himself, had all dividends and profits paid either to Ellerman Lines Limited or to one or 
other of the financial institutions such as Breweries and Commercial Investment Trust. In
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1910 the Moorgate Trust was formed as a vehicle for the Ellerman family and increasingly 
took up shares in Ellerman Lines Ltd by direct transfers from Ellerman’s holdings.
Ellerman was an accountant, the profession considered by some to be responsible for 
Britain's entrepreneurial failures in the twentieth century (Payne, 1985, p.43). Pertinent to 
the secret of Ellerman's success in wealth creation is the structure of his undertakings.
There was no apparent vertical integration around shipping, although ownership of the 
management firms, some agencies and a repair shop could be considered minimal lateral 
integration. Certainly, by 1910 Ellerman Lines Ltd was openly a shipping company, 
recorded in Lloyds Register as the owner of 75 per cent of the ships operated by the 
subsiduary companies. Had Ellerman adopted American business ideas, created a 
‘managerial hierarchy’ and centralised administration in his shipping empire? Or had he 
followed:
a form of organization... which permitted the perpetuation of family firms, albeit
now loosely grouped into a federation” (Payne, 1984), p.35).
These questions will be addressed in the following pages and may explain Ellerman's 
success in his own day, and why he has been described as the first company doctor in 
Britain.
In 1901, British mastery of the seas was being challenged by other nations such as 
Germany and Japan. Now appeared the threat of United States merchant ships backed by 
state subsidies on one side and big business as epitomised by J.P. Morgan and his trusts on 
the other. Those who sold out to International Mercantile Marine, like Ellerman and 
Oceanic, were castigated in press and Parliament for betraying a sacred trust and exposing 
the United Kingdom to control of its lifeblood - the sea - by foreigners. On the back of this 
nationalist emotion, Philipps was able to assume the role of a saviour of the country, while 
Ellerman was hardly the flavour of the month until his shipping enterprises were well under 
way. Philipps collected a knighthood and a peerage, and a short spell in jail for fraud. The 
damage he did was forgotten in the efforts of the gentlemen in the City of London to save 
something from the wreckage of the Royal Mail Group and the dependent jobs and trades. 
Ellerman, on the other hand, made a lasting contribution to the United Kingdom’s merchant 
fleet.
The years from 1900 to 1914 also saw increasing industrial strife between employers 
and workers, particularly in Europe. There were revolutions and counter-revolutions from 
Mexico to Moscow and demands for independence from the disparate nationalities
McCleave, P.R., 2003, chapter 3
68
contained by conquest in the old empires. These changes created dislocation of trade 
patterns at the same time that increasing global industrialisation created new suppliers of 
goods and services. This increased competition for the established industrial nations, 
particularly Britain. Additionally, growing demands for social justice led to greater 
controls over wages and working conditions, particularly in the West. In 1902 the end of 
the South African War heralded a slump in shipping, and economic crises in the United 
States reduced the viability of the North Atlantic trades. Simultaneously, growing 
nationalism encouraged the Germans and the Japanese to build up their merchant fleets and 
introduce a degree of flag discrimination. An extended franchise in the United Kingdom 
saw a radical government which increased taxes and regulated working conditions. In the 
Far East the Boxer Rising and the Russo-Japanese War shook the foundations of the 
accepted superiority of the Europeans, while in the Balkans the Ottoman Empire was 
breaking up into nation states whose existence had been denied for centuries. To 
counteract these political and economic difficulties required a determined effort on the part 
of all businessmen to accept radical changes in response to radical challenges. While 
Britain bravely nailed the colours of Free Trade to the mast, other nations raised their tariff 
walls. In certain fields the United Kingdom still reigned supreme: merchant shipping, 
shipbuilding, coal and textiles. In other fields the lead was lost to the United States and 
Germany, but this must be seen in the context of an increasing world population and the 
growth in production of new entries to the industrialised club.
There is a continuing discussion about the reasons for Britain's economic decline after 
1870 - or even earlier. There is no consensus of opinion on the nature of the decline - if 
any - let alone the causes of it. Was it British culture - positively acting against business 
efficiency? Was it a deficiency in the character of the British businessman who saw his 
product or service as an end in itself? Shipping - the carriage of goods around the world by 
sea - was an indigenous industry exposed to international competition and expanded in 
absolute terms while its percentage share of world trade decreased. Among British 
shipowners Ellerman stands out as an example of probity and personal application to 
problems as they arose. By 1914 he had welded his fleets into an entity which preserved 
individual strengths while removing individual weaknesses. A characteristic of British liner 
trades was the Conference system, which, its exponents claimed, was neither a cartel nor a 
monopoly, but a service to shippers. In essence it required agreement between companies 
running on similar routes to set freight rates in return for guaranteed sailings arranged
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between the participants. A system of rebates gave a loyalty bonus to customers who did 
not ship with non-Conference lines. In certain areas such as the United States and the 
Mediterranean, Conferences did not operate freely either because of political restrictions, as 
in the USA, or because of the multiplicity of small independent operators, as in the 
Mediterranean. In the British Empire it operated to a fine degree, with outsiders being 
frightened off by short-term Conference reductions in freight rates overall, so reducing 
margins for would-be intruders. Ellerman was able to join the South African Conference in 
1902 because his ships had been running there on government charters during the South 
African War.
In 1907 Ellerman was elected President of the Chamber of British Shipping, a public 
recognition of his standing among his peers and his inaugural speech was described as ‘the 
best ever made’{Fairplay, 25th February 1907, p. 269). In the same year he was 
summoned to give evidence to the Royal Commission on Shipping Conferences. With the 
growth of Ellerman Lines Limited, economies of scale were now possible, and insurance- 
broking (Ellerman started an Insurance company in 1905) and bunkering - Ellerman owned 
several collieries and shipped coal out to his own bunker stations when outward cargoes 
were light in his own ships (Sturmey, 1962, p. 13) - were among the first to be adopted. In 
1907 Allan Line was taken over by Canadian Pacific Ltd. Allan Line had been agents for 
George Smith and until they lost their independence continued this relationship with 
Ellerman. On opening his own Agency of Ellerman City Line Steamers on 25th March 
1907 he made a payment of £2,000 to Allans on condition that for five years they would 
not act as agents for any company sailing to India. In the same year James and Robert 
Allan each received fifty shares in Ellerman Lines Limited (UGD 131/2/2/2 folios 15 and 
16). In 1910 Ellerman took direct control of the agency and appointed a new manager.
The Watch Leaders
With foresight and wisdom he left most of the original employees in their existing 
appointments. The Mediterranean steamers operated with Fred Swift from Leylands as 
General Manager and Graham Smith, originally General Manager of Papayanni Line, as 
Assistant Manager. The other General Managers were William S. Workman, ex-director of 
City Line Ltd, and George J.C. Gill, ex-director of Hall Line Ltd. As employees they lost 
the commissions and fees that had formerly been their perquisites. Each company retained 
its original offices in Glasgow and Liverpool respectively and the original management
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companies of George Smith and Sons and Robert Alexander were now under the direct 
control of Ellerman. These were the most visible of his acquisitions, and so attracted 
attention from other shipowners, the public, and the press.
City Line occupied a special role among the companies he had taken over, having 
served the Indian subcontinent with sail and steam since 1840. Managed by George Smith 
and Sons as a 64th family partnership, the name City Line came into use on incorporation 
in 1892. William Service Workman was one of the partners of George Smith and Son and 
an original subscriber to City Line Ltd in 1892. His continuing employment was one of the 
conditions of sale of City Line Ltd to Ellerman ((UGD131/1/2/9/1 )46. After thirty years as 
an employee he was given 100 shares in 1930 and re-appointed to the Board of City Line 
Ltd as a director, at the age of 73! He died in 1937 leaving £50,049 {Confirmations and 
Inventories 1937 M-Z). Certainly William Workman appeared to enjoy a special 
relationship with Ellerman. From 1911 there is a record of correspondence between 
Ellerman and Workman on an almost daily basis until 1932, and Sir John Ellerman’s 
Notebooks, four volumes covering the same period are an additional personal record 
(UGD131/1/4/1-4). From these documents it is possible to see the depth of Ellerman’s 
involvement with the ships, and the extent to which Workman was consulted about new- 
buildings, crew wages, coal sources and conferences.
The senior staff of the different companies had their salaries fixed by the holding 
Company. On 30th May 1904 it was announced that ‘Wm Service Workman’s agreement 
to be renewed on same terms as present for three years from 31st May 1904’
(UGD131/2/1/1, p.84), but there are no details of the terms of the agreement or the salary. 
Workman was General Manager of City Line Ltd. and some indication of Workman's salary 
may be gathered from a meeting of 11th June 1906 when the Management Agreements of 
the Ellerman Fleets were detailed - with the exception of Workman. Exceptionally for an 
employee, he was also given discretion in dealing with the City Line Debentures, being 
authorised by Ellerman to renew them in the early years of the new ownership, and 
remained a Trustee of the Debenture Trust until it was wound up in 1912. This period of 
extending the debenture debt, contrary to Ellerman’s instincts, coincides with the years 
during which earnings were low and bank borrowings high in Ellerman Lines Ltd.
The management structure in the subsidiary companies may be seen as a replication 
of Moorgate Street. The General Manager was responsible for running the company and
46 Letter dated 11th August 1969 from G.J. Weir of City Line writing to E.R. Newman of Hall Line.
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directly accountable to the directors in Moorgate Street, and in his absence the Assistant 
Manager stepped into his shoes. Each of the separate companies charged for services 
rendered to the others - and these transactions were made in cash transfers, not in ledgers. 
This ensured that at the end of each month or conclusion of a voyage account, a negotiable 
instrument was forwarded to Ellerman so that he could see immediately if there was any 
pauchling going on among his trusted employees. In 1904 there was one case in Hall Line 
where a cashier left suddenly and attempts were made to recover sums amounting to 
£2,000 from him. In his methods Ellerman showed a keen appreciation of human 
knowledge, believing that temptation was less attractive when most of the opportunities for 
it were removed.
At a local level managements were allowed autonomy over wages and costs within 
certain budgetary constraints. From the letters between Ellerman and the managers it is 
possible to discern a certain rivalry, particularly between City Line and Hall Line. 
Comparisons made by Ellerman on fuel and other running costs introduced an element of 
competition. By 1908, when Ellerman had opened bunker stations to the Indian sub­
continent, there were fixed instructions to the managers regarding quality and quantity of 
bunkers to be loaded in specific ports. Ellerman's remarks about coal consumption and 
passage times leave no room for doubt about his competence as a ship-manager - querying 
the cost of coaling his yacht Semiramis for a Mediterranean cruise he reminded Workman 
that Ellermans was not a charity (UGD 131/4/13/2)47. The importance Ellerman attached to 
accounting methods is shown by a constant correspondence between the different 
companies for payment of expenses incurred by, for example, City Line Ltd on behalf of 
Hall Line Ltd or vice versa. On 23rd October 1912 a letter was sent to Ellerman's City 
Line Agency, Liverpool, enclosing a draft of £5,000 for disbursements made by Hall Line 
on behalf of City Line Ltd ships in Liverpool during September and October. There is also 
a letter from City Line to Hall Line Ltd stating that there is a debit in the General Account 
of £2:16s:4d which has been collected on behalf of Glasgow freight in S. S. Trafford Hall 
Other letters detail accounts and remittances transmitted between the companies, including 
Ellerman’s London agency of Montgomerie and Workman. It is noticeable that paper 
transactions were not acceptable to Ellerman - he required to know at any given time the 
true cash structure of his holdings.
JRE was usually as up-to-date with his knowledge of ship movements, cargoes and voyage costs as 
the respective managers.
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Technical matters were dealt with in Liverpool, by the Engineer Superintendent, Mr 
Dalrymple. The workshop acquired from West India and Pacific was based in Liverpool, 
and by 1913 Dalrymple was Chief Superintendent for all engineering support, with 
assistants in the different companies and the workshop. In the early days of Ellerman Lines 
Ltd ships remained with their original companies and managers, but by 1913 Lloyds 
Register shows an increasing diversification. One of the reasons was that Ellerman 
decided, sometimes at short notice, to replace one ship with another for a particular voyage 
or to institute additional sailings. There were no records kept of these changes, although 
on occasion Wm S. Workman would query the decisions. How effective Ellerman was in 
his forecasts of the optimum placing of ships at short notice may be seen by the system 
adopted in November 1938 - five years after his death (UGD131/7/9/6.)48. This was more 
expensive and less flexible because none of the individual managers wielded Ellerman's 
authority or shouldered his responsibility.
The General Managers dealt with routine correspondence from agents such as 
Gladstone Wylie in Calcutta and Aiken Spence and Co in Colombo, but any questions 
involving changes in freight rates or competition were passed on to Ellerman. In some 
cases, as with Strick's sailings to Karachi, Ellerman would then take over. In other cases 
such as shortages of cargo due to natural disasters, it would be left to the local managers. 
When labour disputes became more prevalent and showed themselves in longer turn-rounds 
in port, or shortages of bunker coal, Ellerman would override his managers (and often his 
fellow-shipowners) by resisting the workers’ demands until the last possible moment. With 
bunker stocks he was usually able to arrange deliveries of coal from specific collieries not 
affected, and advise on the transport arrangements. There is more detail of his dealings 
with Workman than with the other managers, because of the voluminous correspondence. 
The subjects discussed in these go beyond City Line Ltd and Glasgow, and increasingly 
become more general as the years pass. The next major change took place in 1913, when 
the share capital was increased to £3,500,000 to accommodate the acquisition of Bucknall 
Line Ltd. City Line and Hall Line became Private Limited Companies in 1908.
An agreement between the companies to formalise arrangements between different managers and 
record ‘Movements of Steamers’ in a published Ship List..
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Baling out Bucknalls.
Bucknalls had been in financial difficulties for some years, due to lack of liquidity caused by 
over-optimistic building of new ships and loss o f earnings due to a government boycott on 
their ships during the South African War. In 1906 Ellerman had provided £180,000 by an 
injection o f capital and re-organised the company, despite opposition from some o f the 
Bucknall directors who wanted his money but not his company. By Court Order dated 5th 
December 1906 (UGD131/3/2 p.24-25), the nominal capital was first reduced from 
£1,650,000 to £855,000, leaving a subscribed capital o f £485,000, less than one-third of 
the original nominal capital! On 14 December 1908 another Special Resolution approved 
by Court Order dated 6th March 1909 (UGD131/3/2, p. 26-29) reduced the nominal 
capital o f £885,000 to £101,950. 1,000 Management shares o f £1 each were created and 
taken up by Ellerman.
BUCKNALL CAPITAL
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Figure 9. Bucknall's recapitalisation. Key:
CUMPREF 1 = Cumulative preference shares;
After re-organisation Special comprises:
First preference shares: £80000
Second preference shares: £21250 
Management shares: £ 1000
Ellerman had effectively reduced the value o f Bucknalls from £1,650,000 to £102,250 in 
six years and was now left with a viable unit.
I 1
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In addition to the balance of profits after guaranteed dividends had been paid on First 
and Second preference shares, Management shares each had 400 votes at all shareholders 
meetings (UGD131/3/2 p. 27). Dividends on both classes of preference shares would be 
non-cumulative for five years from 31st December 1907. Ellerman then had the 
Memorandum of Agreement changed to remove the share-holding qualification for 
directors. The existing directors, with the exception of P.E. Bucknall, resigned and 
Ellerman then appointed James Westcott, F.G. Burt and Edward Lloyd. In November 
1908 Ellerman personally took over management of the company, and after some argument 
with the Bucknalls procured an agreement that the management could be transferred at any 
time to Ellerman Lines Ltd. Ellerman then advanced to Bucknalls:
such sums as he may see fit to provide up to £180,000 secured by mortgages on four 
(4) of the new ships and an equity of redemption on two (2) steamers mortgaged to 
the bank (UGD131/3/2/2; Stock Exchange Official Intelligence1909, p. 1604-5 )49. 
Debentures now had to be dealt with. Ellerman had taken up at least £100,000 of the 
original 4.5 per cent First Debenture Stock, secured on specific ships. In 1908 £300,000 
5 per cent 2nd Debenture Stock was authorised, issued to certain creditors, and on 30th 
November 1909 a Sinking Fund of 5 per cent per annum was opened. By 1st February 
1912 most of the debentures had been redeemed, and Ellerman first postponed, then 
cancelled, £100,000 of his own First Debenture Stock. The remaining debenture holders 
later converted to Ellerman Lines Ltd preference shares and the remaining Bucknall 
debentures were retired completely in December 1913.
One More Step
On 7th August 1913 an Extra-ordinary General Meeting of Ellerman Lines Ltd was called 
to vote on a Resolution to increase the capital to £3,500,000. At this first reconstruction of 
capital since 1902 all existing shares were exchanged for new shares, and four classes of 
shares were created: 100,000 4.5 per cent Guaranteed preference with 5 shares for one 
vote; 120,000 5.5 per cent Guaranteed preference with 10 shares for each vote; 120,000 
preferred ordinary shares, with 5 shares for one vote, and 5,000 deferred ordinary shares 
with 5 votes for each share (UGD131/2/1/1, p/186). There were no ordinary shares as 
such, the old ones being replaced by preferred ordinary shares. All the deferred ordinary
The scheme provided that in the event of the company being wound up, Ellerman had a prior lien 
in front of the First Debentures to cover maritime liens and debts incurred on his credit.
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shares were allotted to Ellerman on 30th September 1913 (UGD131/2/2/2) in exchange for 
his interest in Bucknalls. These 5,000 deferred ordinary shares carried 30.8 per cent of 
total votes. As the special dividend attached to these shares also returned 10 per cent of 
net profits when the ordinary dividend was over 6 per cent, they were similar to the 1902 
Management shares. There was, however, a proviso that deferred ordinary shares would 
not qualify for any dividend until the Reserve Fund had reached £750,000 and normal 
depreciation of 4 per cent each year on the ships had been applied or a combination of 
both. In addition there was to be a Guarantee Fund ((UGD131/2/1/1 p. 188) as security for 
the 4.5 per cent Guaranteed preference shares. These shares were as secure as any form of 
investment could be secure (Cottrell, 1980, p. 182).
In April 1902 Ellerman owned personally 18,547 preference and 27,043 ordinary 
shares in the new company of Ellerman Lines Ltd, worth £455,900 at par. He also owned 
Leyland preference shares worth another £1,400,000 and finance company shares worth 
possibly £1,000,000. This does not include the brewery and colliery shares he had also 
acquired since 1890.
He was almost certainly a multi-millionaire at this stage (Rubinstein, 1984, p.250), 
and also, by virtue of his capital, had access to sources of credit denied less prudent or 
fortunate owners. In twelve years the company had made tremendous advances, and built 
up the fleets without incurring massive interest payments on debentures which so 
debilitated many companies. There was also no hidden burden of un-called capital cross- 
fertilizing the separate units of the group, as happened with Kylsant and Royal Mail (Green 
and Moss, 1982, p.21-40).
At allotment there was a large public subscription, including shares to employees and 
previous shareholders of the constituent companies and one third of the shares were held by 
outsiders. JRE interests are expanded to include the holdings of the other directors as well 
as the Ellerman investment financial trusts. From 1902 to 1910 was a period during which 
there were loans from banks and ordinary shares did not pay dividends of more than 6 per 
cent.
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From 1910 there was an increase in the purchase of shares by Ellerman’s private 
trusts such as the Moorgate Trust. Of the total Ellerman Lines 147,000 shares issued in 
1902 26,519 or 18 per cent moved into Ellerman’s control between 1902 and 1913. His 
personal holding increased by almost 14,000 and his financial institutions by 13,000, while 
his colleagues direct holdings decreased by 3,000 and outside investors by almost 24,000 
(see figures 10 and 11).
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Figure 10. ELL ordinary shares 1902.
ELL ORDINARY SHARES 1913
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Figure 11. Ellerman Lines Ltd ordinary shares 1913.
The London, City and Midland Bank had made a loan of £90,000 in 1901 and held 
3000 preference shares and 6150 ordinary shares from August 1902 to February 1912 
(UGD131/2/2/2 folio 345). The bank shares were returned to Ellerman’s personal holding 
which increased by 11 per ce«/(UGDl31/2/2/2 folio 219). Public holdings decreased by 10
□  .IRE PERSONAL. 
■  JRE INTERESTS
□ PUBLIC
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per cent, while Ellerman’s interests, which included the holdings of his colleagues in 
addition to his financial institutions, rose by 9 per cent. Unlike the shares held by the public 
the bank holding was in the ratio o f 2:1 in ordinary shares (see figures 12 and 13).
ELL PREFERENCE SHARES 1902
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Examination of the structure and composition o f the different companies acquired 
shows a diversity that was disciplined into a holistic harmony. The early acquisitions, the 
Leyland ships and Papyanni remained private organisations without boards of directors. 
They were wholly owned by Ellerman Lines Ltd, and paid all profits to the parent 
Company. The only staff costs were salaries or wages; all commissions and fees went to 
Ellerman. With the exception o f nominal shareholdings for the appointed directors, whose 
dividends and profits were paid to Ellerman Lines Ltd, the whole capital belonged to either 
Ellerman or one of his companies.
12. Ellerman Lines Ltd preference shares 1902
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13. Ellerman Lines Ltd preference shares 1913.
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City Line had been a viable concern, albeit highly geared with short-term debentures 
of £300,000 and just over 50 per cent of the nominal capital subscribed. On the death of 
the principal shareholder in 1899 his sons decided to sell rather than stay in a business with 
an uncertain future and increasing liabilities as shareholders’ holdings were divided among 
heritors. Hall Line was slightly different, as there was no obvious heir to the family 
tradition, just a burden of debt and debentures. The similarities between the two companies 
allowed the same kind of internal organisation. The directors of Hall Line were appointed 
by Ellerman, and again their shareholdings were purely nominal. As with City Line, one of 
the previous directors was appointed General Manager. Westcott and Laurence, however, 
was an exception to the rule, as the directors not only remained in their own company, but 
were placed on the boards of other subsidiary companies by Ellerman, although not on the 
board of Ellerman Lines Ltd.
The London agency of Montgomerie and Workman was inherited from City Line; in 
1902 Ellerman announced an ‘arrangement with these gentlemen’ (UGD131/2/1/1). This 
lasted until March 1913 when Montgomerie and Workman was incorporated as 
Montgomerie & Workman Ltd. William E.E. Montgomerie and Robert A.Workman were 
retained as managers on £1100 p.a. for three years and £1200 p.a. for a further four. Both 
resigned their positions on 8th August 1914.
The Bucknall take-over exemplifies Ellerman’s deployment of the skills attributed to 
the complete entrepreneur, with the exception of an extrovert personality. He negotiated 
with the Bucknall gentry for five years before the deal was completed and Bucknall Steam 
Ship Co. Ltd disappeared. In addition to his time and patience, the transaction was 
expensive in the short term. At the age of 52 he had probably reached his peak, with only 
one more major shipping acquisition: Wilsons of Hull in 1916. Looking at the structure of 
his undertaking shows that it was apparently designed to remove the public from the actual 
business of shipowning.
The only public shipping company was Ellerman Lines Ltd, all others being wholly 
owned by Ellerman and his other interests. In the main company Ellerman held a 
considerable number of preference shares as well as most of the soi-disant ordinary shares. 
Like the investors he attracted, he wanted reasonable returns on his capital with the 
maximum security. Unlike them, he also wanted to exercise his skills of policy-making and 
management, reaping the appropriate rewards. His record of providing returns ensured
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that the limited issues he made available, in Leyland in 1900 and LLOS in 1901, needed no 
pushing.
Ellerman’s fleets now had access to East, West and the Africas, building on the 
established trades and agents he acquired. Despite the increase in the number of ships, he 
continued to personally oversee operations. Certainly all ship sales and purchases went 
through him, as did general instructions on bunkering and vessel deployment. The 
managers dealt with local matters, crews and cargos, superintendance and stevedoring, and 
strove for the economic efficiency Ellerman required.
When we come to the operation of the ships and companies, a greater demonstration 
of his attention to detail will be given. As it is, even trying to keep up with his methods 
from reading the minute book is far from easy. How Ellerman managed to carry out all 
these complicated financial schemes over what was a comparatively short time, is the most 
baffling of all the questions. It is clear that his own interests were foremost in all his 
financial dealings, even though the trappings of consultation were assumed. Ellerman Lines 
Ltd was Ellerman, and the other directors were there to rubber stamp his decisions.
Uniformity
In 1904 company funnel markings and an Ellerman pennant, to be worn with the house flag 
of the individual compan, were introduced. Other changes to affect the subsidiary 
companies was the moving of ships between lines and the increasing use of the CzYy-prefix 
for the Indian and South African trades. This practice began in 1903 with the Locksley 
Hall while under construction by Workman Clark in Belfast. She was re-named City o f 
Agra on the stocks, and operated with that name by Hall Line Ltd until 1932 when she was 
sold (Taylor, 1976, p.268). From 1903 only fourteen ships were built and operated with 
the Hall suffix, the others either being built with the City prefix or adopting it before 
entering service. Over the years, the City- prefix supplanted the Hall suffix completely, 
and made its way into the other fleets. At the same time, Hall Line grew faster and greater 
than City Line, and Liverpool was acknowledged as the operational hub of the Ellerman 
ships. This was inevitable given the logistics of trade and the proximity of a variety of 
industries to Liverpool, compared with the comparative remoteness of Glasgow from all 
but Scotland’s indigenous industry.
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As it happened, Ellerman was right to adopt the City prefix because sixty years later 
advertisements proclaimed ‘Ellerman’s City Line’ (Times o f Ceylon Annual 1956)50 and 
few people knew - or cared - that the ships might be operated by Hall Line, Bucknall or 
even City Line. Ellerman was ahead of his contemporaries in defining markets, and his 
experience with passenger ships in Leyland Line was of help in realising that there was a 
regular traffic to the Imperial possessions not served by the large passenger fleets such as 
P&O. Hall Line was primarily a cargo company, while City Line had built a reputation for 
cheap and efficient transport for those who travelled to India. Ellerman decided to build 
bigger and better passenger ships which, while not competing with other established 
services such as P&O were able to exploit a niche in an expanding market. The name and 
flag of City Line was associated with India and a clientele had developed over the years. In 
1912 George and Robert Smith, great-grandsons of the founder, attempted to stop 
Ellerman from using the George Smith and Sons flag, but lost the case51.
From the beginning Ellerman imposed his own disciplines on all sectors of the 
operation, yet without destroying the independence of the managers or their loyalty. The 
only debentures were for City Line and Bucknalls and all were retired by 1913. This 
enabled profits to be used for re- investment rather than paying interest. At the re­
structuring of Ellerman Lines Limited in 1913, provision was made for issuing debentures - 
if necessary - to finance the new-building programme. Ellerman continued to deploy his 
inherent professional skills of accountancy and negotiation, and wrapped his own 
environment around himself. Of his colleagues it should be remembered that Mattinson's 
financial skills were recognised before he joined Ellerman in 1889 and his political and legal 
contacts were not unimportant. This was a period when United Kingdom shipowners were 
being bound by regulations from which their foreign competitors were immune, and much 
resistance from the Shipowners Parliamentary Committee was made to each new measure 
introduced by the Board of Trade which was intended to improve safety at sea. Those 
MPs who were shipowners were well aware that a united voice in Parliament was desirable 
if not necessary (Fairplay; 10th August 1899)52.
From the date of its sale to International Mercantile Marine the fortunes of Leyland 
Line (and J.P. Morgan’s other collected companies) had been diametrically opposite from 
those of Ellerman and his companies. Ellerman’s forecasts in 1901 about the decline in the
50 See Appendix 2, p. 15 5.
51 The original City Line flag, retained by Ellerman, comprised the letters GSS in white on a red field.
52 JRE’s letters to Workman.
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North Atlantic trade were justified (Fairplay, May 10th 1901) and Morgan and others had 
rashly relied on the United States Congress bringing in subsidies for United States merchant 
ships. Unfortunately for Morgan and his associates, there were no subsidies and a 
developing recession led to a reduction in freight rates and little profitability on the North 
Atlantic. In 1909 Leyland Lines had to write down capital and re-organise its shareholding. 
No ordinary dividends had been paid since 1902 (see figure 14), and the preference 
dividends had been paid up at 31 st May 1903 and passed since that date (Fairplay, 18th 
April 1907).
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Figure 14. Comparison o f shipping lines’ dividends.
Notes: the chart shows that Leyland and IMM were unable to match Ellerman’s 
profitable performance from 1903 - 1911. Bucknalls was also in dire straits 
until 1912, while Shaw Savill and Albion, o f which Ellerman became a director 
in 1909, was seen to be a profitable investment.
In 1909 Debenture Securities Investment Trust, an Ellerman Company, became 
Debenture Trustees for Leyland Line and IMM had to pledge all remaining shares as 
security for the debentures. Ellerman, however, not only retained his preference shares but 
imposed strong measures for protecting his assets in the event o f liquidation o f the 
company.
The effects o f Ellerman’s influence can be seen in the results o f the various 
companies, and the balance sheets o f Ellerman Lines Limited, published annually in 
Fairplay, contain very little in the way of details o f the viability or otherwise of the
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different parts o f the enterprise as one single item in the accounts covers new-buildings, 
shares in shipping companies, shipping businesses etc, less depreciation. The affairs of 
Papayanni and Ellerman Line are shrouded from public view. Westcott and Laurence was 
a collection o f single ship limited companies, while City Line and Hall Line had no 
shareholders other than nominees, Ellerman and Ellerman Lines Ltd.
The graph for Hall Line (see figure 15) displays an astounding volatility and some 
high returns. The ships ran to Africa as well as India and the Persian Gulf, but there are no 
detailed accounts to explain the figures. The accounts available show that there was no 
depreciation allowance made and after the preference shares interest had been paid, the rest 
went to the ordinary shareholders - Ellerman or Ellerman Lines Ltd. Remaining balances 
carried forward to the profit and loss account ranged from £96 in 1903 to £17 in 1911 
(UGD131/6/)53.
ELI, FLEETS DIVIDENDS
•ELLERMAN LINES LTD * CITYLINE HALL LINE
Figure 15. Comparison o f ELL, City Line and Hall Line dividends, 1902-1912.
Ellerman's methods could be used for a practical text-book to illustrate the 
development of the complete company from the early days o f limited liability to the 
corporate economy. Every one o f his practices was perfectly legal - he certainly published 
his own version o f consolidated accounts for the shipping companies - and much o f his 
success was based on an exceptional memory and meticulous attention to detail. In 
addition he was a good leader and assembled a reliable team around himself. The 
Bucknall's re-construction was a marvel of clear thinking, and one wonders what Ellerman
In 1901 and 1902 while the takeover was in progress, £197,000 suddenly appeared as a balance. 
See Appendix 11, p. 177.
McCleave, P.R., 2003, chapter 3
83
Original in colour
might have achieved with the wreckage of the Kylsant Group, had he been invited to deal 
with it. There would have been no sacred cows, and the Establishment would have been at 
the mercy o f an attitude which paid no attention to the opinions o f any-one else. Ellerman 
may have been a man o f his time, but he was also the shape o f the future.
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Figure 16. JRE’s directorships 1901-1914. (The Directory of Directors, 1889-1914)
His brewery and shipping interests continued to expand, while the financial businesses 
appeared static (see figure 16). In fact, Ellerman became more discriminating about the 
directorships he accepted, and had plenty of willing nominees to act on his behalf. An idea 
o f the scale and scope o f his interests may be gathered from Figure 16. Between 1892 and 
1901 Ellerman is shown as chairman or director o f foreign investment trusts such as 
American Breweries and General Securities Trust, or companies such as Milwaukee and 
Chicago Breweries Ltd '4. When JRE stepped down, one or other o f his associates, such as 
Mattinson, Burt or Eves remained on these boards.
His personal assets amounted to several million pounds, he was chairman o f a dozen 
companies and could look back on a quarter-century o f success in an occupation which was
I I hi
See Appendix 4, p. 157.
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an art, a science, and a game. Sir John Reeves Ellerman appears to have reached his peak 
with the Bucknall deal. He had a large fleet and was placing orders for new ships 
extending over the next three years. Although he continued to acquire shipping companies, 
and indulged in the doubtful benefits of buying his own shipyards, the spark of his genius 
was fading. Had there not been the Great War it might have been different.
Contrary to the views of his early biographers, it is clear that Ellerman did not buy 
the five shipping companies, which included City Line and Hall Line, on impulse. There 
had been suggestions in Fairplay in 1900, before the take-over of West India and Pacific 
Steam Navigation Company, that Ellerman was putting together a shipping conglomerate 
which would include City Line. As he was bound by the agreement with Leyland to stay 
out of the North Atlantic apart from the Antwerp trade, he concentrated on areas where 
there was the opportunity for expansion, particularly the Middle East, India and South 
Africa. Ellerman was insulated from short term cash flow problems, as can be seen by his 
guarantee for preference share dividends, and his occasional cash injections. It is 
undeniable that his reputation enabled him to borrow money freely where less substantial 
shipowners would have been driven to issuing debentures or extending their equity base.
He engaged in some less successsful ventures - among them a complicated scheme 
for selling two ships to an insurance company, then chartering them back and participating 
in a joint venture with Glen Line in the South American trade. With the addition of 
Bucknalls, Ellerman Lines Limited now had access to all comers of the globe, as the 
sanctions imposed by J.P. Morgan’s International Mercantile Marine had expired. The 
smaller companies such as Papayanni and Westcott and Laurence benefited from ships 
being passed down from the companies for which the new ships were being built - 
frequently without changing the name. In addition to shipping, finance and brewing 
Ellerman was also taking an interest in publishing, buying shares in newspapers and 
periodicals.
During the 1914-18 War, shipowners were among the business-men frequently 
attacked in the media because of the high profits they were perceived to be making. 
Suggestions were made that Ellerman escaped criticism because of his publishing interests 
and influence with publishers and editors rather than because he was not exploiting the 
markets.
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In 1913 Ellerman was at the peak of his success; after 1922 it was downhill all the 
way, with even his wealth decreasing. Later chapters will deal with Ellerman’s 
involvement in the technical, as distinct from the purely financial, side of his operations, and 
also with the effects of war and the peace which followed it.
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CHAPTER 4 -  SHIPS AND SHIPYARDS 
The Ships.
Ellerman’s financial manipulations have been discussed in Chapter 3; this section will deal 
with his re-organisation of the different fleets, and strategy for the long-term future of the 
eponymous company. Records show that Ellerman purchased and operated the ex-Leyland 
vessels in his own name before acquiring any of the other companies (Lloyds Registers o f  
Shipping 1902 - 1903). With Leyland there had initially been one company, with 
established personnel and trades; Ellerman now had a collection of companies. The ships 
ranged widely in age and tonnage, from the 40 year old ex-Leyland Egyptian of 2047 grt, 
to the brand new City ofAthens of 5594 grt. The financial states of the different companies 
varied; City Line, for example, owed £350,000 in debentures, with ownership of specified 
vessels vested in the debenture trustees (UGD131/1/3/2). In 1902 Ellerman owned sixty- 
two ships with an average age of sixteen years ranging from the average eight years of Hall 
Line to the average of twenty-three years for Papayanni and Westcott and Lawrence. The 
ships in the fleet had an average of 2,878 grt, and although there were some compound 
engines, most ships were fitted with triple expansion engines. The ex-Leyland, and the 
Papayanni Line, together with the Westcott and Laurence vessels were short-sea ships, 
trading to the near-continent and the Mediterranean as far as the Black Sea. City Line and 
Hall Line were ocean-going steamers trading principally to the Indian sub-continent. The 
Persian Gulf and South Africa were also included, as was the possibility of trading further 
East. Ellerman had bought into established Conference Lines and their agreements. All the 
companies he acquired had existing infrastructures and links with agents and shippers, and 
the diversity of ships and services provided opportunities for rationalisation. This process 
began with the sale back to Leyland of the Antwerp-Canada trade and five ships. In 
addition to the fleets bought outright, Ellerman had also bought individual vessels on 
government charter to South Africa. The existing tonnage was redistributed among the 
fleets and a programme of sales, purchases and new-buildings was implemented.
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Restructuring the Fleets.
Between 1902 and 1913 fifty of the original vessels disappeared from the fleet. Thirteen - 
about twenty per cent - were lost by marine peril; this percentage was not unusual 
considering the lack of navigational aids and faults in ship construction at the time. Two 
ships were lost simultaneously in Oporto when the river suddenly rose, swamping the 
harbour. The remaining thirty-seven ships were sold, the majority for scrap, but a few 
found new owners.
Sold Lost or Wrecked New-buildings Bought in.
Ellerman 22 2 13 12
City 4 1 12 1
Hall 7 5 39 2
Papayanni 5 1 0 2
Westcott 2 4 0 4
Totals 40 13 64 21
Table 10. JRE's fleet gains and losses, 1901-13.
Ellerman acted as his own broker, and some of the sales were paper transactions 
between J. R. Ellerman and Ellerman Lines Ltd; while two were the sale of 4/64ths in two 
ships to the English and Scottish Insurance Co Ltd in exchange for shares in Glen Line.
This was an unsuccessful attempt by Ellerman to enter the West Indies trade and the ships 
were returned to Hall Line. In 1907 Ellerman and Moss Lines bought the Asia Minor 
Steam Ship Company, giving Ellerman the opportunity to sell this company some of the 
older ships of which the City o f Amsterdam and the Alsatian, both built in 1877, were 
examples.
From the beginning Ellerman moved ships around between the various fleets, and 
gradually disposed of the older tonnage. He inherited a number of antiques with compound 
engines which were relegated to the short-sea services until a buyer could be found. 
Similarly he was always on the look-out for a bargain, and according to Fairplay had an 
uncanny knack of picking ships up at bargain-basement prices. In the first three years of 
operation he had sold the North Atlantic steamers back to Leyland, built new steamers and 
bought in second-hand tonnage from other companies. By 1913 a pattern of ‘Ellerman 
types’ had emerged, with new-buildings fitting the trading pattern of the individual 
companies, while retaining a flexibility which gave the capability of entering other trades at
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short notice. Another change was the introduction of the City prefix for ships in the other 
fleets. This was first used for a Hall Line new-building in 1903 when the Rufford Hall was 
renamed City o f Madras in Palmers Tyneside shipyard. After 1914 all new ships for Hall 
Line were built with the City prefix and the practice gradually spread to ships operated by 
other companies in the group.
The pattern of reconstruction began with the purchase of second-hand vessels for 
Ellerman Line’s Mediterranean fleets, and the disposal of older tonnage; this accounted for 
about three-quarters of all second-hand sales and purchases. In 1902 Ellerman started with 
new construction for the deep-sea trades. Over the next ten years, Hall Line initially gained 
most from new-buildings while City Line had only 18 per cent of the total numbers, but this 
included passenger ships which were larger and more expensive than the cargo vessels.
From 1912 onwards new vessels for the Mediterranean trade of the Ellerman Line began to 
appear.
Passenger Ships.
The first City Line passenger steamers were the City o f Venice, built in 1875 by Barclay 
Curie of Glasgow to carry 38 passengers and the sister ship City o f Khios delivered in 1878. 
Starting with the City o f Cambridge in 1882, Workman Clark of Belfast built six ships with 
speeds of 13 and 14 knots, each carrying 80 passengers. These were all cargo ships with 
passenger accommodation, and lacked certain amenities of P&O or BISN. In accordance 
with the strict temperance principles of the owners, there was no alcohol carried even for 
passengers, while deckchairs were not provided but had to be purchased and transported by 
the individual passenger. Passengers who wanted transport to India without the formality 
and social intercourse of the large passenger ships found them cheap and reliable, so that a 
regular clientele built up among the less prosperous voyagers to India such as missionaries 
and junior civil servants. This reputation for cheap and efficient passenger transport for 
voyages to and from India developed over the years, despite the lack of both entertainment 
and alcohol.
In 1897 George Smith III decided to remove the passenger accommodation from his 
new-buildings (UGD131/1/1, 25th April 1900)55. This was possibly due to the new 
passenger ship construction regulations which stated that to carry more than 12 passengers 
a vessel had to be constructed in accordance with stringent regulations requiring additional
Dispensing with passengers increases cargo capacity and reduces UK and Suez tonnage 
measurements.
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bulkheads. In service more certificated officers were required than for cargo ships and there 
was an increase in the minimum number of life-saving appliances to be carried. Despite this 
stricter regulatory regime Ellerman changed the policy he inherited and began to build 
passenger ships. In 1904 he broke with the George Smith and City Line tradition of 
prohibiting alcohol in City Line ships when the first bar was fitted in the City o f York.
Another innovation was an Indian Service which included a boat train from London 
to Liverpool. In October 1904 the first of Ellerman's new passenger ships, the City o f York 
left Birkenhead on her maiden voyage to Calcutta (Journal o f  Commerce, 14th October 
1904)56. An express train brought passengers from Paddington, and the voyage time was 
scheduled as 24 days, 6 hours and 40 minutes. This was the birth of an Indian passenger 
service from London through Liverpool to Calcutta. As vessels were used from both Hall 
Line and City Line each company issued separate tickets for their respective ships, hence 
the exchanges about freights and passenger supplements. With the gradual introduction of 
the City prefix for all ships, from 1914 all passages were booked by City Line. These new 
vessels were not intended to match P&O First Class in speed and luxury, but still provided a 
good and reasonably cheap passage to India. As it happened, Ellerman was right in his 
decision to build passenger ships, because sixty years later advertisements proclaimed “4 
Century o f Service -1839-1956 by the Cities o f Ellerman Lines “ {Times o f Ceylon Annual 
1956 )57.
Workman Clark built the City o f London for £132,570 in 1907. With a gross 
registered tonnage of 8917, she had a length of 491’ and a draught of 32’. Designed to 
carry 240 first and 60 second class passengers, she consistently averaged less than twenty 
days from Liverpool to Bombay. Barclay Curie built a sister ship, the City o f Paris, for 
£131,500 the same year. By 1905 Ellerman had ordered bigger and better passenger ships 
which were intended to exploit his niche in an expanding market. Hall Line developed the 
South African trade and supplemented City Line services to India.
City o f  York, 7705grt at 14kts was built by Workman Clark and managed by George Smith and 
Sons.
See Appendix 2, p. 155.
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There was a steady increase in the size o f passenger ships (figure 17) and the 
numbers carried (figure 18). With passenger cargo ships, in all companies, the cargo space 
was calculated to recover voyage costs when no passengers were carried. Passenger liners, 
on the other hand, carried little cargo apart from passengers’ baggage, and such commercial 
cargo as there was required to be necessarily low-volume and preferably high value.
AVERAGE PASSENGER SHIP GRT 1875-1933
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Figure 17. PAX tonnages for City Line and ELL 1875-1922.
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Figure 18. PAX nunbers for City Line and ELL 1875-1925.
In 1913, when a Parliamentary Paper reported on United Kingdom passenger ships, 
Ellerman Lines Ltd is shown as operating six ships falling into that category. The increase 
in new ships for Hall Line at the expense o f the other companies was determined by a 
programme o f using more modem and efficient ships to meet the increasing competition
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from other countries, particularly Germany which, backed by subsidies and other forms of 
government aid, was moving into traditional British markets in colonial possessions and the 
Dominions.
The new Hall Line cargo ships fell into two general categories: one of around 4000 
grt averaging about £40,000 and a second group of around 5000 grt costing around 
£70,000. The Ellerman Line58 cargo ships were designed for the Mediterranean trades and 
again fell into two distinct categories, the Lisbon class of around 1500 grt at prices between 
£16,000-£20,000, and the Flaminian class of around 3500 grt and a price of £20,000 - 
£25,000. Ellerman ordered the ships and negotiated prices, purpose and dimensions. 
Sometimes he would tell a shipyard to ‘build like the Lisbon ’, in other cases he would 
specify the trade. Most of these decisions are recorded in Ellerman Lines Directors’ Minute 
Book, as are most of the sales and purchases of second-hand ships. It is apparent that 
Ellerman frequently ordered ships on his own behalf and then sold them to the Company. 
Similarly, he would buy older ships from the subsidiary lines and sell them on to outside 
interests. Over the first five years of Ellerman Lines Limited, City Line and Hall Line 
absorbed the new ships and passed the older ones to other fleets in the group, while 
Ellerman disposed of the more ancient vessels59.
Ships in 1901 Ships in 1913
Line Number GRT Age Number GRT Age
Ellerman 20 46975 18 22 50003 16
City 14 59250 10 19 112340 13
Hall 11 41726 10 37 185797 9
Papayanni 8 21815 23 3 8474 29
W&L. 9 14855 20 5 11468 28
Total 62 184621 16.2 86 368082 19
Table 11. JRE fleets 1901 and 1913.
Hall Line expanded considerably more than City Line (table 11), and Liverpool 
became the operational hub of the Ellerman ships. This was inevitable given the logistics of 
trade and the proximity of a variety of industries to Liverpool, compared with the 
comparative remoteness of Glasgow from all but Scotland’s indigenous industry. City Line
Ex-Leyland Mediterranean steamers - not to be confused with Ellerman Lines Ltd - the ‘holding’ 
company.
See Appendix 9, p. 166-167.
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had 18 per cent o f the new ships, but this included passenger ships which were larger and 
more expensive than the cargo vessels.
It will be seen that while the Ellerman, Papayanni and Westcott and Laurence fleets 
show comparatively little change, City Line almost doubled its tonnage with a 40 per cent 
increase in numbers, and Hall Line trebled both the number o f ships and their combined 
tonnage. In figure 20 below, Bucknalls is shown as acquiring fourteen new ships between 
1906 and 1910 Sir John Ellerman was effectively the manager o f Bucknalls during this 
period, and he implemented the new buildings.
ELL bEWSJLDNGS 1902-16
□ Ellerman ■ City Line ■ Hall Line □ Bucknall
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Figure 19. ELL newbuildings by companies 1902-16.
The degree o f standardisation meant that ships fell into roughly similar categories 
which meant that crews could be moved from one ship in a class to any other without their 
experience being wasted or their efficiency decreased. It also meant that stocks o f spare 
gear could be rationalised, and that greater savings were possible on bulk buying o f stores 
and accurate comparisons could be made on consumptions by different ships in the same 
class.
Gross registered tons (grt) is commonly used to denote the size o f a ship and may 
vary according to the flag state. It is essentially a measure o f the cubic capacity o f a ship, 
while the net registered tons (nrt) is roughly the grt less deductions for ‘non-earning7 
spaces. Gross registered tons, in British flag ships, is frequently used for calculating the
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number o f crew; o f wages and o f the type and quantity o f safety equipment required by the 
national maritime authority. Net registered tons is used for calculating port dues, light dues 
and other imposts dreamed up by authorities such as port and harbour boards and the 
various canal companies.
To define ships by gross registered tonnage (grt) is not as important to the 
shipowner as the deadweight tonnage (dwt). This is a direct measurement o f the weight o f 
o f the ship as built plus the cargo, fuel and stores a ship can carry without sinking below the 
load-line. There is no empirical formula for comparing grt and dwt, but for a standard 
general cargo ship grt is roughly two-thirds o f the dwt. Passenger ships have a larger grt 
than cargo ships with the same dimensions as there are fewer deductible spaces - every 
space concerned with passengers is treated as an earning space.
Ship Types
Flush decker.
The standard ship had a continuous flush main deck, which was also the strength deck, 
below which cargo would be stowed. The number o f holds varied, as did the intermediate 
or ‘tween’ decks. Dues were based on the enclosed volume o f the vessel, less deductions.
Permissable Superstructures .Bulkhead,Tonnage and Freeboard 
.Deck
Engine
Room
Double Bottom 
Tanks - Exempt
Figure 20. Flushdeck cargo ship
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Shelterdecker.
The shelterdecker was designed to reduce the tonnages on which dues were paid without 
decreasing the weight o f cargo carried. This is achieved by leaving the shelter deck open to 
the elements. In practice a tonnage opening is made in the main deck, o f equal width to the 
main hatches but very much shorter - the size being governed by regulations. This tonnage 
opening is covered with normal hatch covers and tarpaulins with the proviso that they must 
not be permanently secured. From this concept the ‘paragraph ship’ developed - a vessel 
designed to have a small gross registered tonnage and a large deadweight60.
Permissable Superstructure^
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r ------------
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Shelter Deck Cargo
Bulkhead, Tonnage & Freeboard Deck
Figure 21. Shelter deck cargo ship.
In 1913 ten o f the Hall Line ships carried City names, while Papayanni Line had 
received three older City Line ships which retained their original names. Gradually the Hall 
suffix disappeared, and the term City Line became synonymous with Ellerman and his 
passenger ships to India and South Africa.
There was an increase in the size o f the cargo ships; those built since 1901 ranged 
between 4,443 and 6,498 with an average o f 4,868grt. So far as falling into classes is 
concerned, cargo ships built between 1900-1903 were in the 4,000grt range, those built 
between 1904-1913 were between 5,000 to 6,000grt. The machinery was the typical triple 
expansion double-acting reciprocating steam engine with coal-fired Scotch boilers;
An example is a ship of 1499.99 grt lifting 3000 tons of cargo. There is a considerable difference 
between the statutory requirements for vessels under 1500 grt and the next band. It should be noted 
that most modem ‘Ro-Ro’ ships are shelterdeckers, with the main ramp at main deck level and a 
consequent reduction in freeboard - the spaces above this deck are theoretically open to wind and 
water.
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electricity was supplied at 110 volts Direct Current by steam-driven dynamos for lighting 
and the wireless installation. This type of machinery installation was still being fitted until 
after the Second World War, while other flags and companies were moving towards diesel 
engines and oil fuel.
The pattern of building shows that Ellerman chose ships for a future of expansion in 
trade and had confidence that cargo would be forthcoming to fill them. This building was 
also taking place during a time of low freight rates. References are made in the Directors' 
Minute Book to poor trading conditions, which precluded payment of a six per cent 
dividend on ordinary shares from 1904 until 1910 (UGD131/2/1/1).
By 1913 the Ellerman fleets had grown to 84 ships aggregating 350,000 grt from 68 
ships totalling 205,000 grt in 1902. Overall, savings were made on building, registration, 
insurance, crews (including linen and victualling), port dues, fuel costs and maintenance. 
Bucknalls added another 32 ships and 152,485 grt to the combined fleets making a total of 
116 ships of 409,524 grt. The Stock Exchange Official Intelligence for 1914 shows 
Ellerman Lines Limited owning 132 ships aggregating 604,432 grt, including vessels 
‘building or contracted for’. This is an increase of some forty per cent for numbers and 
tonnage in less than a year! However, the inclusion of a substantial number of ‘vessels 
building or contracted for’ explains the provision in Ellerman Lines Ltd amended Articles of 
Agreement of 1913 that would allow Debentures to be issued in 1916 ‘to pay for vessels 
now building or on order’ (UGD131/2/1/1 p.186).
This is another example of Ellerman's foresight - he had, after all, acquired Bucknalls 
because of their over-enthusiastic and under-financed acquisition of new tonnage at the time 
of the South African War. Ellerman was contnuing with his long term objective of building 
up a modem purpose-built fleet. It is unlikely, however, that his prescience in planning new 
tonnage extended to the ability to replace future war-time losses.
The enlistment of Prinsep for social occasions shows the retiring nature of Ellerman, 
which persisted throughout his professional life. Whether this was encouraged by the feet 
that he was not yet married to the mother of his child, or whether there was a more deeply 
rooted cause, it is striking that he avoided public gatherings, belonged to no clubs and few 
photographs of him exist.
From the time he took over City Line and Hall Line, rival shipowners like Clan Line 
(Cayzer Irvine) watched him carefully. Their London manager commented on the launch of 
the City o f Oxford in 1902:
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I should think Ellerman will do the Thing really well as he really smells of money. I 
believe there are to be about forty or fifty people aboard. Mr Val Prinsep, RA, and his wife 
are to act as Host and Hostess. He is said to be the next largest shareholder in the 
Ellerman Line, and is, I believe, a son-in-law of Leyland (Muir and Mair, 1978, p.229).
The total expenditure on new-buildings over this period was £3,526,744, including two 
vessels ordered for Bucknall in 1913 - before the take-over! He had also bought second­
hand ships from Bucknall in 1906, which may have been his introduction to their problems. 
Certainly the total of £3,700,000 spent on buildings and purchases was off-set by almost 
£1,000,000 from sales and insurance claims for losses - unfortunately there is little detail 
about either, which are probably under-stated (table 12). The balance sheets of the 
Ellerman Lines Ltd, as published in Fairplay reveal little apart from an entry showing 
‘instalments paid on new-buildings, completed or under construction’.
The pattern of reconstruction shows a concentration on building for the ‘prestige’ 
companies of City Line and Hall Line, while simultaneously modernising his own company - 
Ellerman Line - with reasonably new second-hand tonnage.
Sales Insurance claimed To Newbuildings To Purchases
Ships 40 13 64 21
Paid or received n/a £27750 £3526744 £311995
Table 12. Fleet sales, purchasing and building costs 1902-1913 
Compiled from Ellerman Lines Ltd Directors’ Minute Book.
The bread-and butter of the fleets was in cargo; even in the passenger ships the 
cargoes earned the money. George Smith and Sons are recognised as instigating other 
Glasgow shipowners, in 1874, to sign the first Conference agreement for the Glasgow - 
Calcutta trade. Ellerman acquired all existing conference rights belonging to the companies 
taken over, and thereafter frequently signed Conference Agreements on behalf of all the 
ships (Montgomerie and Workman Ltd Agreements E - Z)61.
At the same time he insisted on separate berths in each port for Hall Line and City 
Line as individual Conference members. With his interests in collieries he also made sure 
that bunkering arrangements followed the same pattern. In common with other shipowners
An exception was the 1899 Colombo Conference of which City Line (George Smith and 
Sons) was a founder member. Hall Line was admitted to the Conference in 1906.
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Ellerman used bunker coal for ballast on outward voyages (Sturmey, 1962, p. 13), but was 
averse to cargo space being lost to bunkers on homeward voyages. In order to maximize 
revenue-earning freight tonnages, ships frequently bunkered in Malta to complete the 
homeward leg. Ellerman made use o f his London Agents Montgomerie and Workman as 
the channel for agreements on Conferences and bunkering in addition to the normal business 
o f agency work.
In 1896 a 5 years Conference agreement with tea shippers was made; although the 
City Line ships, from the days o f George Smith and Son, had been renowned for their 
expertise with tea - the king o f cargoes. There was a division o f tea cargos among the 
major lines - this amounted to around ninety per cent o f the total shipped by all lines - and 
City Line consistently carried forty to fifty per cent o f this (see figure 22).
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Figure 22. Tea cargoes from Ceylon 1904-1916.
Not only did City Line ships make fast passages, but the tea was always in good 
condition on arrival. This required more skill in stowage and attention to cargo than some 
ship-owners - or their crews - were either willing or able to provide.
With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 steamships began to take over from sail, 
and offered a regular and rapid passage from India to Europe. However, tea shippers were 
reluctant at first to entrust their fragrant and valuable cargos to steamships with their 
belching funnels and a mixture o f coal dust and oil which permeated the atmosphere.
George Smith and Sons persuaded some shippers to try their new steamers, which proved
55
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such a success that City Line held its lead in the tea trade until the First World war, when 
cargoes were allocated by the Ministry of Shipping.
The first Conference Minute for the Calcutta and Colombo tea trade was signed in 
1885, with nine companies participating. George Smith and Sons had twenty-five percent 
of the cargoes, with P&O and BISN next with twelve and one-half per cent each 
(UGD131/1/9/1). Under Ellerman’s direction his ships entered into further conference 
agreements including one for South Africa.
Taking upon himself the decisions affecting the group as a whole - salaries, bunkers, 
freight agreements among others, the economies of scale were immediately apparent62.
Ships could be built with basic features in common, engine type, hull form, tonnages for 
particular ports and so on. This meant an increased ability for substitution between fleets, 
which by 1913 had been extended to personnel. The size of his enterprises also gave 
greater weight in financial markets and the respective shipping-related industries. In 1907 
Ellerman was elected President of the British Chamber of Shipping, and also gave evidence 
to the Inquiry into Conferences, a long-running but gentlemanly battle with the government 
of the day. His inaugural speech to the Chamber of Shipping was concerned with over- 
regulation by the Department of Trade - particularly the unilateral demands on UK 
shipowners to comply with safety regulations not generally recognised by most other 
shipping nations. This speech met with great approval from his fellow shipowners, and 
Fairplay reported that it was the most relevant and intelligible speech that august body had 
ever heard.
Ellerman not only acted as ship-broker, director of human resources, overall 
manager but also was effectively the technical director. He negotiated personally with 
shipyards for new-building and agreed the contracts. He also examined plans for 
modifications and even monitored the provision and siting of the Wireless rooms required 
by newly introduced Board of Trade Regulations (UGD131/1/13/1)63. This does not mean 
that he lacked professional advisers among his employees, or that he was not prepared to 
accept technical advice from other shipowners.64
He commented on the proposals of Superintendents while never losing sight of the 
viability of the ships. Common coaling contracts, uniform wages and transfer of officers 
between any ships in the Group were all introduced by him in the early years. There was
62 Ordering stores and ship-chandlery for a large fleet produced discounts - sometimes as high as
50%. Similarly with Insurance.
63 Letter to W. S. Workman ‘Unreasonable attitude of BOT towards W/T\
64 An example is the introduction of the cruiser stem from Wilson Line of Hull.
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also a common form of voyage account which made it possible to draw comparisons of 
performance between different ships and companies. Above all, he was in constant touch 
with his businesses, particularly the ships, even writing personally to Workman from his 
bungalow at Worthing or his hotel in Paris. The letters and notebooks referred to above 
provide a daily commentary on his ability to remember and decide a multitude of issues. 
These were personal interventions, whether from his bungalow in Worthing, an hotel in 
Paris or his yacht, he communicated direct with his managers in Glasgow, Liverpool and 
London. At the same time he allowed sufficient autonomy to his subordinates to act against 
his advice in some cases; when they were wrong, he minced no words in pointing this out. 
This facility to see the wood through the trees suggests that he would have succeeded in 
many other fields had he limited himself to any one of them.
Ellerman was an exceptional man with simple tastes (no large estate, no racehorses, 
no social aspirations). In addition there was no extended family with parisitical demands 
which hindered wealth accumulation and, most important, Ellerman was virtually the sole 
owner and so had absolute authority. Ellerman as a shipowner took a detailed interest in the 
operations of his ships. There is no record of such interest in the mechanics of brewing or 
collieries apart from their finances. There are suggestions that he played some part in the 
editorial decisions of The Financial Times, although one obituary suggests otherwise 
{Financial Times July 18th 1933)65. Compared with the returns from investments in other 
areas such as property, shipping was not a cow which gave perpetual milk (Green and 
Moss, 1982).
Ellerman’s daughter (Bryher, 1973) suggested that her father had little interest in 
money as such - accumulating a fortune was a game for which he had an instinct. He 
enjoyed travelling in his own vessels or sailing his yacht among the Western Isles of 
Scotland or in the Mediterranean. There was, however, no sentimentality about his attitude 
to operating the ships or to the men sailing in them, despite his reputation as a good 
employer. There is a common factor in his shipping acquisitions - apart from Westcott and 
Laurence, the other companies had dissipated their capital among extended family 
shareholdings. For Ellerman, the lack of family connections may be seen as an advantage! 
Another constant in his operation of these companies was the retention of salaried managers 
at the expense of most of the original directors. Again, with Papayanni, City Line, Hall and 
the ex-Leyland vessels, the companies were wholly owned by Ellerman or Ellerman Lines
65 Obituary of Sir John Reeves Ellerman, Bart, CH “only part played in publishing was to check the
printers' bills”.
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Ltd; as the majority shareholder in the latter it amounted to the same thing. Complete 
control of an undertaking is one of the characteristics of the successful entrepreneur, and to 
this must be added his skill in negotiations and his solid assets which were accepted - 
without being specified - as security for all his enterprises.
Different Ships - Same Cap-tallies66
Immediately after the take-over of the other companies the original managers looked after 
their 'own' ships, and until 1912, when the last debentures were retired, some City Line 
ships were wholly owned by the debenture trustees of City Line Ltd. However, within a 
few years Lloyd’s Register showed a diverse ownership among all the companies, including 
Ellerman Line and Papayanni Line. The parent company Ellerman Lines Ltd was shown as 
owner of 29 ships, George Smith and Sons owned 9, City Line 5 while Sir John Reeves 
Ellerman owned the City o f Edinburgh, built in 1899. A possible explanation of the last is 
that the ship was in the process of being sold and that Ellerman had ’bought' the ship from 
City Line67. It has already been pointed out that he personally dealt with all sales and 
purchases - which is where the real money is made in shipping! It must be noted that, 
according to Lloyds Register, Hall Line owned no ships.
The Ellerman funnel colours and an Ellerman pennant to be worn in conjuction with 
the house flag of the original company were introduced in 1904 (UGD131/2 /13/2).
Standard wages for ships' officers and crews were not introduced until 1912, when Hall 
Line complained that they were losing personnel to outside companies paying higher wages. 
In addition, a certain amount of 'horse-trading' went on when officers were transferred, with 
their ship, to another fleet. If the transfer were treated as a bare-boat charter, then the 
receiving company would pay the wages, whereas a voyage charter would be confined to 
payment for the ship alone. When different rates applied to different fleets there was 
unavoidably some friction due to some officers receiving higher pay than usual, which they 
found acceptable, while others received less, which was unacceptable. Eventually Ellerman 
decided upon the rates to be paid throughout the fleet, and told Workman (City Line) and 
MacAllister (Hall Line) to implement them (UGD131/1/13/2).
A cap-tally refers to the band round the cap of a seaman, with the name of the ship printed on it. 
Different ships naturally had different cap-tallies. The original saying is: ‘different ships, different 
cap-tallies’ which means ‘forget what you did in your last ship and start again in this one’. 
Ellerman, with his desire for uniformity, made each ship adopt the same routines.
As the Maplemore she was one of Ellerman’s first purchases - before London and Ocean 
SS was formed.
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Overall the ships were run as one fleet, and insurance, depreciation and capital for 
expansion all passed through Ellerman's control. The astonishing loyalty which he 
commanded, not only from his shore staff but from his crews is something which was 
remembered even after his death. The ships had good accommodation for the officers, and 
fed well, while there was some continuity of employment with paid leave - which was not 
common in the pre-First War Merchant Navy. It was not common in the Second World 
War either, when most shipping companies stopped pay for all officers and ratings as soon 
as the ship was sunk by enemy action. This changed only in 1942, when an Established 
Service scheme was introduced.
Management was even more interestingly diversified. In 1910 Robert Alexander 
managed one ship, City o f Agra, owned by Ellerman Lines Ltd. Wm S. Workman 
personally managed three ships, including one owned by City Line Ltd but shown in the 
Papayanni fleet list. Hall Line Ltd managed thirteen ships, while George Smith and Sons 
managed eighteen. These were the nominal managers; in fact Ellerman personally was the 
de facto manager. Lloyds Register is notoriously inaccurate with up-to-date information 
about masters, owners and managers as changes may not be recorded for over a year, 
depending on the actual date of publication of amendments. Ellerman was a typical 
shipowner in that any ship was for sale at the right price and time.
The Shipyards
It was not unusual for shipowners to have interests in fields allied to shipping - collieries, 
steelworks - and shipyards. Furness bought the Withy shipyard a year after he started 
operating his own fleet, and later acquired interests in other forms of heavy industry. 
Workman Clark of Belfast was founded by a shipowning family and expanded with the 
offspring of others - Allans, Clarks and Smiths among them. This family connection 
probably led George Smith and Sons to build most of their new vessels in Belfast, and 
George Smith III was a major shareholder in Workman Clark from its incorporation.
Ellerman continued to build new tonnage with Workman Clark, but also used other 
yards including Barclay Curie on the Clyde and Palmers on the Tyne. Workman Clark 
shared passenger ship construction with these other yards, and there was little difference in 
the prices (UGD131/2/1/1). He did not, however, use Harland and Wolff who were 
pioneers of the motorship and deeply involved with Royal Mail Lines and Owen Philipps68.
Pirrie, chairman of Harland and Wolff, joined Leyland Line as a director when Ellerman 
resigned as chairman.
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By 1913 he was using some smaller yards, particularly for the Mediterranean steamers, 
including yards in which Thomas Wilson o f Hull, the largest private shipowner in the United 
Kingdom, had an interest.
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Figure 23. Ellerman newbuildings by shipyards.
At this time Ellerman showed no interest in acquiring his own shipbuilding facility, 
but changed his policy after acquiring Thomas Wilson of Hull in 1916. Ellerman had now 
added a fleet which gave him an additional 66 ships of about 200,000 grt with world-wide 
trading facilities. Also included in the transaction were other interests and part-ownership 
of Earles shipyard which he had been using since 1914.
In concert with Sir William Gray and others, the Egis shipyard was opened on the 
Tees in 1917 to prepare for the post-war demand for ships. So far as the Egis yard is 
concerned, Inchcape and Strick stopped short o f ownership o f the yard, but did undertake 
to build ships there (Taylor, 1976; Rubinstein, 1984; Boyce, 1995)69. Ellerman also bought 
the whole o f the shares in Ramage and Ferguson o f Leith, another shipyard he had 
favoured, particularly for cruiser sterns. During the war he had been keeping his own tally 
of shipping losses, and production o f merchant ships from British shipyards, and in 1918 
expressed his views forcibly that the whole British war-time ship-building output was 
insufficient to cover losses by marine causes, let alone losses due to enemy action to 
provide for this shortfall in building capacity (Fairplay 1917 p.263). From 1917 Ellerman 
also contracted with several shipyards to provide building berths to be available from the 
end o f controls on shipping and shipbuilding for the following ten years (UGD131/2/1/1).
UGD131/1/1 makes it clear the the Egis shipyard was started by Gray, Ellerman and Wilson; 
Inchcape and Strick dropped out of the negotiations at an early stage.
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The increase in tonnage in 1914 was due primarily to the aquisition of Bucknall, and 
was followed by a new- building programme covering the next four years. Ellerman 
ordered ships from different yards and specified each individual order with descriptions such 
as ‘same as 232’ - an earlier order, or ‘similar to Roumelia and for the Mediterranean 
trade’.
Cruiser Sterns
In the last four decades of the nineteenth century development of more efficient steam 
engines, the use of electricity at sea and the opening of the Suez Canal revolutionised the 
operation of shipping. The steam turbine, the internal combustion engine and the use of oil 
as a fuel further changed the pattern of shipping in the years leading up to 1914. The first 
operational turbines were fitted to naval vessels, where economic restraints were secondary 
to speed, fighting efficiency and firepower. The development of hydraulics allowed the 
application of servo-systems which gave remote control and flexibility in siting machinery in 
less exposed and more accessible parts of the ship.
Greater speeds and greater displacements required more powerful steering 
mechanisms, which required the application of steam engines. Steam steering engines, like 
the old hand-steering wheel, were placed on the after deck above the rudder and 
consequently were exposed to wind and weather. With the existing counter stems, retained 
from sailing ships, there was no room for the steering engine below the main deck.
Warships were also exposed to enemy shells, so new cruisers were built with the steering 
gear in a compartment below the main deck, which effectively formed the cruiser stem. Not 
only was there reduced maintenance on the equipment which was now protected from the 
elements, but the surrounding space could be used for stores and spare gear. In addition, 
the new form extended the waterline at loaded drafts giving greater buoyancy and better 
sea-keeping qualities and in the early 1900s the construction was adapted to merchant ships.
Cruiser stems first appear among the details of ships in the Lloyd’s Register for 
1914-15. Although a French cross-channel ferry, the Seine circa 1890, is reputed to be the 
first merchant vessel fitted with a cruiser stem, no details of the name or ship have been 
found in Lloyds Registers.
McCleave, P.R., 2003, chapter 4.
104
William Gray built the first o f a recognisable Ellerman type, with cruiser stem and 
welldeck abaft the midships structure housing accommodation and galley.
Figure 24. Counter stem, Sandon Hall, 1906, Barclay Curies, Glasgow. Painting by A. 
Khan, Hong Kong, (published by Shipwrecked Mariners Society).
Figure 25. Cruiser stem. Hall Line City o f  Norwich, William Gray, 1913. Reproduced 
from The Golden Age o f  Shipping (1995), p.38.
Compare Sandon Hall, with the counter or ‘duckbill’ stem as it was known, built in 1906 
by Barclay Curie o f Glasgow (figure 24) and City o f  Norwich, with the cruiser stem, built in 
1913 by William Gray (figure 25).
Thomas Wilson o f Hull appear to have been the first United Kingdom shipowner to 
adopt it, in the Borodino o f 1987 grt, delivered from Earle’s shipyard in 1911. After this 
the design spread, and was adopted by Ellerman with the City o f  Norwich from William 
Gray’s yard in 1913..
McCleave, P.R., 2003, chapter 4.
H
Although other companies gradually moved towards its use, some, such as Alfred 
Holt and Hamburg-Amerika Line, retained counter stems until the 1930s. Ellerman and 
Wilson built most of their subsequent tonnage to this design, and also spread their orders 
wider as more shipyards adopted the technique. Table 26 below shows the companies and 
vessels with cruiser stems as reported in Lloyd’s Register for 1916-17.
Date Company Ship Yard GRT
1911 Thos Wilson Borodino Earles 1987
1913 Ellerman C/Norwich Wm Gray 6382
1913 Allan Line Alsatian Beardmore 18481
1914 Cayzer Irvine Clan Campbell Napier 5897
1915 Federal Nav. Devon A.& C de France 9661
1915 Red Star Bergenland Harland & Wolffe 26500
1915 Chatham & SE Rly Biarritz Denny 2495
Table 13. Cruiser stems by owners and builders.
The Pinnacle of Power
With the acquisition of Bucknalls Ellerman crowned his shipping empire and entered into 
the second half-century of his life. Like his contemporaries, Ellerman appeared unaware of 
the clouds on the horizon - indeed, his orders for newbuildings suggest that he looked 
forward to a bright future. In any event he was a significant figure in shipping with a large 
work force comprised of different nationalities. Ellerman, whatever his feelings about trade 
unions and socialism, was an enlightened employer. Does this hold the key to his success, 
this ability to get the best out of his available resources, whether material or human? 
Perhaps he was completely devoid of emotion, as his daughter suggested, and whatever the 
task to which he applied himself it was treated as a game of skill with the objective of 
optimizing his talents - which meant making a profit. The element of personal control must 
be the lynch-pin of his organizations, and whether he would be equally successful today is 
open to question. Certainly he was a man ahead of his time - but that time was still the 
Victorian age. In the application of new technology he was behind other shipowners in 
using turbines or building motorships. In favour of his staying with tried and tested 
equipment, it must be said that both turbines and diesel engines had high capital costs and 
required a higher standard both of personnel and maintenance. In addition, it was easier to
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sell a 25 year-old simple coal-fired three-legged up-and-downer70 to Greeks or Chinese 
buyers than it was to sell more sophisticated ships. Here again is an explanation of 
Ellerman's success in shipping - as with other fields of investment. By building ships to a 
standard design which served for over twenty years, and also looking at the eventual 
disposal of the assets for a satisfactory price (serviceable second-hand tonnage is worth 
more than the scrap value), his operation made the maximum use of all resources. He was 
without question a manager par excellence who owned most of the ships he managed. In 
this context it is no coincidence that while the number of shipping companies has decreased 
dramatically since 1980 the number of ships operated by Management Companies has 
increased. Ellerman was the active manager of all the ships - this meant that all 
commissions, fees and rebates went to him. Better still, his office and staff were provided 
free while he not only received a salary but also collected a substantial performance bonus 
through his Management shares (UGD131/2/1 p.34). It should be a salutary lesson to all 
businessmen that profits are more hardly earned than commissions and fees. These are, 
however, well worth the extra work involved in active management. Unfortunately, few of 
us have the memory or the aptitude for balance sheets possessed by Ellerman, who 
appeared capable of remembering and reducing any collection of facts and figures into an 
evaluation of profitability.
70 The colloquial description of a triple expansion reciprocating engine.
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CHAPTER FIVE - WAR-TIME MILLIONS.
The First Shock
In 1914 Sir John Reeves Ellerman controlled 139 ships (including 13 building) of 756,077 
gross tons in Ellerman Lines Ltd, in addition to a 55 per cent holding in Shaw Savill and 
Albion (UGD131/2/1/1) and a continuing interest in Leyland Lines with his large 
preference share-holding. With the acquisition of Bucknalls he had access to properties 
and agencies in South Africa, and because his agreement with J.P. Morgan and IMM had 
expired, was able to trade again to North and South America. From 1912 he had engaged 
in a massive building programme on behalf of Ellerman Lines Ltd, personally negotiating 
for each ship, and spreading his orders around many shipyards. To prepare for unforeseen 
cash flow problems, he had prudently made provision for debentures to be raised if 
necessary and so cover the cost of the newbuildings. It is not surprising that the outbreak 
of war between the ‘Triple Entente’ or Allied Powers71, and the ‘Triple Alliance6 or Central 
Powers72, came as a shock.
The immediate effect of the prospect of war followed by the actual outbreak 
administered a rude shock to the delicate mechanism so essential to the operation of 
financial markets and associated world trade. For the City of London there was a week of 
vacillation and timidity because the magnitude of the possible effects, assuming they had 
ben foreseen, had been underestimated and miscalculated. There was the shadow of 
impending insolvency and a lowering of share prices, which meant that where shares 
formed all or part of the collateral for loans, the lending banks, to reduce their exposure to 
a reduction in their own solvency, started calling in some loans and forcing unfortunate 
customers into bankruptcy. With some success this effect was minimised in the United 
Kingdom by closing the Stock Exchange on 31st July 1914, and keeping it closed until 
September, which prevented any movement of share prices other than by private traders.
In 1914, Britain, France, Russia, Serbia and Belgium,
In August 1914 the Empires of Germany and Austro-Hungary and the Kingdom of Italy. Italy 
stayed out of the initial hostilities, and joined the Allies in 1915. Although not a member of either 
grouping, the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in October, 1914.
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Simultaneously there was an immediate problem caused by a shortage of change 
which made it difficult to cash larger notes; on 6th August 1914 the Treasury issued 
Treasury73 notes of £1 and 10 shillings which were advanced to the Joint Stock Banks 
against a floating charge on the Treasury (Keynes, 1914). Bank Rate rose from 3 per cent 
on 22nd July to 10 per cent on 1st August, before dropping back to 6 per cent on 7th 
August. Foreign trade dried up as foreign clients failed to meet their obligations on a scale 
which left £350,000 outstanding in London.
For over a decade it had become increasingly obvious that Germany was in active 
competition with the United Kingdom, and was building up maritime forces to challenge 
her mastery of the seas74. Subsidised shipping led to low freight rates with little prospect of 
improvement in the short term (Lloyd’s Weekly, 29 February 1914, pp 120-1)75; Fairplay, 
August 1914, p.345)76. Novelists like Erskine Childers in The Riddle o f the Sands11, and 
Rudyard Kipling, forecast a conflict between the two ‘Teutonic cousins’ (Nicholson, 1930, 
p.391). After all, was not the King of England of good German stock, and was not the 
family name Saxe-Coburg? The ceding of Heligoland to Germany in 1890 was seen by 
some of the more wider-thinking British politicians and military leaders as opening a gap in 
the defence of the United Kingdom. The Liberal Government under Asquith was pledged 
to Free Trade and social intervention78 and was openly pacifist. When war, after days of 
procrastination, was eventually declared on 4th August 1914, the first shocks reverberated 
around an unprepared international shipping industry.
Russell Smith (1919, p.26) points out that the war fell on a world oversupplied with 
shipping. Shipowners, like everyone else, were stunned by the explosion and the war itself; 
their industry had a paralysis - a quadruple paralysis {Lloyd’s Weekly, February 29th 1914 
pp. 120-1)79; Fairplay, August 1914, p.345)80.
75
76
So called in order to distinguish them from bank notes which were the normal currency.
In 1896 the German Admiral von Tirpitz announced his naval programme - to surpass
England(szc) in numbers of both warships and merchant ships. This latter introduced a world­
wide surplus of tonnage and low rates.
“Depression in the shipping trade has followed so closely on the heels of a remarkable ... freights 
have touched an unprofitable level. Steamers are being laid up at certain ports in steadily 
increasing numbers”.
“In July shipowners were preparing for a long depression, and the question was, how long would it 
last”.
An adventure tale about German military pretensions in the North Sea.
A minimum wage and reform of legislation curbing trade unions.
‘Depression in the shipping trade has followed so closely on the heels of a remarkable ... freights 
have touched an unprofitable level. Steamers are being laid up at certain ports in steadily 
increasing numbers’.
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The first effect was the drying up of credit, due to the disturbances in the financial 
markets, which lasted for two months {Lloyd’s Weekly, October 2nd, 1914, p.627)81. The 
strength of German land forces was underlined by their invasion of Belgium and France. At 
sea, immediately war was declared, German commerce raiders started their attacks in the 
South Pacific, South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, and reaped a harvest among 
unsuspecting British merchant ships. Submarines and mines made their appearance in the 
waters round the British Isles and the North Sea, taking a slow but steady toll of shipping. 
As early as the 6th August 1914 the British ship charter market was reported ‘absolutely’ 
dead {Fairplay, 6th August 1914) and later that month it was declared:
Chartering has come to a complete standstill in all the trades of the world {Syren 
and Shipping, 12th August, 1914).
Simultaneously, underwriters went ‘on strike’ as the presence of raiders made it impossible 
to calculate risks and so insure either hulls or cargoes. In the Mediterranean and nearby 
waters where the Royal Navy offered some protection, trade continued, although at a 
reduced level. Within three weeks, however, the governments of the leading maritime 
nations had entered into the insurance market by providing finance for War Risk premiums 
(Russel Smith, 1919, p.28) either directly or through subsidies to private insurance 
companies.
Shipping business began to move again, but freight rates continued their decline 
from the already unprofitable levels of July 1914. Traders were waiting for stability in the 
money markets, while shippers remained loath to commit themselves to sending goods 
across uncertain seas to destinations which might no longer be accessible {Lloyd’s Weekly, 
August 28th, 1914)82. This initial stage of the war ended with the German retreat from the 
Marne, and by October 1914 the opposing armies were dug in along the line of the Aisne, 
beginning four years of virtual stalemate and bloody trench warfare. By this time freight 
rates were rising and neutral shipowners were advertising sailings (Russell Smith, 1919 
p.29). Among those publicly less confident of the future, however, were shipowners like
‘In July shipowners were preparing for a long depression, and the question was, how long would 
it last’.
’Ships here [New York] cannot obtain cargoes for the reason that American shippers are not 
convinced they can get quick payment... Until the state of the financial market is improved there 
will continue to be hundreds of vessels lying idly at the docks’.
‘... St Petersburg, Gothenburg, Copenhagen, Danzig, Hamburg, Stettin, Emden, Antwerp, 
Rotterdam and Trieste, are practically closed to trade. These are all large receiving ports, and the 
fact that they are all shut down means that some of the largest markets in the world are closed to 
shipowners.’
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Ropner and Co., Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, and J. P. Morgan’s International 
Mercantile Marine, all of which notified shareholders of a ‘deplorable position’ for 
earnings due to the high cost of insurance offsetting increases in freight rates.
These fears were unfounded, because by the end of November it had been realised 
that the loss of Eastern European supplies to Western Europe meant a demand for more 
ships, as the alternative sources were more distant. Requisitioning of British tramp ships 
began in October 1914, with the publication of Blue Book rates of eleven shillings/grt (6 
shillings and 6 pence/dwt) for a 7,000 dwt steamship compared with 45shillings/dwt for 
neutral vessels. An estimated 10 per cent of British tonnage was requisitioned in the first 
weeks of the war, rising to 25 per cent by the end of 1915. Requisitioned ships carried 
government cargoes, and as sixty per cent of British sugar supplies came from enemy 
territories, on August 20th 1914 a Royal Commission was set up to buy, sell and distribute 
sugar from other sources. Transport from the producing countries provided a bulk cargo 
for requisitioned ships (Taylor, 1990, pp 5-6), which were predominately from the 
trampship companies.
As the war continued, so the scarcity of ships became more acute and ship prices 
rose in response. Requisitioning was a factor in higher freight rates for free tonnage, which 
by January 1915 were rising daily. The submarine and the mine were proving more lethal 
than the surface raider, most of which had been removed from the seas by the Battle of the 
Falklands in December 1914. Despite these war-time perils, the commerce of Britain was 
not seriously affected, and in April 1915 insurance rates were down to 1 per cent. The 
Allied blockade was working, and:
The whole of the enemy trade had been swept off the outer seas, and all avenues of 
victualment and reinforcement were held for the sole use of the Allies (Churchill, 
1947).
Freight rates rocketed, and shipping companies were able to pay dividends reckoned in the 
millions - pounds, dollars or kronor. So far as the United Kingdom was concerned, the 
requisition of passenger liners for conversion into Armed Merchant Cruisers or troopships 
was one of the first acts of government. Many passenger liners had been earmarked for 
these roles from the time they had been built, with an appropriate government subsidy for 
strengthened frames in the way of proposed gun mountings, and Ellerman Lines Ltd was 
affected immediately.
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Despite his international connections, Ellerman was no better prepared for the war 
than anyone else, and now found that some of the ships he had ordered in 1913 and 1914 
would be much delayed. However, he continued to commission new tonnage, discovering 
in 1915 that shipyards would in future only accept orders on a cost-plus basis 
(UGD/131/2/1/1). From the outbreak of war, his fleet had been decreasing both in 
numbers and in tonnage. Ellerman Lines Ltd had passenger ships taken up by the 
Admiralty as Armed Merchant Cruisers, troopships or hospital ships; other vessels were 
lost to raiders or interned in German or Turkish ports. The remaining ships continued 
trading on the owner’s behalf, and it was not until 1917 that cargo liners were brought into 
the net of requisitions, to a chorus of complaints by Ellerman and his fellow liner owners. 
There is little detail in the Directors’ Minute Book of Ellerman Lines Ltd about ship 
movements, other than ‘lost by enemy action’; but a great deal about the profits being 
made, and complaints of the iniquitous taxes the government was now levying on 
shipowners.
Convoys or Capitulation.
If shipowners were unprepared for war, the Admiralty and senior officers of the Royal 
Navy were even more so. On 4th August, 1914, the German minelayer Konigen Louise 
was sunk by British destroyers in the Thames Estuary, having laid about 180 mines. The 
following morning the cruiser Amphion struck one of these mines, and sank within minutes. 
There was no provision in the fleet for minesweepers, so trawlers were requisitioned and 
pressed into service. On 22nd September 1914 three ageing cruisers were sunk by U-9 on 
their way back from patrol off Harwich. Admiralty had made no provision to provide any 
naval base anywhere on the East Coast of England. Rosyth, on the Firth of Forth, was 
under construction, and Scapa Flow, the ‘haven’ for the Home Fleet, had no anti-submarine 
defences, mine-sweeping facilities or any form of defence other than the guns of the 
battleships lying there. On 18th October 1914 Jellicoe moved the Grand Fleet to the safety 
of Lough Swilly in Northern Ireland - hardly the best vantage point for rapid response to 
enemy action in the North Sea. The success of the U-boat should not have come as such a 
surprise. Admiral ‘Jackie’ Fisher, when First Sea Lord, had been aware of the potential of 
the submarine as an offensive weapon, and in 1901, at the Institute of Mechanical 
Engineers, a lecturer had pointed out that submarines would be capable of inflicting 
incalculable destruction against unsuspecting and defenceless merchant ships (Watts, 1994,
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p.l 17). These pearls were cast before swine, falling on stony ground at the same time, and 
the Royal Navy was completely unprepared for the new war at sea.
The U-boat war can be divided into four phases: the initial campaign from August 
1914 to January 1915 when U-boats stopped merchant ships and ordered the crews into 
boats before sinking the vessel; then from January 1915 to March 1916 when ‘sink at sight’ 
applied to all merchant ships. March 1916 to January 1917 saw the return to ‘controlled ‘ 
sinkings by U-boats and finally from January 1917 to November 1918 there was 
unrestricted U-boat warfare. The German Navy had entered the war with a fleet of 29 
submarines, with only two or three in service at any one time, a limited range and a 
maximum of 4 torpedoes. By 1916 the number had grown to over 100, and the newer 
submarines had a greater range, more torpedoes, and an increased striking capability. The 
policy of unrestricted sinkings included neutrals and passenger ships, one of the latter was 
the Cunard liner Lusitania carrying a number of American passengers and torpedoed in 
May 1915. In March 1916 the Sussex, another passenger ship with Americans on board 
was torpedoed and the Germans then stopped unrestricted sinkings in order to avoid a 
possible severance of diplomatic relations with the USA (Callender, 1940). When the 
United States was seen to be entering the war on the side of the Allies, unrestricted U-boat 
warfare began again in February 1917 (Kemp, 1969, p. 147). The first three phases of U- 
boat warfare had not affected the commerce of the United Kingdom to any great extent, 
although the threat to neutrals from unrestricted warfare reduced the number trading to 
Britain. The total losses for 1914-1915 amounted to 800,000 tons, mostly British ships.
In 1916 over 1.25 million tons was lost, far exceeding the output of British shipyards. The 
last phase, of total unrestricted under-sea warfare, began on 1st February 1917 (Kemp, 
1969, p. 147), and in that month alone 520,000 tons was lost, rising to 860,000 tons in 
April.
Most merchant ships voyaged alone and unarmed, and within three months one and 
a half million tons of British shipping had been destroyed. Despite historical evidence for 
the advantages of the convoy system (Callender, 1940, p. 94-5)83, this was not re­
introduced until May 1917. That this long delayed measure was justified was shown by the 
fact that in September 1917 losses from submarines were declining, although still greater 
than the rate of replacement. However the introduction of convoys with their delays and 
detours increased voyage times, which meant even more ships were required.
83 To combat Prince Rupert’s privateers, the Commonwealth institued a system of convoys.
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Governments also needed shipping space to transport troops and materials to the 
various battlefields, and munitions manufacture demanded increased imports o f raw 
materials. As the scarcity of ships increased, so the demands o f the fighting navies reduced 
the berths available for new merchant tonnage. For the first two years of the war there was 
no co-ordinated policy by government on shipping or shipbuilding, nor any thought of 
introducing rationing for the population.
Whose Risk?
The chaos in the financial markets extended to underwriters and governments had to 
intervene to guarantee premiums for the additional risks posed by war. In the United 
Kingdom shipowners and underwriters had prepared a provisional measure which was 
implemented within the first month after the outbreak of war in August 1914.
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Figure 26. Insurance rates 1914-18 (Russell Smith, 1919, p.49-73).
There was no open trading in insurance, and rates varied widely between different 
underwriters and the trades o f the insured vessels. When records were made available in 
1918, it was seen that the underwriters had a more realistic approach to German naval 
activity than Asquith’s government, particularly in the months of the ‘sink at sight’ U-boat 
campaign which began in late 1916 (Russell Smith, 1919, p. 49-73).
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Losses to U-boats decreased dramatically with the introduction o f convoys and the 
defensive arming o f all merchant ships. Scale of total losses represents millions o f tons and 
includes neutral and Allied shipping. It was a near thing, and had it not been for the United 
States and its massive shipbuilding programme, which handled the supplies o f men and 
materiel for the US armies in France, the shortage o f shipping would have increased during 
1918.
U.K. LOSSES TO U-BOATS 1914-18
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Figure 27. U.K. merchant ship losses to U-boats 1914-18. Compiled from a variety of 
sources including Winston Churchill’s published personal memoirs and naval 
histories referred to in references.
Asquith, as Prime Minister and an ardent apostle of Free Trade, refused to take 
formal control o f shipping, choosing to leave it to existing departments. For the first two 
years o f the war, therefore, control o f shipping was vested in two departments, the 
Admiralty and the Board o f Trade; and three special committees: Shipping Control 
Committee, Ships Licensing Committee and Port and Transit Executive Committee 
(Russell Smith, 1919, p 159).
This multiplicity of authorities meant cargo ships were requisitioned on a rather 
haphazard basis until December 1916, when a Ministry o f Shipping was created. Joseph 
Paton Maclay, owner o f the Glasgow tramp company Maclay and MacIntyre, was 
appointed Controller o f Shipping and for the first time one man had ‘practically the whole 
shipping o f the country under control and regulation’ (Lloyd's Weekly Review , 16th May 
1917, p.7). Until that time, most liner companies had been immune from requisitions,
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leaving tramps to carry cargoes at Blue Book rates84. Maclay requisitioned all ships and 
employed the owners as managers. The liner companies were invited to sign Heads of 
Agreement which made use of the Conferences already in existence. Alfred Holt of Blue 
Funnel Line challenged Maclay in the courts, on the grounds that the system was ultra 
vires, as requisitioning applied only to ships and not services (Taylor, 1990, Pp. 77-9). 
Although Holt was upheld by the court, Maclay ignored the ruling. In addition to direct 
controls on vessels’ movements and their cargoes, a system of licensing shipments before 
they could go overseas was introduced (Russell Smith, 1919, p.43). Similar controls were 
imposed on manufacturing industry to determine production and prices. In 1917, therefore, 
complete control of all British ships covering building, purchase, cargoes and ports was 
introduced.
The combination of losses by enemy action and longer voyages meant that the need 
for merchant tonnage expanded beyond the capacity of British shipyards. Losses due to 
perils of the sea were also higher during the war, because lights around coasts were 
extinguished, and ships were running for longer periods before being refitted or scrapped. 
Some ships were supplied by neutral countries, building in hurriedly constructed ship-yards, 
but currency controls meant that British shipowners depended on indigenous shipyards. 
Quite apart from the expansion of the Royal Navy, which was met from yards normally 
building merchant ships, vessels which had been damaged in action increased the amount of 
repair work for hull damage. A large percentage of skilled workers had been lost to the 
fighting services, while materials were also in short supply, so inevitably both costs and 
delivery times rose rapidly.
Merchant shipbuilding was now down to one-third the pre-war level and although 
the Admiralty controlled all shipyards, it was not concerned with building merchant ships.
In December 1916 Lloyd George appointed Eric Geddes, an industrialist, as Controller of 
the Navy, and in May 1917 he also became controller of shipyards when Maclay saddled 
Admiralty with the responsibility for all shipbuilding. Designs for standard cargo ships 
were introduced in 1917 and enabled a form of mass production which was speedier and 
cheaper than the individual vessels hitherto produced. Unfortunately these changes were 
too late to be effective as the Armistice was signed when only a handful of these vessels
This contained standard rates for cargoes and voyages which were appreciably lower than those 
available to neutrals and others on the open market.
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had been built. Like shipowners, in the first two years o f war shipbuilders had benefited 
from the higher prices for their products, but were soon constrained by controls on 
materials and the sale of their ships. No building was carried on for neutral flags, and the 
transfer o f ships, even from one British owner to another, was strictly regulated.
Total tonnage registered includes both ships built in the United States and prizes, 
but the graphs speak for themselves. Many merchant ships, started before the war, were 
not completed for three or four years so that some ships ordered in 1914 were not 
delivered until 1918. British shipyards never again attained the tonnage achieved in 1913, 
despite the frenzy of shipbuilding orders following the Armistice in 1919 (Russell Smith, 
1919 p.219).
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Figure 28. Operational and newbuilding merchant ship tonnage 1913-1919.
The Open Market
In August 1914 the total UK fleet o f vessels over 500 grt amounted to 12,000,000 tons 
net, or about 24,000,000 deadweight (Mitchell and Deane, 1962, p .219-223). Ten per 
cent, was immediately requisitioned at Blue Book rates, with the effect o f leaving fewer 
ships to meet market requirements. However, those ships - predominately liners - were for 
the first three years allowed to trade freely. In 1917, therefore, complete control was 
introduced for all British ships covering building, purchase, cargoes and destination ports. 
There was such a crisis in shipping that at one point food supplies were as low as six 
weeks rations for the civilian population o f the United Kingdom.
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The first two years of the war produced a backlash against profiteers, particularly 
shipowners, who were seen as forcing domestic prices - particularly staples - ever higher.
As an example, The International Mercantile Marine Company had passed dividends and 
had been unable to pay interest on debentures from 1902. Then in 1916 its earnings rose to 
£20 million, declining to £11. 5 million in 1917(Russell Smith, 1919, p. 176-7). High 
freight rates were reflected in the price of bread in the shops, so it is hardly surprising that 
shipowners had a poor public reputation. It seems incredible that the United Kingdom took 
so long to take any action about requisitioning all ships at reasonable rates.
An open market continued, therefore, during the first two years o f the war for the 
75 per cent o f British shipowners whose ships were not requisitioned. After the South 
African war freight rates for grain varied between nine shillings/ton and eighteen shillings 
until 1911. From 1912 to 1916 the rates varied between a low o f five shillings/ton in 1914 
to a high o f one hundred and eighty shillings/ton in 1916 (figure 29).
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Figure 29. Freight rates 1904-1916.
The post-South African war low prices over ten years were over-compensated by 
the excessive prices obtained in the first years o f the 1914-18 war. With the bulk purchase 
o f grain in 1917 Blue Book rates were applied and the large profits for shipowners ended.
Although the U-boat campaign gathered momentum in 1916, it was a year before 
active counter-measures were introduced. The high freight rates o f 1916 declined sharply 
when government purchase o f cereals started. Until Sir Joseph Maclay was established as 
Controller of Shipping, many liners were making use o f triangular voyages. This meant 
calling at a neutral port during both outward and inward voyages to the United Kingdom, 
gaining the opportunity for high freight rates and evading control on the type o f cargo.
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This window of opportunity was shuttered when all voyages required prior approval for 
each stage and a detailed log of the voyage.
Controls were also brought in by licensing all cargoes, both inward and outward. 
Earlier attempts at controlling cargoes and sailings had been shared by three different 
bodies, composed of professional civil servants and retired academics, with disastrous 
results. By the end of 1917, Britain was a strictly regulated economy, with controls on 
every commodity and on every individual of working age. Profits were still being made, 
however, and the thoughts of some industrialists were now turning to peace and the huge 
markets that rebuilding war-time destruction would offer. Certainly Britain was going to 
need all its old markets, let alone new ones. The Japanese and the Americans in particular 
had filled the vacuum caused by the Allies war effort, and neither was prepared to 
relinquish these new markets which they had been supplying since 1914.
In 1915, wishing to expand into the Burmese trading area, Ellerman acquired the 
German-owned Dickman Mills from the Receiver of Enemy Property and leased, with an 
option to purchase, the Rangoon Rice Mills. These two companies were amalgamated as 
the Ellerman Rice Mills (Burma) Ltd. Four months later, in Junel915, Ellerman bought a 
majority shareholding in the Arracan Company which included rice mills and the Arracan 
Flotilla Company. John Halliday, chairman of the Arracan Co Ltd died in March 1915, and 
in July Ellerman became chairman and a new board was elected which included F.G. Burt 
as one of the directors (UGD131/5 et seq). Although subscribing to the Burma 
Conference, Ellerman restricted cargoes from his own mills to his own ships at his own 
rates. In March 1920 the Arracan and Ellerman Rice Mills (Burma) were merged to 
become Ellerman’s Rice and Trading Company Ltd, and immediately sold on to Ellerman 
Lines Ltd. The next two years saw more acquisitions and greater diversification.
In September 1916 Ellerman took the opportunity to buy Thomas Wilson, of Hull, 
which expanded his fleet by 65 ships and 300,000 gross tons. In addition, he now had a 
majority interest in a railway and Earles shipyard, wholly owned by Wilson, which Ellerman 
had been using for some years. In concert with Sir William Gray and others, the new Egis 
shipyard was opened on the Tees in 1917 to prepare for the post-war demand for ships.
Ellerman also bought the whole shareholding in Ramage and Ferguson of Leith, 
another shipyard he had favoured, particularly for cruiser stems. He had been keeping his 
own tally of shipping losses, and production of merchant ships from British shipyards, and 
in 1918 expressed his views forcibly that the whole British war-time ship-building output
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was insufficient to cover losses by marine causes, let alone losses due to enemy action. 
Ellerman-Wilson Line remained a separate company, with its own livery and staff, although 
ships were at the disposal of Ellerman, who included them in the general post of the other 
lines so far as new-buildings and transfers were concerned. Among the original lines, fifty 
ships had been lost by enemy action, including internment; twelve lost by marine peril; four 
taken up as Armed Merchant Cruisers, and another twelve as troopers, hospital ships or 
transports. Between 1914 and 1918, therefore, Ellerman Lines Ltd had lost over sixty 
ships completely, which would require replacement, and suffered restricted income from 
another sixteen, which would require extensive refitting before being able to resume their 
peacetime work. Thirty new ships were built during the war, but in Ellerman’s case many 
of the orders had been placed in 1913.
Ellerman was fortunate in having most of his liners left to continue their normal 
trades, subject to the constraints of enemy action. In 1915 freight rates soared, and all the 
companies in the Ellerman group returned substantial profits. By 1916, however, the 
glaring discrepancy between the treatment of tramps and liners was so obvious that the 
whole system was changed. Profits dropped, but were still substantial.
Shipowners were suffering mixed fortunes, depending upon their trades and their 
assets. For those whose fleets had been accumulated before shipyard prices rocketed, and 
who already had arranged payment for new tonnage at reasonable rates of interest, there 
were large profits. For those who were late in building up their fleets, at inflated prices, the 
increased operating costs85 could bring insolvency. Some owners, therefore, decided to 
leave the industry altogether - providing a buyer could be found.
At the Annual General Meeting of Ellerman Lines Ltd in September, 1916, 
Ellerman announced a final dividend on deferred ordinary shares of £950,000, and the 
purchase of Thomas Wilson of Hull: 49 per cent for Ellerman Lines Ltd, the remaining 51 
per cent on his own account.(UGD131/2/l/l).
One company in which Ellerman had an interest was Leyland Line, part of the 
IMM. Formed by J.P.Morgan in 1902 it included British companies such as Leyland Line 
and Oceanic, which were now primarily financed with American capital. These concerns 
operated under the British flag on the United Kingdom register in order to take advantage
85 High insurance premiums were one factor, higher crew wages another.
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o f a cheaper maritime regime. A typical example was a 6,000 dwt British tramp with a 
crew o f 26 which had a total running cost calculated at $. 16/ton, while an equivalent 
United States registered vessel needed a crew o f 34 and cost $.65/ton. No allowance in 
this calculation is made for depreciation or insurance, but the attractions o f the British flag 
are apparent. When war began, however, these US owned vessels came under the control 
o f the United Kingdom government, and were therefore subject to controls and 
requisitioning.
Dividends declared on the Ellerman Lines Ltd deferred ordinary shares from 1915 
to 1918 totalled almost £5,000,000 before tax o f three shillings in the pound. There was 
also a charge of £3,000,000 for excess profits duty, o f which £2,500,000 had been paid 
(UGD131/2/1/1). Ellerman owned all the deferred ordinary shares, which received 50 per 
cent o f the surplus of net profits after the preference shares’ dividends had been paid. 
Ellerman’s personal wartime income from shipping was therefore about £5,000,000 before 
tax. The dividend was not to exceed 50 per cent o f surplus profits after payment of 
preferential dividends.
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Figure 30. ELL deferred ordinary dividends 1915-21.
Ellerman Lines Ltd must have had wartime gross earnings from shipping interests 
alone in the region o f £10,000,000, and Ellerman’s personal profit was half o f that. Not 
wishing to add to his personal tax bill, Ellerman arranged for sums from company deposits 
in the USA to be transferred to a personal account he had opened in New York. He also
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arranged for Bucknalls to transfer funds from Australia to his personal account in the USA 
and in November 1917, £325,000 was transferred in this fashion (UGD131/2/1/1). There 
was a purchase of 1929/47 War Loan in January 1917, a patriotic duty for the company, 
which bought £1,750,000 worth, and also for Ellerman, who bought £550,000.
When controls were extended to all types of ship, the government was virtually the 
manager and charterer of first instance. However, almost two years of mismanagement by 
civil servants and academics had proved the impracticability of operating merchant ships 
without the knowledge and expertise of those whose fortunes and futures depended on 
shipping. The shipping controller, therefore, passed the management of the ships to the 
owners, and rather than deal directly with each vessel, used the existing Conferences to 
organise the cargoes (Russell Smith 1919). The system worked well, and was a 
justification of the owners’ claims that Conferences were the most effective way of 
providing a degree of stability in freight markets, even under wartime conditions. In the 
case of City Line, there is a sudden shift of tea exports from Calcutta to Brocklebanks in 
1917, explained as a wartime measure only.
Ellerman, through his existing companies, was a member of several Conferences 
and in 1915 joined the Far East Conference and also the Rangoon Homeward Conference. 
As already stated, Ellerman reserved cargoes of rice from his own mills for his own ships. 
Ellerman and Bucknall was also used to join with White Star Line and Lamport and Holt in 
a Manchester - USA service, taking Ellerman back into the Atlantic. He extended his 
Mediterranean operations by joining with Cunard to buy Watsons, complete with ships and 
trades.
The Eastern Mediterranean and the Adriatic were under the control of the Austro- 
Hungarians, who occupied the Balkan states from Trieste to Ragusa, and the Turks, who 
were fighting to retain the rest of the Balkans and the Aegean. From Gibraltar to Port Said 
was in the hands of the Allies, and the Germans were eventually driven from their African 
colonies. The Far East, however, was in the friendly hands of the Japanese. Ellerman 
extended his services to the Pacific and Australia, both of which trades he developed 
further after the war, including the acquisition of an agency in Shanghai.
In 1913 Ellerman had formed the City of Oran Steamship Co. Ltd, a single ship 
company, and had toyed with the idea of converting all the vessels into single ship limited 
companies. This idea was scrapped (UGD131/2/1/1), but in 1915 he proposed forming 
companies in neutral countries such as Spain, in order to avoid requisitioning and Blue
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Book rates. However the practical difficulties were equalled by the political problems that 
would have ensued, particularly when it became clear that the British Government was 
prepared to use controls and undisclosed sanctions to prevent evasion of patriotic duty.
Apart from shipping he was expanding his interests in publishing with the 
acquisition of a number of illustrated weeklies and trade magazines. He also bought an 
estate in Scotland, which he soon sold, and the company offices in London. It was during 
this period of high profits that he acquired the Egis shipyard in co-operation with William 
Gray, Thomas Wilson, Strick and Inchcape. The shipowners agreed to take a certain 
number of new-buildings each - after the war - to build up their attenuated fleets. When the 
time arrived to confirm these orders, Ellerman and Gray found themselves left with the yard 
and its building programme.
Profit and Loss.
The First World War ended with an Armistice; brought about not by a massive military 
defeat of the enemy powers, but by social unrest and mutiny in their towns and their forces. 
The Allied naval blockade had made a large contribution to this break-down and a growing 
dis-enchantment of the European masses with their rulers. At sea, however, Allied ships 
were being sunk by submarines until 11th November 1918, and by mines for some years 
later, even after a determined post-war effort to sweep the fields that had been sown by 
both sides. Normal or pre-war trade took longer to recover than had been expected by 
those engaged in industry and commerce. One of the factors inimical to normal trade 
resumption was the demand on the enemy powers to pay reparations for the material 
destruction caused in France and Belgium. Another was the re-drawing of national 
boundaries and the disposal of real estate belonging to Germany, Austro-Hungary and the 
Ottoman Empire.
The European nations were impoverished and had depended upon the United States 
for food and material during the last days of the war, and had also lost a large part of their 
male populations, particularly in the most economically and socially important age groups. 
The United State’s dollar had supplanted the Pound sterling as the trading currency of the 
world, and much of Britain’s overseas investments had passed into the hands of the 
Americans in payment for war supplies. At the same time, the German merchant fleet was 
non-existent as their shipping operations were suspended while reparations - including the 
transfer of vessels to the Allied merchant fleets as prizes - were demanded.
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However, trade did start, and freight rates remained high, as did ship-building prices 
for the immediate post-war years. Ellerman entered into a spurt of new-buildings, and also 
expanded his trading areas into those where lacunae had developed with the disappearance 
of German competition. The Ellerman fleets acquired a number of prize vessels from 
Germany, which entered into service in 1920. Prizes were considered by most British 
shipowners to be second-rate, compared with purpose built new-buildings. Inchcape was 
charged with the task of disposing of these vessels, and eventually had to offer them to 
foreign owners who were not so fastidious. In addition to building in his own yards, 
Ellerman also leased berths in other shipyards as far ahead as 1926(UGD 131/2/1/1).
In 1919 the Bucknall America and Indian Line started services again, between New 
York and India, although the service was seasonal and slightly irregular. Britain’s trade in 
goods had been heavier in imports than in exports; coal for export including a high 
percentage for bunkers to supply overseas coaling depots, such as Port Said and Aden. 
Another staple export had been textiles, and during the war overseas customers had turned 
to other suppliers, such as the Japanese, while India expanded its manufacturies to become 
a net exporter in competition with the Home Country.
A balance sheet for the United Kingdom would show little to encourage optimism 
in the future post-war world. Four years of total war had resulted in the loss of over a 
million men, and the exploitation of indigenous raw materials with no heed to the costs. 
Munitions plants had displaced factories for domestic manufactures, and the working 
population had been swollen by the large scale employment of women. Wages had risen at 
the same time, with an increase in the money supply allied to a decrease in the goods and 
services available for private consumption. Export markets and overseas investments had 
been lost, yet the need for imports of food and raw materials to return to a pre-war 
standard of living remained. The Liberal governments of Asquith and Lloyd George had 
encouraged the working classes to expect a better standard of life which was unfortunately 
delayed by the war. Now there was no reason to expect that the pre-war promises would 
not be kept. On the debit side there was a potential demand for continual spending by the 
state to improve the welfare of the people. On the profit side there was the experience 
gained during the war of centralised control of all the factors of production, which also 
meant the control - or restriction - of prices. However, industrialists had made it clear that 
such controls were a temporary expedient, to be removed as soon as peace returned. 
Britain, therefore, ended the war having lost its pre-eminence in shipping, ship-building and
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textiles, while its stock in the form of plant and machinery was older and, in many cases, 
worn out and inefficient. The immediate future looked bright - women could return to their 
homes, and men could find work, but this was to last for a very short time.
Ellerman continued to make profits for the first years after the war, and rebuilt his 
fleets, yet some of the fire disappeared from his activities. He took an even greater interest 
in his ships, but was averse to moving far from the traditional and tried models of his earlier 
days. Having adopted the cruiser stem in 1914, his ships remained predominately coal- 
fired and reciprocating engined. All he had gained from the war was a period of high 
profits, while increased taxation restricted the large gains in personal fortunes known in the 
last century. If there was a public face of Ellerman, it was recognised as one of a man who 
shunned publicity. Both during his lifetime and in his obituaries there was speculation 
about his political affiliations, and apart from the self-evident fact that he was opposed to 
socialism in any form, there is no evidence that he supported any political party. He was a 
believer in free trade - which included the Conference system - and objected to unnecessary 
controls imposed by the state. Yet he was in favour of most Companies’ legislation, 
particularly as the statutory appointment of auditors, in 1901, and the 1907/8 Companies’ 
Acts legitimizing private limited companies accorded well with his own interests.
Despite his vast wealth and his high-profile shipping interests, Ellerman attracted 
little public attention as one of the coterie of war-time profiteers. There was one article, in 
The Daily Chronicle in 1917 which drew attention to his publishing interests, and 
suggested that was the reason newspapers had left him alone. There may have been truth 
in this; he was certainly a close friend of Northcliffe, and a major shareholder in The Times 
and The Daily Mail - two newspapers which led the move to oust Asquith as Prime 
Minister in December, 1916. The critical factor in deciding Asquith’s fate was the 
government attitude towards controls in general, and shipping in particular. By the end of 
1916 it was becoming obvious that unless merchant shipping losses were curtailed, Britain 
would be unable to continue fighting, and would require to make peace with Germany. 
Lloyd George became Prime Minister in December 1916, and immediately the changes 
referred to above - a Shipping Controller, institution of convoys, Controller of Shipbuilding 
among them, were actively pursued and implemented. There is circumstantial evidence that 
Northcliffe exerted pressure on Bonar Law, the Conservative leader, to support Lloyd 
George as Prime Minister of the new coalition government and it is possible that Ellerman
McCleave, P.R., 2003, chapter 5
125
was privy to these manoeuvres. He was a patriot if for no other reason than that the bulk 
of his fortunes were bound up with the emergence of a victorious United Kingdom.
After the war, Ellerman now took stock of his fleet, and re-arranged the fleets 
according to his ideas of the most profitable trades (UGD131/2/1/1; Lloyds Registers o f 
Shipping). This saw an extension of services to the Antipodes, China and Japan in addition 
to the Americas. The United Kingdom fleet in 1919 was slightly more than 88 per cent of 
its tonnage in 1914, thanks to the increase in shipbuilding in 1918 and the decline in losses 
at sea to enemy action. Before adding the prizes taken as replacements, some of which 
were not in commission before 1920, the Ellerman fleet in 1919 had 80 per cent of the 
tonnage in 1914. Among the prizes were three passenger ships built between 1907 and 
1920, some small replacement for the five passenger ships lost during the war. In addition 
those ships taken up by the government as armed merchant cruisers or hospital ships would 
not be fit for civilian service until 1920. New buildings were now costing £25/ton 
compared with less than £ 10/ton in 1914, and the first flush of peace brought with it a 
boom in trade of all sorts, domestically and internationally. This lasted less than two years, 
however, and the winter of 1920-21 saw a massive increase in unemployment in Britain, 
which rose to over two million in Spring 1921. Freight rates collapsed, and new ships were 
now worth less than the contracted price. The ex-enemy prizes which Inchcape had been 
unable to sell to British owners now went to Greeks and Chinese, even Germans, at knock­
down prices, so increasing competition in international shipping.
Ellerman Lines Ltd continued to show a profit until 1922, and the re-naming of 
existing ships with the City- prefix continued, spreading to Bucknalls and Ellerman Line 
itself. Shareholders were happy as Ellerman had personally guaranteed the dividends on 
fixed interest shares, and held the only ordinary shares with dividends dependent on profits. 
Passenger services started again, with Bucknalls operating a service between New York 
and India, and even moving into the Far East and Japan. The years of the Depression show 
how Ellerman used the profits accumulated during the war, and how the different lines kept 
running as long as possible, before ships had to be laid up.
From 1919 Ellerman gradually disposed of his publishing interests, starting with the 
periodicals and disposing of The Times in 1922 and Financial Times in 1923. 
Simultaneously he was expanding his property interests, which began with his office 
building in Fenchurch Street in 1915. In 1920 the Ellerman Property Trust was formed to 
purchase part of the Co vent Garden Estate and coninued with the purchase of several
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London West End estates including 82 acres in Kensington from Lord Iveagh in 1929. He 
certainly enabled the impecunious offspring of some noble families to continue passing their 
time in the manner they should have been used to doing.
Ellerman wrote a personal letter to Sir Percy Bates dated 31 st January 1929 in 
which Ellerman agreed that the two companies could work well together. The Wall Street 
crash of 1929 was regarded by Ellerman as the prelude to a deeper and longer lasting 
depression. A confidential memorandum from Sir Percy Bates, chairman of Cunard, dated 
27th November 1929, expresses his disagreement with Ellerman’s opinion that the financial 
trouble in New York was deep and would seriously reduce America’s imports (Davies, 
1999, private collection). Ellerman died in 1933 and the depression he predicted lasted 
well into the end of the decade. Despite belated re-armament with its consequent increased 
demand for labour, together with the expansion of the Armed Forces, unemployment in the 
United Kingdom was still above 12 per cent in 1939.
Shipping continued to be an unprofitable business, despite government schemes to 
aid shipowners, until after the start of the Second World War, and only in 1941 did 
Ellerman Lines Ltd show a profit for the first time since 1922. Although the Naval Control 
of Shipping organisation was activated before the 3rd September 1939, there was a lack of 
resources, just as in 1914. In September 1939 not only were there insufficient escorts, but 
the use of aircraft as an offensive maritime weapon had been discounted.
Ellerman left almost £40 million, yet it is possible that his fortune had diminished 
since 1920. He continued taking a strong interest in his shipping empire until his health 
started to decline from 1930, and even built a new ship, City o f Sydney, in 1928 at 
Workman Clarks of Belfast - one of the last ships to be built there before it closed 
(UGD131/7/2/9/60)86.
If Ellerman had wanted to build up an empire in shipping for his sons and 
grandsons, he was sorely disappointed. The second (and last) baronet is remembered more 
for his collection of beetles than for any talent derived from his father. What was the 
driving force behind Ellerman’s success, and was he really an entrepreneur? From his early
86 From Syren 11th August 1955: Letter from Wm Strachan of Workman Clark & Co (1928) Ltd: 
‘Ellerman personally negotiated with Sir George Clark for the design and price of the City o f  
Karachi in 1905. Once the basic design and price were agreed, JRE then started bargaining for 
modifications to design and costs. He used this as a model for all future new-buildings starting 
with the City o f  Karachi of 1905, and negotiating from there. JRE returned to Workman and 
Clark after the Mackay-Edgar Sperling tragedy,and ordered the City o f Sydney in 1928, for 
delivery in 1930. Again he started with a repeat of the City o f  Karachi and negotiated from that 
design and price’.
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days it appears that his risks were calculated and his investments were supported by cash or 
othe securities he may have acquired. Certainly he was an accomplished negotiator and he 
was able to gain advice from those with experience. Whether the advice was acted on is a 
diferent matter, for in some ways he appeared extremely conservative. He was one of the 
first shipowners to adopt the cruiser stem, but tried only one motorship - in 1923 - which 
was soon bmshed out of the picture. Oil as a fuel was used for some of the passenger 
ships, while the cargo ships remained coal-burners. In this Ellerman followed the example 
of most other shipowners of his period, and it is possible that the ownership of collieries 
(common among shipowners) contributed to continuing with this practice. Yet in 1923 
Ellerman had signed a Fuel Oil Agreement with the Asiatic Petroleum Company for 
between 25,000 and 49,000 tons of fuel oil annually at forty-eight shillings and 
sixpence/ton to be supplied at specified ports worldwide, including the United Kingdom, to 
all Ellerman vessels including any others owned or operated by him.
Sir John Reeves Ellerman brought to shipping inborn talents which had already been 
successful in his financial enterprises, and the particular network he had built up. The 
shipping network he acquired was fitted into his existing one, and the retention of senior 
employees and managers from the companies acquired brought the professional expertise 
he needed.
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CHAPTER 6 - FROM UNDERTAKERS TO ENTREPRENEURS 
The Undertakers87
In the Nineteenth Century the population of the United Kingdom grew from 16 million in 
1801 to 42 million in 1901; the merchant fleet required to serve this growing population's 
demands for food, and its industries demand for raw materials and markets, grew in size 
from 16,500 vessels of 1.8 million tons to 20,000 totalling almost 11 million tons (Mitchell 
and Deane 1962, p. 217-9).
The greatest changes in shipping were the development of the steamship and the 
opening of the Suez Canal. In 1801 all ships depended on sail or oars and their voyage 
times depended, literally, on weather and the will of God. In 1869 the opening of the Suez 
Canal reduced voyage times between East and West from months to weeks. By 1901, 
under the British flag, although there were still 10,500 sailing ships the tonnage was almost 
unchanged at 1.9 million. Steamships now numbered 9,500 with a total tonnage of 7.6 
million (Mitchell and Deane, 1962), p.217-9).
George Smith and Sons of Glasgow, also known as the City Line, was one of the 
family firms which played its part in this metamorphosis of Britain into an industrial and 
commercial power which, for most of the Nineteenth Century, dominated the world. The 
story of George Smith, bom in 1777 in Ayrshire is not just the story of one family, but also 
of the interlinking relationships of many families, all sharing a common origin among Scots 
Protestants who accepted the challenge of moving to Northern Ireland and building up 
businesses, rising in the social scale, and contributing to the backbone of Britain's 
supremacy through manfacturing, shipbuilding and shipping.
These men, and many others like them, did not think of themselves as 
'entrepreneurs' - the term was not even known in the English language at that time - but 
they fulfilled functions now attributed to the entrepreneur (Mathias, 1969, p. 151-6).
They were undertakers who created businesses by raising capital, first from their own 
resources and then from family and friends. They manufactured or processed raw materials 
such as textiles, selling the finished products to merchants. They acted as intermediaries by
Undertaker in this context refers to those individuals and their associates who undertook the 
assembly of resources for profitable application. The term is still used in public utilities.
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buying goods in bulk; storing them for future use by those who needed smaller quantities 
and did not wish - or could not afford - to tie up capital.
They also bought or built and owned ships, sometimes sailing in them as master, but 
increasingly staying ashore and arranging cargoes, agents and freight rates; continually 
building up their businesses. The demand for capital to invest in manufacturing and 
merchandising was growing, not only in the UK but in both North and South America, and 
the Indian sub-continent (Gregg, 1950, p.309-310).
George Smith married Margaret Workman, whose brothers went with the Smiths to 
Ireland in 1810, where they started in the textile trade. Smith had two sons with whom he 
returned to Scotland in 1820 to start a warehousing business. In 1840 he bought his own 
ship, a step which led to his sons eventually taking separate paths: George II concentrating 
on shipping, while Robert became a warehouseman. When George Smith II took over the 
shipping company at his father's death in 1867 the City Line, as it was then known, owned 
26 sailing ships, totalling 25,259 tons.
In 1870 George Smith and Sons built their first three steamships, two in Barclay 
Curies and one in Charles Connels, both Glasgow shipyards. By 1880 the fleet numbered 
twenty-five sailing ships and twelve steamers, all fairly new. In 1881-2 there was an 
extensive re-organisation of the fleet, with the sale of fourteen sailing ships and two 
steamers. In 1882 the first of seven steamers was ordered from Workman Clark of Belfast 
and by 1892 the fleet contained twelve steamers and nine sailing ships.
After the death of his father in 1879, George Smith III was joined by Robert S. 
Allan and Wm S. Workman as partners in George Smith and Sons, sharing profits - and 
losses (UGD131/1/5/1). Income was derived from management fees for each ship, plus 
commission on anything and everything passing through the managers' hands. Profits came 
from the sum remaining after all expenses, which included crew costs, insurance and 
repairs, had been deducted. The management partnership did not benefit directly from the 
earnings of the ships. These were distributed to the owners of the '64th' shares among 
whom were the partners. In 1879 the Allans and Smiths each owned 40 per cent of the 
sailing ships' shares, the remainder belonged to other family connections. With the 
steamships the situation was different: George Smith III owning 60 per cent, the Allans 25 
per cent and Workman 12.5 per cent. In addition to their shares in profits from George 
Smith and Sons, George Smith III and Wm S. Workman drew annual salaries of £300 each 
until 1883; when the accounts from 1884 show that their salaries had ceased, and profits
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only were drawn. From 1879 investments were also made on behalf of the firm in such 
diverse stocks as the Suez Canal Company, whose 100 shares cost £8,587, and the 
Glasgow Coffee House Company with 200 shares at 5 shillings each.
Since forming the partnership in 1879, the composition of the fleet had changed: 
from twenty-five sailing ships totalling 22,880 tons to six of 10,226 tons; and from eleven 
steamers totalling 27,364 tons to fourteen totalling 50,406 tons (Lloyd's Registers, 1850- 
1905). There was no requirement to publish accounts or to hold formal meetings. The 
only record of business dealings is George Smith and Sons’s Private Account Book 
(UGD131/1/5/1), which is tantalizing with constant references to The Large Ledger, in 
which all details of transactions were entered, apart from an annual casting up of the shares 
in profits due to the partners. In 1880 a total net profit of £4,000 was distributed among 
the partners; over the next few years it averaged around £9,000; none derived from ships’ 
earnings.
To the outsider, in 1890 the City Line and George Smith and Sons appeared a 
prosperous business, despite the effects of periodic recessions which had resulted in 
financial failure for other established companies. There appeared to be no particular reason 
for George Smith and Sons to incorporate their firm unless funds were required for 
expansion. Surviving records of George Smith and Sons show the fluctuations in returns, 
the changes in management, and the names of those who had 64th shares in the ships which 
were converted into shares in City Line Ltd. What it does not show is why Robert S. Allan 
withdrew as a partner from George Smith and Sons before incorporation, nor why he did 
not take up shares in City Line Ltd. Similarly, the records: account books, share registers 
and Minute Books do not explain why William S. Workman worked from 1879 to 1901 for 
so little to show for his years of service.
In all respects Workman was the junior partner, and Folio 41 of the Private 
Account Book shows that in 1879, when the partnership was formed, Workman started 
with a debit balance of -£25,456 to George Smith and Sons, while R.S. Allan had a credit 
of £2,102 and George Smith III £66,225. It must be remembered that this money had 
nothing to do with the ships, but was capital for the agency firm; Workman was following 
the custom which allowed likely aspirants for professional partnerships to buy themselves in 
by being allotted profits which were then credited to the firm, so building up initial capital; 
this practice was common among all professions.
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The statement o f Equity Balances (see figure 30) held by the partners is illuminating 
as it shows the outstanding amounts due to each member after successive twelve months o f 
trading. Workman was always in the red; reducing his debit balance until 1883 when it 
began rising; George Smith showed a credit balance o f £66,000 in 1879 which dropped to 
£20,000 in 1884. R.S. Allan, on the other hand, steadily increased his balance, having 
doubled his initial investment by 1884.
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Figure 31. George Smith and Sons equity balances 1879 - 92. (Compiled from
UGD131/1/5/1).
In the Private Account Book both George Smith and Workman are shown as 
making frequent interest payments on personal loans to George Smith and Sons, while R.S. 
Allan regularly receives interest on his investment. Examination o f the figures available 
from the records will give an indication o f the relative assets o f each partner in the 
management firm. At incorporation o f City Line Ltd in 1892 the value o f the steamers as 
security for the debentures was assessed at £650,000, o f which George Smith owned 60 
per cent, or circa £390,000, while the Allans and W. S. Workman owned 25 per cent 
(£162,500) and 15 per cent (£97,500) respectively. From the Equity Balances in the 
George Smith and Sons' Account Book, it is seen that in November 1891 George Smith 
had £99,801 to his credit; R.S. Allan £41,000 while Wm. S. Workman owed £52,866.
Details o f earnings from the ships were first made available in 1892, when 
Thomson, Jackson, Gourlay and Forsyth, Chartered Accountants o f Glasgow, produced an 
abstract o f Voyage Accounts for the four years to 30th April 1892 when Robert S. Allan 
was withdrawing from the partnership. This shows that the yearly average earnings for the 
fourteen steamers from 1888-92, exclusive o f interest and re-boilering o f three vessels,
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totalled £76,918. Without allowing for depreciation, this amounted to a return of 11.2 per 
cent on a capital value of £650,000. All charges and commissions were deducted from 
the total earnings; these were paid through George Smith and Sons who also deducted their 
management fee. There were five new steamers commissioned between 1885 and 1890, all 
built at the new Belfast shipyard of Workman Clark and Co. Ltd, of which George Smith 
and William S. Workman were directors. Average earnings for these new vessels were 
£6,890 compared with £4,180 for the nine older ships.
Death brings the Bankers
Two unconnected deaths in the year 1892 led to changes in British shipping which were to 
have far reaching effects. The death of Frederick Leyland, one of the country’s leading 
shipowners, at Blackfriars Station in London, from a heart attack on 4th January; led to 
John Reeves Ellerman entering shipping. Less directly the death of Jane Allan or Smith, at 
home in Glasgow on 28th February, led to a close-knit family enterprise breaking apart so 
that individuals could pursue their own disparate interests. The effects of the two deaths 
culminated in 1901, when John Reeves Ellerman acquired a highly respected family firm, 
gaining entry to a network of agents, shipowners, shipbuilders and merchants which had 
developed over four generations.
There are no records of meetings of the partners of George Smith and Sons over 
the years, nor of any decisions taken: only un-connected pages of raw data, which is more 
easily capable of mis-interpretration than providing reliable information. There is no 
indication that there were serious financial problems; average earnings of the steamers 
appears to be £80 for each 64th share after deductions apart from interest. No records, 
unless comprising private papers not presently available, give any warning of the meeting 
in Edinburgh of a Special Committee of the National Bank of Scotland to discuss the future 
of City Line and the Smith family firm. The single recent event which could require 
dissolution would have been brought about by the death of Jane Allan leaving her shares in 
the City line ships to her sons. They had their own interests which required money, not 
shares in ships. Robert Allan, unlike George Smith III and William S. Workman, did not 
receive any wages from the partnership. He does not appear to have been a working 
partner in George Smith and Sons, concentrating instead on Allan line interests. His 
brother, Charles Allan, was an engineer who had joined Workman Clark and Company in 
Belfast, and had started an engine works there. With the development of exciting new
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means of marine propulsion such as steam turbines and diesel engines the Allans had other 
fields ready for investment.
In 1892 George Smith III, according to records in the Royal Bank of Scotland 
archives, appears to have been forced into either incorporation of the steamships of George 
Smith and Sons into City Line Ltd, or seeing the partnership break up with subsequent 
piecemeal disposal of the assets. The earliest reference to a pressing need for financial 
accommodation is a Minute dated 27th May 1892 of the Special Committee of the National 
Bank of Scotland held in Edinburgh to consider a proposal put forward by the manager of 
the Argyll Street Branch, Glasgow (National Bank of Scotland Minute Book No 33, Royal 
Bank of Scotland Archives, Edinburgh):
The Manager stated that the Argyle Street Agent had come to Head Office for the 
purpose of putting forward a proposal which might involve advances reaching 
£250,000 to Messrs George Smith and Sons, Shipowners, Glasgow, in connection 
with the dissolution of their firm. It was agreed to entertain this business when a 
definite proposal was submitted.
In this Minute there is nothing to suggest possible incorporation of George Smith 
and Sons; simply a request for £250,000 in connection with the dissolution of their firm. A 
reasonable estimate of the value of the business including the pamers’ shares in the sailing 
ships and the steamers would be £750,000. There was no limited liability for partnerships, 
and the distinction between partnership and private assets was frequently blurred. George 
Smith is asking for a loan equivalent to a third of the notional assets the partnership owned, 
jointly and severally. One of the partners wishing to cash in his investment is the most 
likely explanation for this request.
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No references are made in the available papers of George Smith and Sons to any 
dealings with the Bank or requests for a loan; the next reference is found in the National 
Bank of Scotland Minute Book of a Directors' Meeting on 28th July, 1892:
With reference to Minute of Special Committee of 27th May last, when a proposal 
for an advance to George Smith and Sons of Glasgow, which might extend to 
£250,000 was considered, the Manager reported that he had now received a definite 
proposal from Mr Clark88 for a loan of £250,000 to a 'Limited' company about to 
be formed, the partners of which would be Mr Smith and his family connections on 
the security of Debentures for a like amount to be issued by the 'Limited' company, 
carrying the fleet of steamers belonging to it. It was agreed to grant the Credit 
against the Debentures of the company for that amount, provided these are secured 
by a Deed to be approved by the Bank's Law Agent, conveying to Trustees for the 
Debenture Holders the steamers belonging to the company, the loan to go for two 
years, and the rate 4.25 per cent if 4.5 per cent cannot be obtained ((National Bank 
of Scotland Minute Book No 33, Royal Bank of Scotland Archives, Edinburgh).
Two months after George Smith is recorded as having approached the National 
Bank of Scotland for a loan in connection with the dissolution of their firm, there is now a 
firm proposal for £250,000 to be lent to a Limited company about to be formed. In 
addition, the partners or shareholders for this limited company are to be Mr Smith and his 
family connections. Incorporation as a vehicle for raising additional capital for expansion 
pre-supposes that all existing part-owners are prepared to take equivalent shares in the new 
limited company, leaving the £250,000 for investment.
Making nonsense of that hypothesis the Bank states, unequivocally, that the loan is 
to be secured against the existing steamships by Debentures against Bills of Sale, effectively 
transferring the ownership of the vessels to the Debenture Trustees (UGD/131/1/3/2). The 
value of the steamers is quoted at £650,000, of which £250,000 is to be hypothecated 
against debentures, leaving £400,000 to be divided among the owners of the 64th shares, 
effectively reducing their worth.
Clark was the agent of the National Bank of Scotland in Glasgow - the equivalent of a branch 
manager.
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The steamers shown in the Schedule were transferred three times on the 29th 
December 1892: first from the 64th owners to George Smith and Sons; second from 
George Smith and Sons to the newly incorporated City Line Ltd, and finally from City Line 
Ltd to the Debenture Trustees ( Mitchell Library, Glasgow, Register 18, Folio 216 inter 
alia).
The Allans and other family members who did not take up shares in City Line Ltd 
required a cash payment, calculated on 64th shares in the steamers, o f over £200,000. Cash 
had to be raised; this was met by an issue o f debentures, o f which the National Bank of 
Scotland took up £210,000 worth o f bonds for two years, representing 30 per cent o f the 
value o f the fleet, against the 60 per cent represented by the share issue. Outside 
subscribers took up most o f the remaining debentures; only £4000 being taken up by 
members o f the family.
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Figure 32. 64th shares in steamships and distribution as shares in City Line Ltd.
The 64ths in the steamers do not translate exactly into equivalent shares in City 
Line’s subscribed capital. For example, George Smith with 36/64ths receives 
22,830 shares at flotation equivalent to 36/64 x £400,000 = £225,000; Wm. S. Workman 
owned 8/64 x £400,000 = £50,000 and receives a shareholding of 7,000 shares or £70,000.
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George Smith and W.S. Workman were able to convert their ownership shares into only 
£310,000 worth of shares in City Line Ltd at a fleet valuation of £650,000. The authorised 
share issue was for 75,000 shares at £10 each, amounting to £750,000; the equivalent of 
the total value of the 64th shares held by Smith, Workman and family or friends in the 
steamers was £400,000 in 40,000 paid up City Line Ltd shares.
The newly elected board of directors continued to reflect family alliances developed 
over the preceding decades among the subscribers to the share issue. The price for the 
ships was £650,000, to be settled by an allotment to the Vendors or their nominees of 
40,000 shares of £10 each, in such proportions as the said George Smith may direct or 
appoint. The balance was to be met by an issue of debentures secured over steamships 
belonging to the Company bearing interest at 4.5 per cent per annum and repayable 7 years 
after 1st November 1892 unless extended by mutual consent.
City Line was incorporated on 7th December 1892 (UGD131/4/3/1). but the 
steamships remained under the management of the partnership. The Minute of Agreement 
for management of the steamers was drawn up on 1st November 1892 and was to last for 
ten years. Geo Smith Jnr then became a partner in the management firm which continued 
to trade with three partners89.
The partners in George Smith and Sons sometimes had to write to themselves as 
directors of City Line Ltd, the following is an example:
To: The Secretary City Line Ltd;
With reference to the issue of Debenture Bonds for £210,000 sterling by your 
company to the National Bank of Scotland Limited Edinburgh for the period of two 
years from 1st November 1892, we hereby guarantee the renewal of these on their 
maturity at the same rate of interest during a fiirther period of three years.
(Signed) Geo. Smith, W.S. Workman, George Smith and Sons.
George Smith III and Wm S. Workman were Debenture Trustees, Directors of City Line Ltd and 
partners in George Smith and Sons.
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The Minute Book (UGD/131/1/1) has a marginal note ‘issue of Debenture Bonds’; 
the main text includes the following:
With reference to the Bonds for £210,000 granted to the National Bank of 
Scotland Ltd Edinburgh for two years, Mr Geo Smith and Mr W.S. Workman 
guaranteed their renewal at maturity.
It seems unlikely that George Smith and Wm Workman were guaranteeing renewal 
of the Bonds by the National Bank of Scotland although some gentleman's agreement may 
have been reached. Less than one year after incorporation the company had liabilities of 
£700,000 to shareholders and debenture holders, against an asset value of something under 
£650,000 for the steamships. It was probably a wise move for the Managers to suggest, at 
the Board meeting of 15th August 1894 that the Bonds would require to be renewed in 
November 1894. The directors were also told that City Line showed a loss of £39,336 in 
addition to a depreciation allowance of £35,394 after the first full year of trading.
In 1893 a further £50,000 of Debentures was issued and Mr Smith reported that 
the brokers advised of the difficulty in placing Debentures above par ex-expenses, and any 
further period should be not less than 5 years nor more than 7 years. In 1894 both 
directors' fees and shareholders’ dividends were suspended, indefinitely, by family 
agreement and in 1898 a Reserve Account was opened, with the City o f Lucknow 
transferring to the Debenture Trust. The South African War, and government contracts, 
provided a demand for shipping that provided sufficient profits for dividends in 1899 and 
1900.
Records provide a framework of feet, but the interpretation of underlying motives 
and reasons behind these facts must be speculation - informed perhaps; but without 
personal evidence from those involved it can be nothing more than a structured speculation 
from which assumptions may be drawn. Starting with financial figures from Account 
Books; moving to records of ships and comments from the Minutes it is clear that family 
relationships were an integral part of the saga of the Smiths' ships from 1879-1901, when a 
new breed of entrepreneur appeared on the scene of British shipping.
Despite attempts to maintain their share of existing trade, the Balance Sheet 
produced at 17th May 1895 showed a credit of only £4,500, transferred to the Profit and 
Loss Account. For the second year there were no dividends, and the Directors agreed to 
forgo their fees. At this meeting the Managers announced that although they had been
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given permission by the Board in 1893 to open a bank account in the name of City line Ltd, 
George Smith and Sons had decided not to use these powers but instead had opened a 
Debit and Credit account for City Line Ltd with the Managers.
City Line Ltd had carried their own insurance, but the Debenture Trustees decided 
to insure half the value of each of their steamers with outside underwriters. The Minute 
Book shows losses or neglible profits over successive years, and changes in the fleet due to 
losses by marine peril and replacements from new-buildings. The managers, George Smith 
and Sons, received the insurance payments recovered against the casualties, and arranged 
finance for building replacements. There was also a continuing concern about Debentures, 
with difficulties in renewals, even through brokers.
In the National Bank of Scotland Minute Book No 34, dated 27th August 1896 the 
following appears:
With reference to Messrs George Smith and Sons advance of £87,100 against 
£105,000 City Line Debentures, a proposal is submitted that advances in future 
should be at local Bill rates from November next, with a minimum of 3.5 per cent - 
agreed.
No reference is found to this transaction in the City Line Ltd Minutes as the Managers 
were agents and bankers for City Line Ltd (UGD131/1/2/1, 17th May 1895). In this 
capacity they settled all liabilities, received all payments, arranged repairs and ordered new- 
buildings - all as George Smith and Sons, charging commission at every turn. The advance 
referred to above appears to be dear money - discounted by almost 20 per cent, not 
counting the interest payable.
International tensions overshadowed domestic affairs when on 2nd December 1898 
it was announced that:
due to the serious position of affairs between this Country and France it had been 
decided to take out cover against War Risk on a fleet value of £650,000 for six 
months at 5 per cent at a total of £1,543.
There is no further mention of War Risk Insurance, but on 25th January 1899 the balance 
sheet for the year ending 1st November 1898 is announced as showing a credit of £86,175. 
The debit balance of the previous year was written off, and a Reserve Account opened with 
the remaining £14,579. This improvement in trade was possibly due to the start of the
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South African War. For the first time since incorporation, City Line Ltd was able to pay a 
dividend of 4 per cent to the shareholders on 2nd February 1900, having made a net profit 
of £97,232. How long this state of affairs would have continued is unknown, for with the 
death of the chairman the pattern of ownership of George Smith and Sons, and of City Line 
Ltd, changed.
Workman’s Worries.
On 14th November 1899 George Smith III died aged fifty-one years, resulting in even 
greater upheaval for the surviving partners than the departure of Robert Allan. He left an 
estate of £314,944 {Calendar o f Confirmation and Inventories, 1900, M-Z) which 
included £260,000 worth (at par) of shares in City Line Ltd, and his 50 per cent share of 
George Smith and Sons at whatever the buildings, office equipment and goodwill might be 
worth. The first of the two firms to be affected was George Smith and Sons; the father's 
shares being distributed between the sons, with George increasing his share to 37.5 per cent 
and Robert acquiring the same amount, Wm S. Workman retaining his original 25 per cent. 
Robert Smith, the younger son, had been admitted to the English Bar and appeared to have 
no interest in shipping, never having owned even a nominal shareholding in either City Line 
Ltd or George Smith and Sons. William Service Workman had not only lost a brother-in- 
law, but also found himself junior partner in the management company; the Private Account 
Book shows that he was unlikely to be in a position to buy a substantial shareholding in 
City Line Ltd or Geo. Smith and Sons should the heritors, or even one of them, decide to 
go for cash and sell the shares. With over twenty years experience, however, he should 
have been able to provide the steadying influence the younger Smiths might require had 
they continued to run the company. The requirement for valuation of the assets of George 
Smith and Sons meant that for the first time records appear showing the financial structure 
supporting the earnings of the Management firm.
Certain formalities, such as electing George Smith IV as Chairman of City Line Ltd, 
and appointing him to succeed his father as a Trustee of the Debenture Trust with 
consequent changes to the Registers of the ships involved were almost automatic and 
completed by 28th March 1900. Charles E. Allan, of Workman Clark, was then elected a 
Director of City Line Ltd, having received 100 shares from the estate of the late George 
Smith, while Wm S. Workman was appointed Secretary of the Company in place of George 
Smith IV, who was now chairman.
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As noted in the Minute Book on 17th May 1895, George Smith and Sons were 
effectively bankers for City Line, holding its cash in their own account. This cash formed 
part of the estate of George Smith, so:
The Managers agreed to take over 15,000 shares of City Line Ltd as security 
against the sums that may from time to time be lying in the hands of George Smith 
and Sons.
The shares were to be held by Andrew Laughland and Robert Clark, nominees appointed 
by the Executors of the estate of George Smith; this security from the Managers, George 
Smith and Sons, was registered on 11th April 1900. The brothers, therefore, had neither 
opportunity nor temptation to liquidate any of the assets of George Smith and Sons which 
may have belonged to City Line Ltd.
When all the steamships were transferred to City Line Ltd, the sailing ships 
remained with the original owners of the 64th shares under the management of George 
Smith and Sons. In 1895 the Allans and George Smith III sold their shares to William 
Workman. He operated them as single ship limited companies, and a loan for their 
purchase was arranged with the National Bank of Scotland using the sailing ships as 
security. In 1901 they were sold off to private buyers, and, with the sale of all the assets of 
George Smith to Ellerman, the outstanding loan was repaid from Workman’s share of the 
assets distributed to the remaining partners of George Smith and Sons.
William Workman was the person most affected by the death of George Smith III, 
particularly as the Account Book for George Smith and Sons shows that he had become 
increasingly indebted, despite, or perhaps because of, having taken over the sailing ships. It 
was in Workman's interest to see that the Company was sold as a going concern, preferably 
to someone who would appreciate his knowledge and ability and make use of it. It is no 
coincidence that his son Robert A. Workman (Armitage, 1992, p.l 14-115)90 introduced 
Ellerman to City Line and acted as the intermediary. Ellerman knew the Allans - his 
purchase of Leyland Line in 1892 brought him in touch with other Liverpool shipowners - 
and he would probably have known Montgomerie and Workman through shipping circles in 
London.
With the sale of City Line Ltd, Workman as manager had a position at least equal 
to his old one as a director; possibly with more authority and autonomy than under the
Robert Workman later joined with Clarence Hatry and others in the Sperling Combine, an attempt 
to create a large shipbuilding and steelmaking combine which ended in disaster.
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Smiths and no personal financial risk other than his shareholding. He now had an 
investment in an growinging company with the knowledge that other Workmans were also 
likely to benefit from links with Ellerman and his expanding shipping interests. These 
details about Workman are relevant to the research since he continued with City Line as 
Manager until 1930 when Ellerman gave him a nominal shareholding of £100 and 
appointed him a director of City Line Ltd. He left £50,049 at his death in 1937 
(Confirmations and Inventories 1938 M-Z).
Tidying Up
City Line after November 1899 continued to operate and even made profits, paying 
dividends of 4 per cent in 1900 and 8 per cent in 1901. This was to be the last full year's 
dividend received by the remaining shareholders, all connections of the Smith family. On 
the 12th July 1900 the Managers reported that cash not immediately required was to be 
invested in short term loans and on the 27th July the Managers were asked to obtain 
information regarding what terms and conditions would be given for a Stock Exchange 
quotation for the Debentures of City Line Ltd. The Bond for £50,000 held by the National 
Bank of Scotland had been redeemed and debentures to the value of £26,000 had been re­
issued to new holders for 5 years at 4 per cent; the balance to be re-issued as opportunity 
offered.
A Special Meeting of City Line Directors was called on 9th August 1901:
... to consider an offer by J. R. Ellerman of Leyland Line for purchase of the fleet 
and entire business of the Company. The Chairman (Mr George Smith) said that 
he had been in treaty with Mr Ellerman for some days ... believed that with the 
Directors' approval he could bring the matter to a successful conclusion. The 
auditors were asked for a statement as at 1st August 1901, and on 20th August 
1901 the shareholders agreed (with the exception of Dr C. Workman who was 
abroad) to sell their holdings to Mr John Reeves Ellerman as from 1 st June last.
Ten days later, on 30th August 1901 a meeting of the Directors of City Line was 
held at 12 Moorgate Street, London, those present being George Smith as Chairman,
W.S. Workman as Secretary and C.E. Allan. A letter of authority to Messrs Andrew
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Laughland and Robert Clark to sign a transfer o f 15,000 shares to Mr Ellerman was 
produced. These were the shares registered as security for cash held by the Managers and 
represented 37.5 per cent o f the total shareholding. Further transfers o f 100 shares each 
were made to Miles W. Mattinson, F.G.Burt and W.H. Mollett all o f whom were elected 
directors o f the company, while the previous directors resigned.
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Figure 33 City Line Ltd balances 1893-1900
Sailing ships Steam ships
Number Tons Number Tons
1840 Constellation 1 334 0 0
1867 At death o f George Smith I 25 23,380 0 0
1877 At death o f George Smith II 27 26,145 9 25,938
1879 Partnership 25 22,880 11 27,364
1892 Incorporation 6 10,226 14 50,406
1899 Death o f George Smith III 0 0 15 62,466
1901 Sale to Ellerman 0 0 14 59,171
Table 14. George Smith I to John Reeves Ellerman, 1840-1901.
So ended the sixty years o f traditional shipowning which was started by George 
Smith I with a sailing ship of 334 tons, and ended with the sale of a family company owning 
fourteen steamships totalling 60,000 tons to a new breed of shipowner.
On 22nd October 1901 the first Board meeting o f City Line under the new 
ownership took place with Miles Mattinson as chairman, Burt being the only other director 
present. The final balance sheet of City Line Ltd under the control o f the Smith family was
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issued at 1st August 1901, and shows £293,000 outstanding in Debentures, plus £3,000 in 
accrued debenture interest91.
The Entrepreneurs
A condition of the sale of City Line was that Wm S. Workman should be retained as 
General Manager which guaranteed him a job for the next three years (UGD131/1/2)
In addition he recived shares from London Liverpool and Ocean Steamships, later 
converted to Ellerman Line Limited shares. Other members of the Smith and Workman 
families also received Ellerman Lines Ltd shares.
Those who have written about George Smith and Sons, City Line, and Ellerman 
have expressed surprise that such a desirable company should have passed so suddenly 
from the family, even at a price estimated to be in the region of £1,000,000. Some of the 
ships were owned by the trustees, and the debentures were not retired until 1910. The real 
value of City Line Ltd for Ellerman lay in its goodwill, represented by the network he 
bought into which gave him access to agencies, shippers and shipyards.
George Smith IV remained as a trustee of the debenture holders until replaced by 
Ellerman in 1905. He died in France in 1915 as a Captain in the Gordon Highlanders. In 
1902 he and his brother received, in joint names, 200 preference shares and 100 ordinary 
shares in Ellerman Lines Ltd (UGD 131/ 2/ 2/2). The ordinary shares were sold to The 
Moorgate Trust (Ellerman) in 1913; the preference shares were shown as still held by 
Robert W. Smith in 1916.
George Smith and Sons had been typical of the family firms which developed from 
merchants who took a financial interest in a ship, buying one of their own, and eventually 
becoming shipowners. The extended family in its widest sense provided labour, as 
shipmasters, agents, brokers and merchants; sometimes as manufacturers supplying 
cargoes. The capital required in the early days, with sailing ships and later with simple 
steamships, limited by fuel consumption and loss of cargo capacity at the expense of 
bunkers, could be met by the family and its connections. With the development of the 
compound engine and steel hulls capital requirements increased at the same time as family 
ties were being stretched. Ellerman represented a new breed of shipowning entrepreneur; a 
man whose expertise lay in the employment of capital and the allocation of resources, 
including labour of all degrees of skill and specialisation. By 1910 another old family firm
See Appendix 8 feeing p. 163.
McCleave, P. R., 2003, chapter 6.
144
connected with the Smiths and Workmans - the Allan Line - had also gone to a larger 
competitor, and in the liner trades few family firms were to survive the First World War.
By the end of the Nineteenth Century the age of the amateur and polymath was 
almost over, and in his place came the specialist and the expert, whether as a worker or an 
employer; an accountant or an engineer. Ellerman recognised this early in his life, and was 
almost unique among the shipping giants of his age in not coming from a shipping or 
merchanting background - he was an accountant, pure and simple. Despite what may have 
seemed a disadvantage, he built a company whose reputation long outlived him, particularly 
among his sea-going staff.
Ellerman was not alone in his collection of interests which were to include 
newspapers as well as breweries and collieries, all of which were completely separate from 
his shipping operations. Unlike Lord Kylsant (Green and Moss, 1982, p.95), he did not 
succumb to the excesses of moving the same notional resources around different areas of 
his own establishment, achieving temporary totals greater than the sum of the parts. 
Ellerman's strength appeared to lie in his homework before buying any of his new 
companies and in building for long term growth. His personal assets meant that he did 
not require to go to the Stock Market with slightly dubious proposals. With City Line he 
acquired access to trades on which some of his other acquisitions were already employed, 
and when a new route proved unsuccesful, it was abandoned, like the River Plate trade 
with Allan Line.
From the composition of the fleets it is possible to see how some shipowners 
accumulated so much wealth in the first seven decades of the Nineteenth Century. The 
Constellation cost about £4,000 in 1840; the value of the fleet at sale to Ellerman was 
recorded as £803,809 (City Line Balance Sheet, 1st August 1901); unlike previous 
generations of the family, George Smith's sons appeared to want money rather than ships. 
Ellerman appears to have hovered around the death-beds or sick-beds of other shipowners 
whose companies he acquired.
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CHAPTER SEVEN - CONCLUSION 
Hypothesis.
The hypothesis to be tested is :
Sir John Reeves Ellerman’s success as a shipowner was due to specific 
entrepreneurial qualities which he transferred to shipping and distinguished him 
from his contemporaries.
Ellerman had financial and management skills which enabled him to identify companies with 
sound core structures and a potential not being realized under the existing regimes. 
Retaining existing managers and re-organising capital he produced profitable enterprises 
which inherited the characteristics and loyalties of the original family firms. Was Ellerman 
an entrepreneur or an opportunist? The bare frets of John Reeves Ellerman's life are well 
known and documented in biographies and obituaries. In many cases he is referred to as an 
entrepreneur; one biographer going so frr as to suggest that Ellerman's success was partly 
due to having entered both brewing and shipping at a particular stage of entrepreneurial 
decline in particular companies. In shipping this decline was frequently due to the demise 
of the senior member of the family, and the reluctance of the heirs to continue with the 
business. In brewing there was frequently failure to adapt to new conditions. As an 
example, Ellerman gained control of Hoare & Co in 1902 and within one year produced the 
largest profits for 435 years.
Before judging whether or not he was an entrepreneur it is necessary to define the 
term - both as it is generally understood, and as it may be interpreted. The dictionary 
definition is fairly straight-forward: the literal translation is undertaker, but even this is 
qualified by the association of the word's root with enterprise. The expression was not 
commonly used, in the United Kingdom, until the 1870s, when the director of a musical 
entertainment advertised himself as an entrepreneur, stating that he was personally 
responsible for putting the whole operation together, including providing the capital. There 
developed an understanding of the term as one who personally assembled and utilised 
resources for a specific undertaking, whether it be banks, breweries, railways or shipping. 
The individual may or may not have had technical knowledge; he certainly would have had 
access to information and a communications network which provided it. In the case of 
Ellerman his forte initially lay in company promotion and the provision of capital from
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either external sources, including the public, or internal sources such as unrealised assets, 
including plant and stocks. The entrepreneur could, therefore, be seen as one who by the 
‘fructifying use of capital’ made possible the expansion of existing industries, enabled the 
generation of new ones and gave employment. The nineteenth century entrepreneurs, in 
the United Kingdom at any rate, were often perceived as capitalists who, starting from 
humble backgrounds, finished up with fortunes. In fact, most of those involved in starting 
industrial and commercial enterprises were from families with some claims to wealth and 
influence and very few first generation entrepreneurs sprang from labouring groups - the 
humblest levels of society without savings or schooling (Mathias, 1969, p. 156-7).
It is in the Twentieth Century that the noun and its derivatives have obtained a 
certain mystique at the expense of meaning. There are references to ‘political 
entrepreneurs’, ‘salaried entrepreneurs’ and even ‘revolutionary entrepreneurs’ (Casson, 
1982). This was inevitable with the growth of corporate business and professional 
managers. Detailed definition was now required to identify the counterparts of those 
individuals who had put together organisations, and made profits from them. The 
entrepreneur at one period appeared in the factors of production( Lobley,1983, pp. 84, 96- 
98). ‘It was once common practice to regard the entrepreneur as a separate factor of 
production. He provided the capital...took all the decisions and risk and.reaped all the 
profits’.
Large limited companies are owned by their shareholders and the entrepreneurial 
function is divided among many different groups. The individual entrepreneur could raise 
capital from his own resources, he could also manage his own business, and he might also 
deploy specific technical skills in his practical application to production. The growth of 
large industrial and commercial organisations and the growth of management structures 
may be seen as splitting entrepreneurial activity into separate components, capital 
provision, marketing and production among them. Schumpeter (1883-1950) saw the 
entrepreneur (Ger. Unternehmer) as the central figure of his system who ‘aided by bank 
credit, challenges the established equilibrium with a new product, a new process or a new 
type of productive organisation’. He also perceived the entrepreneur as ‘one of the somber 
(sic) company of laborers, white-collar workers, solemn executives and assorted corporate 
bureaucrats’ not carrying the burden of guilt of the capitalist (Galbraith, 1987, pi 81). 
Casson stresses that Schumpeter ‘is very explicit about the economic function of the 
entrepreneur ... prime mover in economic development... function is to innovate’ (Casson,
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1982, pp.173-6).’ Having stated at the beginning of his book that there may be little 
demand for a theory of the entrepreneur, Casson then goes on to say that this is the very 
opposite of the truth. ‘... existing theories are demonstrably inadequate ... the need for a 
theory of the entrepreneur’ (Casson, 1982, p. 10-11).
From discussing alternative theories of the entrepreneur; one draws the conclusion 
that an entrepreneur needs to be skilled in many business attributes!
Certainly, there are individuals who can galvanize tired companies into life by 
providing enterprise that had been lacking before their arrival on the scene. Similarly, some 
individuals can seize opportunity and introduce innovation. These individuals are 
frequently described as entrepreneurs, and fit the dictionary definition of the term.
Attempts to discover the magic quality possessed by those individuals who took advantage 
of opportunity has led to a mountain of learned discourse on what entrepreneur and 
entrepreneurial really mean. This spirit - or lack of it - is postulated as a cause for 
economic decline in countries/companies/industries or success in others. One fact on which 
most economists reach a guarded consensus is that the entrepreneur exists ‘even in the 
closing decade of the Twentieth Centuiy’ and may be recognised as an individual who 
exercises personal control of his undertaking - even though he might not own the majority 
of the capital. He (or she) makes decisions, allocates resources and reaps profits. Casson 
(1982) provides a table of entrepreneurial qualities (Casson, 1982, p 36). Just as there is an 
acceptance among economists of the existence of the entrepreneur, so there is a general 
agreement of the qualities required. Boyce (1996) sums up the activities of an entrepreneur 
in the title of his book. These words comprise networks, negotiation, capital deployment 
and marketing, while the second part of the title includes 'enterprise'. Boyce is dealing with 
a case study of one shipowner and places great importance on social mobility, but the 
general thrust of his discussion supports the interpretations of those authors already 
quoted. This is the entrepreneur with whom Ellerman and others of his period must be 
identified. Attempts to examine their structures against a background of present-day 
business practice and its jargon simply confuse the issue.
The business environment of the last decades of the nineteenth century saw the 
growth of the limited liability company and an increase in rentiers who drew dividends 
from businesses managed increasingly by professionals. The conversion of family firms into 
limited companies had the effect of divorcing ownership from management. The question 
arises, if entrepreneurial skills are individual, can they be applied to a company or an
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industry? When it is suggested that brewing was on the downward slope of the 
entrepreneurial cycle, what exactly is the meaning of this statement? Does it mean that 
there were no longer opportunities for expansion or enterprise? Has the prospect of 
technical innovation disappeared? The reverse is true of the British brewing industry when 
Ellerman first became involved - one of the reasons, in the 1880s, that breweries required 
more capital was to finance expansion of their market by acquiring additional licenced 
premises and also to modernise existing plants (Gourvish and Wilson, 1994, p 263). 
Ellerman (and others) are described as ‘newcomers to the industry who displayed 
entrepreneurial skills equal to those established families’ (Gourvish and Wilson, 1994, 
p. 234) already in brewing. This suggests existing brewers already had entrepreneurial 
expertise, and that Ellerman and others' knowledge lay in the field of exploiting capital. 
Certainly, there is no evidence that the company promoters had any particular knowledge 
of the mechanics of brewing, or of any other industry to which their talents were applied92.
When Ellerman first bought shares in Frederick Leyland and Co Ltd. there is no 
evidence that he had any expertise in shipping. However, there were opportunities 
presenting themselves in new trades, technical developments in shipbuilding, and the 
expansion of the British merchant fleet. Some companies were no longer capable of 
meeting the challenge - and Ellerman acquired some of these firms. The chief factor in his 
success was his ability to find cash, not paper, for his acquisitions. This ability led to 
rumours about his plans for expansion even before Leyland Line bought the West India and 
Pacific Steamship Company. Fairplay reported on 1st March 1900 that Atlantic Transport 
Line and its interest in American National Line had been sold to Leyland Line, and further 
acquisitions would follow. The Leyland Company would control a huge company with a 
capital of £4,000,000. This was before the advent of IMM, and appeared to be simply 
rumour, but does demonstrate that even then Ellerman was seen as a powerful figure in 
shipping and finance93. In June 1900 the sale of West India and Pacific S.S. Company was 
announced and intimation was given of a restructuring of the company. By the end of 
1901, Ellerman had sold his own and most of his fellow shareholders ordinary shares to J.P. 
Morgan of IMM for cash, formed London Liverpool and Ocean Shipping Co Ltd and 
acquired four major shipping companies94.
See chapter 2, p.30-31.
See chapter 2, p.34; 36-40; Chapter 3, p.63.
See chapter 2, p.44-47.
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From his early days Ellerman showed an interest in using money to serve his own 
interests. This did not necessarily mean making profits; as an apprentice he lent money to 
his master in order to specify his own hours of work, and also to take long holidays 
mountaineering. There is no question about his organising ability, aided by his astonishing 
memory, so what entrepeneurial qualities did he possess, and how much did they 
contribute to his success as a shipowner?
He certainly possesed the qualities outlined above - a consensus from a selection of 
authors, but was there any specific ability which he transferred to shipping and 
distinguished him from his contemporaries? The two men with whom he was compared in 
Chapter 1 were both directors of much larger organisations, yet they both failed in 
producing real growth in the worth of their companies. In his shipping companies there is 
no question about Ellerman’s managerial role - one of - if not the - most important role of 
the true entrepreneur. Both Owen Philipps and James Mackay succeeded in raising money 
from shareholders, but their influence on their fleets was limited because the day to day 
running was left to subordinates, while they concerned themselves with finance and the 
images of their companies.
If management is an entrepreneurial quality, then Ellerman was an entrepreneur. 
Ellerman was a successful manager in all his many enterprises, as is shown by his successes. 
The attribute which is central to his whole method of operation must be his phenomenal 
memory, and his ability to assess facts and figures with lightning speed. These talents 
fortified his skill with negotiations - a pre-requisite for the successful entrepreneur.
Ellerman was effectively a managing owner, backed by his professional knowledge 
and experience in solving problems and defining his objectives - and transmitting them to 
his colleagues and subordinates. He also either owned outright or had a majority 
shareholding in his shipping companies - so he fulfilled another function of the entrepreneur 
- owning or controlling resources and capital. Both contemporaries with whom he is 
compared relied on shareholders or financial institutions to provide their capital, and Owen 
Philipps left nothing to his wife at his death, while James Mackay died as a comparatively 
poor man. Certainly, the need to find money is a brake on enterprise, and to some extent 
inhibits decision-making. Ellerman had none of these problems, and was able to guarantee 
the dividends of his preference shareholders - paying from his own resources if necessary.
There is no doubt that Ellerman was possessed of a good memory and an ability to 
sum up situations with speed and ease. He also had his finger on the pulse of his shipping
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interests to a degree that is not suggested in his other enterprises. One commentator has 
suggested that Ellerman was the first ‘company doctor’ and may also be seen as a form of 
entrepreneur. In no instance did Ellerman institute original practices - with the possible 
exception of his periodic briefings to his fellow directors outlining the systems he was 
developing. It can be said that he brought into shipping the practices and skills developed 
in other fields which were personal and so distinguished him from contemporaries and 
certain of these qualities are generally recognised as entrepreneurial. So far as empire- 
building is concerned, he built up a large undertaking that included, at different times, 
publishing, collieries, a shipping fleet, breweries and financial institutions, ranging from 
insurance companies to mortgage trustees, but it is doubtful if he regarded it as an empire. 
On a different theme, did his ships, and City Line in particular, contribute to the growth of 
the British Empire? If they did, it was not because of Ellerman. When the sub-continent 
was grudgingly granted Independence one of the early changes saw British shipping 
companies displaced by newly formed national fleets and the ‘Kipling Companies’95 
gradually disappeared. The arguments above lead to the conclusion that Ellerman was an 
entrepreneur in the best possible sense - he was successful, and he added to shipping skills 
that were not matched by his peers.
Rudyard Kipling, The Crab that Played with the Sea: 
‘China-going P. & O.s pass Pau Amnia’s playground close, 
And his Pusak Tasesk lies Near the track of most B.I.s ... 
Orient, Anchor, Bibby, Hall, Never go that way at all’.
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Appendix 1. Copy of original prospectus for incorporation of Edinburgh United 
Breweries showing Ellerman’s participation.
The List of Applications will open on Thursday, the 10th day of December, 1889, and will dose on or beroro 
Saturday, the 21st day of December. 1880
T H E
Edinburgh United Breweries,
L I M I T E D .
Incoi’pornted under tlie Com panies A cts, 1S63 to  1SS6.
S H A B . B  C A P I T A L  £ 2 3 0 , 0 0 0 ,
DIYTDXD 1WT0_______
J'2,500 Six per Cent. Cumulative Preference Shares
of £10 each - - - - - -  £125,000
12,500 Ordinary Shares of £10 each - £125,000
£250.000
Five per Cent, First Mortgage Debentures - £200,000•
(Redeemable at Ih* end o f Ten Tear*, at the option of the Company, at 10 per cent, premium.)
The whole of the Heritable Property of tbe Company will be conrejod to the Trustee* on behalf 
of the Debenture Holder*.
Smoot lu te  £110,000 in Snftnoea Sham ; £110,000 in Ordinary Shams; and £200,000 ia Dibmturcs.
Tho remaining Share, will be held ia Voaerre for fetors in e e  ahoold the Company require fortlirr Capital to
extond it* business.
Tbe Shares are payable as follows:—via., 10a. per Share on Application; £ 4  10s. per Share on Allotment, 
and the bular.ee b r two instalment* of £2  10a* each per Sliara, a t two and four months thereafter rmjtccLively, or liic 
whole raay be paia up on illo n se s t,  tbe 6aares ranking for dividend from tbe dates of payment.
'Hie First Mortgage Debentures, which will be issued is  multiples of £10, sro payable 5 per cent, on 
Application, and So per cent, on Allotment.
The Dividcoas on Urn Preference 8hares and the Interest on tbe Debentures will be payable balf-ycariy on 
the l i t  of January and tbe 1st of July m each year.
The Dividends on tbe Ordinary Shares will be payable yearly, bn t tho Articles of Association provide for the 
payment of interna dividends.
TRUSTEE8 FOR THE DEBENTURES.
The Commercial Union Brewery Investment Corporation, Liinitod.
DIRECTORS.
Sir W. HAMILTON DALEYMPLB, Bart., of North Berwick.
F ^ S^ ’’ } Directors of Parker’s Bursiem Brewery, Limited.
PERCY REID, Esq., of Messrs. Prior and Reid, Brewers, Hatfield.
*DCXCAN STEWART, Esq., Edinburgh and Loith Browing Compaoy.
'ARCHIBALD SMITH, Esq., Summerball Brewery, Edinburgh.
MANACINC DIRECTOR.
'M r. WILLIAM STEWART, late Managing Partner of tbe Edinburgh & Leith Brewing Company. 
*wai joia tiu Bmt* lOm  inm w
BANKERS.
T HE IlOYAL RANK OF SCOTLAND, 123, Sisiiopsgnie Street, London ; St. Andrew’s Square, 
Edinburgh; and Branches.
SOLICITORS.
Messrs. NICHOLSON, GRAHAM St GRAHAM, 24, Coleman Street, London, E.C.
Messrs. PH ILIP LAING St CO., 41, Charlotte Square, Edinburgh.
BROKERS.
Messrs. PANMuRE GORDON, HILL & CO., Hatton Court, Threadneedlo Street, London, B.C. 
.Messrs. JOHN ROBERTSON & CO., 31, Georgo Street, Edinburgh.
AUDITORS.
Messrs. J. R. ELLERMAN St CO., IS, Moorgalc Street, London, E.C.
Messrs. V, J. MONCRETFF <Ss HOltSBRTTGH, 4-C, Castlo Street, Kdinburgh.
SECRETARY (pmum.,
Mr. ¥ . G. BURT.
Tf.iijwuht Lomjon O fF im :—12, 1IOORGATE STREET, LONDON, E.C,
R eotsteeku Orncas:—BELL BREWERY, EDINBURGH.
PROSPECTUS.
::or. ;. e-;cEc:nj... 12 :.h?. erponge* Simula be effected, boLti of nroGoetis.i and
T - j  = r.rj n:’ r.« and hnvi su::;e*.f ;i>- -nv-v.d on 11 • -) the -.•rc-.-.-rA ::r ti
Figure 34. Edinburgh United Breweries prospectus for incorporation.
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A Century
£ ■ >  o fDervicePIONEERS in the Eastern Trade, the City Line Clippers o f a bygone age were notable examples of contemporary marine construction. 
Over a century ago, the City Line 
established regular sailings to and 
from the Orient and had already 
gained an outstanding reputation 
amongst Merchants for their relia­
bility and efficiency. This association 
with the Eastern Trade lias been 
constantly fostered during the past 
century which has seen the proud 
City Line Sailing Clippers eclipsed 
by the supremely efficient modern 
“Cities” , but the reputation for 
careful handling and safe delivery 
achieved in a past era has been 
maintained and enhanced.
1839 195-6
Today the City Line serve the United Kingdom, 
Continent and Hire with a fortnightly service 
whilst the Ellerman & Bucknall Line fort­
nightly “ Cities” link Ceylon with Canada and 
the U.S.A. Thus the Commercial Enterprise of 
the past, harnessed to a progressive policy, 
has combined to  strengthen and consolidate 
the “Cities” intimate association with Ceylon, 
its people and its trade.
ELLERMAN LINES
C IT Y  L I NE  E L L E R M A N  & BUCKNALL LI NE
C O L O M B O  A G E N T S : A IT K E N  S P E N C E  & C O . L T D ., P .O . BOX 5
r o f
Figure 35. City Line advertisement Times o f  Ceylon Annual 1956.
156
Appendix 3. Examples of JRE’s investment trusts {Burdett’s Official Intelligence 
1898, p. 1324).
Brewery and Commercial Investment Trust Ltd.
Directors: (1890)
J.R. Ellerman, (chairman), R. Monckton, M.W. Mattinson, (vice-chairman), A.E. Dibb, 
H.A. Haigh, F.G. Burt (secretary).
Registered June 1890 {Stock Exchange Official Intelligence 1902, p. 1324), object being to 
provide a medium for the investment of capital in brewery debentures, preference and 
ordinary shares, and in any other commercial undertakings. The authorised capital was 
£350,000, of which £90,860 was in preferred ordinary shares and included 100 Founder’s 
shares which receive 10 per cent of net profits when ordinary share dividend is 6 per cent 
or more.. Ellerman as chairman owned 5,859 (£58,950) ordinary shares and 94 Founder’s 
shares (£940). During 1899 the old 5 per cent debenture stock was converted into a 4 per 
cent stock. In 1900 the ordinary shares were converted into stock, viz 40 per cent 
cumulative preferred ordinary stock and 60 per cent deferred ordinary stock, the Founder’s 
shares being extinguished by converting each share into £25 (£2,250) of ordinary stock by 
a Private Act of Parliament. Report and balance sheet to stockholders only.
Authorised capital (1900): £350,000 of which £90,000 as 4 per cent Preferred Ordinary 
Sock and £150,000 Deferred Ordinary Stock issued. 4 per cent Debenture Stock of 
£110,000(1920).
Debenture Securities Investment Trust.
Registered 21st March 1896.
Directors:
J.R.E. Ellerman (chairman), M.W. Mattinson, QC, J. Aiokenhead, W.H. Alhusen, A.G. 
Beebe, A.K. Bibb, W. Glynn, V. Princep, F.E. Steed, F. Stroud, Secretary W.H. Mollett. 
Nominal capital £500,000 of which 30,000 ordinary shares and 20,000 preference shares 
both at £10 each. £400,000 of capital called up.
Investment in mortgages, mortgage debentures, debenture stocks or bonds. Maximum of 
2.5 per cent in one security; maximum 20 per cent in one country.
Dividends: 1897 Ordinary 5per cent; preference 4 per cent.
Figure 36. Examples of JRE’s investment trusts.
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Appendix 4. Companies of which JRE was a director from 1889-1901. ( Directory o f  
Directors for relevant years).
Year Number of directorships
1890
London General Investment Trust Ltd
United Discount & Securities Co Ltd 2
1891
Brewery & Commercial Investment Trust Ltd
United Discount & Securities Co Ltd
London General Investment Trust Ltd 3
1893
Brewery & Commercial Investment Trust Ltd 
United Discount & Securities Co Ltd 
London General Investment Trust Ltd 
G.H. Hammond & Co Ltd 
Mercantile & Debenture Agency Co Ltd 
Frederick Leyland Ltd
Indianapolis Breweries Ltd 7
1895
Brewery & Commercial Investment Trust Ltd 
United Discount & Securities Co Ltd 
London General Investment Trust Ltd 
G.H. Hammond & Co 
Frederick Leyland Ltd
Indianapolis Breweries Ltd 6
1896-97
Brewery & Commercial Investment Trust Ltd 
United Discount & Securities Co Ltd 
London General Investment Trust Ltd 
G.H. Hammond & Co
Table 2-1. JRE’s directorships 1887-1913.
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Year
1896-7 (continued)
Frederick Leyland Ltd 
Indianapolis Breweries Ltd 
American Breweries & General Securities Trust 
Debentures Securities Investment Co Ltd 
J.W. Cameron & Co Ltd
1899
Brewery & Commercial Investment Trust Ltd
United Discount & Securities Co Ltd
London General Investment Trust Ltd
G.H. Hammond & Co
Frederick Leyland Ltd
Indianapolis Breweries Ltd
American Breweries & General Securities Trust
Debentures Securities Investment Co Ltd
JAW. Cameron & Co Ltd
Wilson & Fumess-Leyland Line Ltd
Milwaukee & Chicago Breweries Ltd
1901
Brewery & Commercial Investment Trust Ltd
United Discount & Securities Co Ltd
London General Investment Trust Ltd
G.H. Hammond & Co
Frederick Leyland (1900) Ltd
American Breweries & General Securities Trust
Debentures Securities Investment Co Ltd
JAW. Cameron & Co Ltd
Wilson & Fumess-Leyland Line Ltd
Milwaukee & Chicago Breweries Ltd
Table 2-1 (continued)
Number of directorships
9
11
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Appendix 5. Ellerman Lines Limited Senior Staff and Conditions.
George J.C. Gill General Manager of Ellerman's Hall Line and so comparable
in status with W.S. Workman. 5 years at £2,100 per annum 
for 2.5 years and then £2,400 per annum. (Originally a 
partner in Sun Shipping before its incorporation as Hall Line 
Ltd when he was appointed a director).
5 years at £1,100 per annum. Joined Ellerman from Leylands 
as manager of the Mediterranean ships of Ellerman Line (ex- 
Leyland) and Papayanni Line.
appointed Assistant Manager Hall Line for 5 years from 1st 
September 1907. Starting salary from 1st June 1906 £600 
p.a. (Appointed director of Hall Line 1910).
5 years from 21st May 1906 at £600 p.a. (Originally General 
Manager of Papayanni Line now Assistant Manager to Fred 
Swift (Appointed director Hall Line 1910).
H Raeburn Mann Assistant Manager City Line Ltd: 5 years at £550 p.a.
Dalrymple Engineer Superintendent of Ellerman Lines Limited and
responsible for all ships and workshops:5 years at £675 per 
annum for first 2 years then £700 per annum 
Table 2-2. Ellerman Lines Limited senior staff and conditions.
From the above it will be seen that there is a great difference between the salaries of those 
who were 'professional managers' and G.C. Gill who had been a director of Hall Line. It is 
reasonable to assume that W.S. Workman was paid a salary at least equivalent to Gill.
Fred. Swift
MacAllister:
Graham Smith
Appendix 6. P.& O. Group Accounts 1922-31
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P. & O. ‘published net results’ compared with Deloitte’s calculation of profits which took 
into account depreciation at five per cent on cost, and excluded special credits and 
dividends and bonuses from subsidiaries. In 1931 Deloitte’s presented the real picture of 
the P. & O. accounts throughout the 1920s (Jones, 1989, p.202) by comparing the net 
published results with their own figures.
P. & 0. as stated by James Mackay, Lord Inchcape Deloitte
Published 
Net Result
Carried over Preference
shares
Deferred
Ordinary
Net result 
published
Year £ £ per cent per cent £
1922 696,600 101,700 5 12 125,506
1923 1,013,200 101,800 5 12 1,017,344
1924 1,346,900 101,000 5 12 137,003
1925 1,273,000 142,100 5 10 345,141
1926 1,196,000 133,000 5 10 - 306,237
1927 1,200,000 118,000 5 10 513,591
1928 1,200,000 121,000 5 12 371,437
1929 1,200,000 120,000 5 12 - 105,847
1930 1,165,000 115,000 5 10 916,730
1931 947,800 115,000 5 6 -830,817
TOTAL £11,309,971 £2,183,751
Figure 37. P&O accounts 1922-31. (Jones, 1989, p. 202).
Appendix 7. Royal Mail group and subsiduaries.
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Principle wholly owned subsidiaries.
10 shipping Groups 42 shipping companies
Non-shipping groups 6 engineering and shipbuilding
Investments in other companies:
Agencies 14
Brokerage 4
Cartage and Transport 6
Coaling and oil supply 30
Collieries 3
Hotel Office and Land 9
Investment 6
Lighterage, wharfage and boating 16
Oil storage etc 5
Photographic 9
Produce 5
Shipbuilding, steel, etc 7
Shipping 8
Miscellaneous 12
Table 2-3. RSMP group and subsiduaries 1929. (Green and Moss, 1982, p.216-222)
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Appendix 8. City Line balance sheet at take-over by JRE. 
The City Line Ltd Glasgow 
Balance Sheet at 1st August 1901 
Capital and Liabilities.
To Share Capital £ s d £ s d
Nominal Capital
75,000 Ordinary Shares at £10 each
Paid up Capital
40,000 Ordinary Shares at £10 each
Fully Paid 400,000 - -
To Debenture Account
Amount Outstanding 293,500 - -
Interest accrued to date 3,000 - - 296,500 - -
To Bills Payable 51,933 18 -
To Agents and Rebate A/cs
Due in Sundry Accounts 6029 19 11
To Current Voyages
Balance of Receipts & Outlays 16,259 17 5
To Current Voyages closing after date
Balance of Receipts & Outlays 14,083 14 11
To Insurance Fund Account
From last year 19942 3 5
“ Do. Profit & Loss A/c 20557 16 7
“ Voyage Accounts to date 5258 - 10
45758 - n r
Less Claim per “City of Edinburgh” 247 4 7 45,510 16 3
To Income Tax Account
Retained from Debenture Interest _________________ 26 2 3
To Reserve Account
From last years Profit 40,000 -
To Profit & Loss Account   115,513 13 5
985,858 2 7
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Appendix 8. City Line Balance sheets. 
Balance Sheet at 1st August 1901 
Preperty and Assets
£ s d £ s d
Bv Fleet of Steamers
Valued at 585,000 - -
Deduct Price of Steamers sold
“City of Calcutta” £13,300 - -
“Citv of Dublin” £32.150 1 s 1 d 45.450 1 1
539,549 18 11
Add Cost of New Steamers
“Citv of Madrid” £75.926 - -
“Citv of Delhi” £70,220 10s -
“Citv of Athens” £90.926 4s5d 237,072 14 5
Bv Instalments paid on steamers building 27.186 15 8 803,809 9 -
Bv Advances in anticipation of Instalments 2,135 17 9
Bv Crane Account
Cranes & Stevedoring Paid 1,145 8 4
Less charged to Earnings A/c 35 8 4 1,110 - -
Bv Insurance Account
Unexhausted Premiums 4.995 1 5
Bv George Smith & Sons
Balance of Current Account 113,726 14 9
Bv Cash
Cash on Hand 1.722 2 3
At London & Westminster Bank in
a/c in George Smith & Son’s name 214 4 6
In National Bank of Scotland Ltd 930 18 9
Do Do Do No 3 A/c 118 4 3 2,958 9 9
Bv Loans
Agaist Securities Deposited 50,000 - -
Bv Bills Receivable on Hand 6,659 14 6
Bv Rebates on Bills Discounted 435 15 -
985,858 2 2
Figure 38. City Line accounts 1901.
BLANK
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Appendix 8 (continued)
Profit and Loss Account (City Line Ltd) 
1 st January to 31 st May 1908
To Interest
Paid and accrued on Debentures 
Paid on Sir John Ellerman’s Loan 
Accrued on Bank Account 
Paid on Agents’ Accounts 
Discounting Bills Receivable 
Commission on Country Cheques 
Received for London Cheques &c 
Do Discount Coal Accounts
To Debenture Stamp a/c 
To Office Expenses a/c
To Crane Working a/c
To Special Survey of 
“City of Perth” Balance
To Depreciation a/c
To Balance to Balance Sheet
s d
1934 16 10
789 18 4
420 15 5
353 19 11
145 18 4
15 15 5
35
25
3361 4 3
60 7 8
3600 16 7
2810 13 4
102 11 10
820 19 0
12500 0 0
5108 19 11
2
2808
12 6
10
24,963 18 8
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Appendix 8 (continued). City Line Ltd Balance Sheet on incorporation as private 
limited company.
Profit and Loss Account (City Line Ltd)
1 st January to 31 st May 1908
Bv Balance of Profit per Steamers 
Vovage Accounts after deducting 
Management Allowances and 
General Charges against Steamers 20598
Bv Management Fees A/c 3475
Bv Commission on Freights and 
Passage Money 3778
By Stevedoring a/c 587
24,963
Figure 39. City Line accounts 1908.
Appendix 9. Tables.
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Name of Steamship Value £ Year Built Tonnage
City o f Canterbury 40,000 1875 3416
City o f Venice 36500 1875 3372
City o f London 27500 1876 3212
City o f Edinburgh 33500 1876 3230
City o f Khios 45000 1878 3246
City o f Agra 45000 1879 3274
City o f Calcutta 35000 1881 3836
City o f Oxford 60000 1882 3959
City o f Cambridge 37500 1882 3780
City o f Bombay 60000 1885 4490
City o f Dublin 45000 1887 3260
City o f Vienna 85000 1889 4460
City o f Dundee 50000 1890 3427
City o f Perth 50000 1890 3427
Totals 650000 50389
Table 2-4. City Line steamships transferred to Debenture Trustees 1891.
SHIPYARD 1902-4 1905-7 1908-10 1911-13 1914-16 TOTAL
Barclay Curie 1 0 2 3 1 7
Craig Taylor 0 0 0 1 1 2
Earle 0 0 1 3 4 8
Wm Gray 0 0 0 1 13 14
Harkess 0 0 1 3 2 6
Palmers 1 7 2 7 4 21
Ramage Ferguson 0 0 0 2 1 3
Swan Hunter 2 3 2 3 2 12
Workman Clark 3 4 0 3 1 11
TOTAL 7 14 8 26 29 84
Table 2-5. ELL ships built 1902-16.
Note: Data for 1916 collated before the take over of Wilson Line
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.Appendix 9 Tables (continued).
Name Disposal Year Name Disposal Year
Pinemore Leyland 1902 City o f Dundee lost 1909
Albanian Leyland 1902 Sardinia lost 1909
Aimer ian Leyland 1902 Ararat sold 1909
Cedardene wrecked 1902 Andalusian sold 1909
Lesbian sold 1903 Aston Hall sold JRE 1909
Egyptian sold 1903 Eden Hall sold JRE 1909
Aga Sofia sold 1903 Aston Hall lost 1909
Plantain sold 1903 Douro lost 1909
Hardwick Hall wrecked 1904 Gaston lost 1909
Prome Hall Line 1904 Arcadian lost 1910
Tenedos sold 1904 City o f Calcutta City Line 1910
Roumelia sold 1905 City o f Colombo lost 1910
Athenian sold 1905 Falemian sold 1911
Plymothian wrecked 1906 Algerian sold 1911
Net her by Hall Glenaim 1905 Flaminian sold 1912
Branksome Hall Glenavon 1906 City o f Corinth sold 1912
City o f Cork sold 1907 Minho Closed 1912
Avon sold 1907 Flavian sold 1912
Orestes sold 1907 Barcelona lost 1913
Alsatian sold AM 1907 Egyptian lost 1913
City o f Amsterdam sold AM 1907 Haddon Hall lost 13
Methley Hall sold 1908 Italian sold 1913
City o f Bombay sold 1908 City o f Vienna sold 1913
Croxteth Hall sold 1913
Table 2-6. Ships sold or lost 1901-1913.
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Appendix 9 Tables (continued)
J. R. Ellerman Personal 1902 1904 1997 1912 1913
Preference shares 18547 23111 22358 22456 23308
Ordinary shares 27048 34757 35770 35770 35875
Bank holdings as security
Preference shares 2000 3000 3000 3000 0
Ordinary shares 5500 6150 6150 6150 0
Ellerman’s colleagues
Preference shares 13461 13300 12820 12462 12302
Ordinary shares 8550 8675 7395 7425 7373
Ellerman’s institutions
Preference shares 5282 6105 8391 7973 12169
Ordinary shares 3242 3517 3497 6618 10973
Public subscription
Preference shares 42992 31000 31000 30000 30000
Ordinary shares 13378 10385 9619 8147 8000
Table 2-7. Shareholdings in Ellerman Lines Ltd 1902-13.
Compiled from UGD131/1/2/1 Ellerman Lines Ltd Share Register, 1901-1913.
Totals do not include Ellerman's 100 Management shares which gave a dividend of 10% of 
net earnings when the Ordinary dividend exceeded 6%. These shares had a nominal value 
of £1 each, so would have made little difference to the totals, particularly as they carried 
only one vote each. It could be argued that in terms of value, each represented £10 worth 
of votes - the price of one ordinary share!
The bank holding the shares was the London, City and Midland Bank of Threadneedle 
Street. The first 2000 shares were from the original allotment, and all were sold in 
February 1912.
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.Appendix 9 Tables (continued).
Bucknall S.S. Original Capital
Ordinary Shares (£10) £850,000
5.5% Cum. Preference Shares (£10) £650,000
Un-issued Ordinary Shares (£10) £150,000
Nominal Capital £1,650,000
Bucknall Shareholdings Dec. 1906 Changes in Share Values
5.5% Cum. Preference Shares (£10) £650,000 Unchanged
Odinary Shares reduced to £1 £85,000 £9 written off.
Ordinary Shares (£10) £150,000 Unissued
Nominal Capital £885,000
Bucknall Shareholdings Dec. 1908 Changes in Share Values
Shares issued and paid up: Capital
Preference Shares (£10) £8 written off.
Ordinary Shares (£1) 15s written off.
First Preference Shares (£2) £80,000 Old £10 preference.
Second Preference Shares (£2) £21,250 Eight 5s old ordinary
Management Shares (£1) £1,000 New issue to Ellerman.
Total Capital £102,250
Table 2-8. Bucknall’s capital re-organisation.
In 1908 the Bucknall Agreement with J.R. Ellerman was agreed because interest on 
Cumulative Preference shares was difficult to provide, dividends were passed and the 
obligations under the Trust Deed for £60,000 per annum for interest and amortization of 
Debentures could not be fulfilled. J.R. Ellerman advanced sufficient funds to meet 
outstanding liabilities.
The Terms of Agreement transferred management to Ellerman and also changed 
the Articles of Association, removing any requirement for directors to hold shares in the 
company.
Total liabilities exceeded £1,000,000; Ellerman paid off the debentures, bought in 
the Cumulative Preference shares, and acquired all the ordinary shares. When Ellerman 
Lines Limited increased its capital to £3,700,000 in 1913 the shareholdings were 
restructured and outstanding Bucknall debentures were retired in exchange for Ellerman 
Lines’ Limited preference shares.
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Appendix 11. Hall Line Papers (continued).
Extracts From Hall Line Ltd Directors’ Minute Book.
11th October 1899
22nd May 1901
October 1901
November 1904 
May 1908
March 1910 
December 1918 
December 1920
First Meeting - Directors: Robert Alexander, Mervyn K. King,
James Henry Beazley, George J. C Gill, Frederick Alexander,
William Henry Nicholson.
Balance after interest on Debenture bonds and Preference shares 
£53,788. Ordinary dividend of 20per cent equal to 26per 
cent per annum. Carried forward £33,788. Auditors Harwood 
Banner - fee 100 guineas.
Balance after interest on Debenture bonds and Preference shares 
£127.686. Ordinary dividend of 20 per cent per annum.
£10,000 to ‘special reserve fund’. Auditors Harwood Banner - fee 
100 guineas.
EGM Moorgate Street. Present: M.W. Mattinson. Val c. Prinsep, F. 
G.Burt, Arthur Norman Hill (Solicitor) J.R. Ellerman.
M.W. Mattinson in chair. The Resolution of 22nd May 1901 
transferring £10,000 to ‘Special Reserve Fund’ cancelled.
Balance after deducting amount written off steamers and dividends 
on Preference and Ordinary shares £27,051. Preference dividend @ 
6 per cent £2,000; Ordinary dividend @ 24.5 per cent £24,500.
Final Balance £551. Robert Alexander resigned as chairman and 
was replaced by John Reeves Ellerman.
Prome bought from Ellerman Lines Limited for £25,000.
EGM. Articles of Association Altered and Amended (Act of 1907) 
to form Private Limited Company.
Harry Herbert M’Allester and Fred Swift elected Directors.
Loss of 4 steamers - 3 Enemy action; 1 Marine Hazard.
2 Prizes - ex-German: Arensky re-named Knowsley Hall; Santa Cruz 
re-named Merton Hall.
Table 2-12. Extracts from Hall Line directors’ minute book.
Appendix 11. Hall Line Papers (continued)
December 1922 
December 1923 
March 1924 
December 1925 
October 1929
November 1930 
September 1931
October 1933
Worsley Hall sold.
Investment in Montgomerie and Workman (1920) Ltd.
City o f Newcastle purchased from City of Oran Steamship Co Ltd. 
“Pyro” Steam Float Co Ltd (T.J.May & Co).
Writing down investments. Stanley Hall sold to Alloa scrapyard. 
Knowsley Hall sold to J.N. Elphinstone for £14,500 - £5000 cash 
and 3 years at 6 months + 6.5 per cent.
Crewe Hall sold for £9,750.
Branksome Hall and City o f Salford laid up from September 1930 
to date.
3 steamers laid up. Death of SIR JOHN ELLERMAN.
Table 2.12 (continued). Extracts from Hall Line directors’ minute book.
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Appendix 11. Hall Line Papers (continued)
Extracts from Hall Line Share Register UGD131/6/2/1
Total capital £180,000 in £10 Ordinary shares;
26,000 in Preference shares.
October 1901 Robert Alexander transferred shares to: J.R.Ellerman 500
M.W. Mattinson 150
F.G. Burt 100
V.C. Prinsep 249
Ellerman Lines Ltd 1
Solicitors Hill & Dickinson: Jointly J. Dickinson & A.N. Hill 2264
Total: 3,265
August 1902 Ellerman Lines Ltd 8,998
W.H. Mollet* 1
* All dividends etc to Ellerman Lines Ltd.
Total 12,266
Note: Nominal capital £206,000 against £122,660 issued. 
Table 2-13. Hall Line Ltd extracts from share register.
Appendix 12. Correspondence between Sir John Reeves Ellerman and Sir Percy Bates of 
Cunard.
Letter from Ellerman to Sir Percy Bates dated 31 st January 1929.
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Figure 46. JRE’s personal letter to Sir Percy Bates o f Cunard January 1929.
Appendix 12 (continued)
Memorandum from Sir Percy Bates 27th November, 1929.
(Confidential and personal.)
27th November, 1929.
MEMORANDUM.
As requested by the Chairman, I called yesterday to see 
Sir John Ellerman. Sir John opened the conversation by referring 
to the unintentional breach of Conference regulations recently 
admitted by Messrs Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank. and explained that he 
had put into the waste-paper basket a very hot draft submitted by 
his office for his signature. I thanked him for having taken up 
the matter with me personally, and he said that should any similar 
instance recur he would have no hesitation in adopting the same course.
From that Sir John passed to the consideration of the Calcutta/ 
New York trade. He said that in his opinion the financial trouble 
in America had gone very deep indeed and would be likely to affect 
seriously the volume of America’s general imports. In these 
circumstances he thought that the present would be an opportune time 
for considering a general reduction in sailings between Calcutta and 
New York, and he thought further that it might be a good opportunity 
to try and reduce the Roosevelt interest in the trade. I told him 
that while doubtless Messrs Brocklebank would be guided by common 
prudence as soon as any serious shortage of cargo had in fact developed, 
I thought they would prefer to see matters go considerably further 
before agreeing to any reduction in sailings. I added that there were 
apparently two schools of thought with regard to the American situation; 
one was his own and if that was correct I admitted that the position 
might become serious; and two, the view that this financial trouble was
Figure 47. Copy of memorandum by Sir Percy Bates 27th November, 1929.
Appendix 12 (continued)
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merely a spasm which, while acute at the time, would nevertheless 
leave the consuming power of the American nation practically 
unimpaired. I explained that I had had some discussion with 
Mr. McKenna on the subject last week and Mr. McKenna’s personal 
view was distinctly in favour of the latter. The subject then 
dropped, Sir John asking that consideration should be given to 
his views and added that he also would consider what I had said. 
From that subject Sir John passed to the consideration 
of the outward trade to Calcutta, in which he thought a good deal 
too much tonnage was employed. He thought that everybody would 
make more money on fewer sailings and urged with considerable 
force that consideration be given to this. I listened to 
all that Sir John had to say and promised to bring it to the notice 
of the Managers. I did not hold out any hope of anything, 
however, and told him that so far as I could see, the volume of 
tonnage being sent out by Brocklebanks generally bore some relation 
to the amount of their commitments home and that I disliked the 
policy of chartering more ships than could be avoided. Sir John 
remarked that we were too timid and added that an altered policy 
would make much more money.
Figure 47. (continued). .
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I then got a chance to mention the real object of my 
visit, namely, the Bombay Agency of the Ellerman Line. I 
explained to Sir John that my own firm had held that agency ever 
since the inauguration of Hall Line, away back in the last 
century and that for nearly 30 years I had carried it on for him.
As he knew, I had carried it on through the agency of Messrs. 
Killick, Nixon and Coy., my own office there having been closed 
since the late nineties. I then informed him that I had received 
a polite as possible intimation from Messrs. Killick, Nixon and Co. 
that they thought it was about time that Messrs. Edward Bates & 
Sons laded out of the picture, that my present agreement with 
Messrs. Killick, Nixon & Co. terminated at the end of next year, 
and that after considering all that Killick, Nixon & Co. had said,
I had come to the conclusion that I was unable practically to 
combat their arguments. I then proceeded to thank Sir John for 
having entrusted us for over 29 years with the work of his steamers 
and to express my regret that the connection would in all probability 
come to an end with the close of 1930. Sir John expressed great 
concern at the prospect of such a very old link being severed and 
urged me to reconsider the point, even if it only meant retaining 
the name on the notepaper.
Sir John proceeded to talk generally about Agents and in 
the course of his remarks it became apparent that while at one time 
Figure 47. (Continued).
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he might have ben willing to resume his relationship with Messrs. 
Graham in Calcutta, the passing of time had magnified his original 
grievance against that firm, and it appeared to me very improbable 
that any shift of the Ellerman Agency to Grahams could be effected.
I think during the years that have elapsed since Sir John gave 
notice to Grahams in Calcutta, he has been building up in his own 
mind a species of justification for his actionin dismissing them.
At the time it would be remembered his action appeared to us to be 
harsh and unreasonable. I told Sir John that I had said nothing 
yet to Killick, Nixon & Co., feeling that I owed him the courtesy of 
a personal call and the intimation that was in and said 
that in view of his remarks I would reconsider the thing in 
Liverpool and advise him in due course as to what was agreed. Sir 
John repeated his great concern at the breaking of 
such a very old connection.
Before leaving, I referred to the Anchor Line and said that 
that Company was engaged in considering the building of new tonnage 
for its Bombay service. I remarked that it is not the easiest 
trade in the world to build for and said that I had the Chairman’s 
authority for mentioning that the Company would not be averse to 
considering any suggestions which Sir John might care to make by 
which both his Company and the Anchor Line might make more money 
in that trade. Sir John expressed some concern with regard to the 
present state of the Bombay trade. He agreed that it was difficult 
and admitted he was not doing well in it. He said he would like to 
Figure 47. (Continued).
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turn the matter over in his mind, but I can see that his mind 
will run naturally to a consideration of all three trades 
together, and it will only be with difficulty that we shall get 
him to dwell on the trade we are most concerned to adjust.
I should like to add that Sir John looked considerably better 
health that when I saw him last. He was a much better colour and 
very much more alert; part of the change is no doubt due to the 
improved health of Lady Ellerman, whom he described as on what 
he thought was a firm road to recovery.
Figure 47. (Continued).
(sgd.) Percy E. Bates.
Appendix 13. Ellerman fleets tonnage growth from 1905 to 1921. {Fairplay, 2,000th 
issue, 8th September, 1921)
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Figure 48. Illustration o f ELL’s development from original shipowners and companies.
Measurement is in deadweight tons which corresponds to weight o f cargo able 
to be carried after deducting weight o f ship, fuel, stores and crew etc.
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GLOSSARY
Agent, Agency
ballast
Bart; bart.
BISN
BOT
CA
cap-tally
Certificates of Competency 
CH
charter market
charterer
Conference
counter stem
cruiser stem
deep-sea
displacement
dry ship
Individual or firm providing facilities to shipowners 
who do not have their own agency in the port; this 
includes crew changes, cash disbursements, 
arranging Customs entering and clearing formalities; 
payment for port dues, stores, provisions etc.
Materials, solid or liquid, carried solely for purposes 
of stability or to immerse the propellor sufficiently.
Baronet.
British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.
Board of Trade - originally responsible for merchant 
shipping.
Chartered Accountant.
Ribbon on seaman’s cap with ship’s name printed on.
Statutory BOT examinations for merchant navy deck 
and engineer officers.
Companion of Honour.
Place where shipowners and shippers fix charters. In 
London the Baltic Exchange is the major market.
A person who hires a ship.
Any type of formal or informal agreement between 
shipowners which restricts competition.
Also known as ‘duckbill’ stem; lies wholly above 
water.
Rounded stem extending into water, lengthening 
waterline and improving propulsion efficiency.
Ocean going, Atlantic, Pacific and south or east 
beyond Mediterranean.
Volume of water displaced by total weight of vessel. 
Light displacement no cargo, stores, fuel etc..
Vessel with no alcoholic beverages allowed on board 
either for passengers or crew, in port or at sea.
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dwt
ELDB
ELL
flag
Free Trade 
grt
house flag
IMM
in-house
JRE
lascar
LCMB
liner
LLOS
loadline
LMCBLvB 
managing owner
Deadweight tons; weight in long tons of ship, cargo, 
fuel, stores etc. which a vessel is able to carry at the 
applicable loadline.
Ellerman Lines directors’ minte book.
Ellerman Lines Limited.
Flag or ensign of country in which ship is registered; 
used to describe nationality of ships.
Removal or reduction in tariff barriers between 
countries.
Gross registered tons; measure of ship’s size based 
on cubic capacity of permanently enclosed spaces. 
100 cubic feet to 1 long ton equals 1 gross ton.
Flag with company emblem or other markings.
International Mercantile Marine.
Goods or services produced for firm’s own use.
Sir John Reeves Ellerman.
Native seaman; specifically from Indian sub­
continent.
London City and Midland Bank.
Passenger or cargo vessel providing regular services 
on scheduled routes.
London, Liverpool and Ocean Steamship Co. Ltd.
Permanent mark on ship’s side showing the 
maximum depth to which vessel may be immersed.
London and Midland Counties Bank (Liverpool).
One who manages ships in which he/she has an 
interest.
master
MP
Legal term for captain of merchant ship. 
Member of Parliament.
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Night Order Book
nominee
nrt
NSWB
OP
P&O
paragraph ship
PAX
pennant
port dues
RMSP
Ro-Ro
SE
short-sea
single ship limited company 
sixty fourthers
Master’s signed instructions each night to 
watchkeepers on Middle and Forenoon watches 
(midnight to 08.00).
Director or shareholder acting on behalf of a 
principal who may not wish to be known.
Net registered tons denote size of vessel derived 
from deducting spaces for crew, propelling 
machinery and fuel.
North and South Wales Bank.
Owen Philipps, Lord Kylsant.
Peninsular and Orient Steamship Co.
A ship designed to carry the maximum deadweight 
compatible with not exceeding gross registered 
tonnage at which extra manning and safety equipment 
must be carried.
Passengers and all applying to them.
Triangular flag used in signalling, to denote 
commodore or as additional to house flag.
Charges by local administration for lights, buoyage, 
pilotage and other ancillary services of a port.
Royal Mail Steam Packet Co.
Roll-on Roll-off vessel operating primarily as a 
vehicular ferry on which vehickles are loaded or 
unloaded by means of ramp.
Soth Eastern
Coastal and European trade including Baltic, 
Mediterranean and Black Sea.
Intended to reduce tax and also to limit owner’s 
liability to one vessel rather than the whole fleet in 
circumstances leading to detention of a ship.
Owners of 64th shares each representing 1/64 of 
value of ship. May be multiple ownership of single 
shares, or single ownership of multiple shares.
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SN Steam Navigation.
SSA Shaw Saville and Albion Co.
stagging Buying or taking option on shares at or before issue
expecting to sell at a premium once the market 
opens.
swap Exchange - frequently used of shares used in
takeovers instead of cash.
tramp Dry cargo ship not used on regular service but
employed on charter voyages for either a fixrd cargo 
or a fixed period of time.
UGD University of Glasgow Archives document.
USA United States of America.
well deck Portion of hull between castles or islands and about 7
feet to 8 feet lower.
W/T Wireless Telegraphy.
WFL Wilson and Fumess-Leyland Line.
WIPS West India and Pacific Steam Ship Co. Ltd.
WL Westcott and Laurence Line.
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City Line Ltd Directors’ Minute Book 1892-1969.
City Line Ltd General Minute Book 1893-1969.
Calcutta steam trade conference 1892-1903.
Memorandum and articles of association 1892, City Line Ltd.. 
Agreement between City Line Ltd and Debenture Trustees. 
Montgomerie and Workman Agreements.
Correspondence between Sir John Ellerman and the manager of the 
City Line Ltd.
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E.R. Newman of Hall Line.
Sir John Ellerman’s Notebooks 1911-1932.
City Line Ltd Share transfer journal.
Sir John Ellerman’s general notebooks 1911-1917.
Sir John Ellerman’s general notebooks 1915-1932.
Sir John Ellerman’s general notebooks 1926-1929.
Sir John Ellerman’s general notebooks 1929-1946.
George Smith & Sons private ledger.
George Smith and Sons Abstract of voyage accounts 1888-1892. 
City Line Ltd Profit and loss account 1893-1899.
City Line Balance Sheet August 1901.
City Line Ltd Profit and loss account and balance sheet 1908 
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Ellerman Lines Share Register 1913-1935.
Ellerman Lines Ltd ShareAllotment Book n.d..
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Ellerman’s Arracan Rice and Trading Co Ltd minutes.
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Montgomerie and Workman Ltd Agreements
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EUB2/1 /1 Prospectus for flotation of Edinburgh United Breweries.
PRIVATE COLLECTION; contact through Merseyside Maritime Museum, Liverpool.
Ellerman letter to Sir Percy Bates, Davies, H.(1999).
Sir Percy Bates memorandum, Davies, H.(1999).
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Shipping Registers consulted including:
Sailing ships
Steam ships
Register No. Folio No. Name of ship
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XVIII 59 City o f Madras (1882
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